

Filed by 4874
AUG 22 1949

The Jewish Agency for Palestine

2210 Massachusetts Ave., N. W.
WASHINGTON 5, D. C.
ADAMS 5411

May 14, 1948

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to notify you that the state of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic within frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution of November 29, 1947, and that a provisional government has been charged to assume the rights and duties of government for preserving law and order within the boundaries of Israel, for defending the state against external aggression, and for discharging the obligations of Israel to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law. The Act of Independence will become effective at one minute after six o'clock on the evening of 14 May 1948, Washington time.

With full knowledge of the deep bond of sympathy which has existed and has been strengthened over the past thirty years between the Government of the United States and the Jewish people of Palestine, I have been authorized by the provisional government of the new state to tender this message and to express the hope that your government will recognize and will welcome Israel into the community of nations.

Very respectfully yours,

Eliahu Epstein

Eliahu Epstein, Agent
Provisional Government of Israel

ce/nf

B. File

4. The confidential report by the Economist may throw light on the financial moves by the British which strengthen the Jewish State, as well as on their currying of favor with the Jewish Army. It is possible that the British see eye to eye with Dr. Weizmann in the view that he has privately expressed that a strong Jewish State is going to be the only true bastion against the Bolsheviks in the Middle East.

B. File

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FROM DR. CHAIM WEIZMANN, PRESIDENT OF THE STATE COUNCIL
OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

X
"We are deeply perturbed by reports and indications that Britain is using pressure on Egypt with a view to preventing her from entering into armistice and peace negotiations with Israel, in order to assure that peace between the Arab states and Israel is made on Britain's terms or not at all. By taking this line, Mr. Bevin again assumes direct responsibility for maintaining the Middle East in turmoil and wrecking the efforts of the United States of America and ourselves to achieve peace.

"In deference to United States representations and because of our sincere desire to facilitate a peace settlement, we gave up important strategic positions which we had occupied while driving out the invaders before the cease-fire became effective, and withdrew all our forces without exception to the Palestine side of the Egyptian border without insisting on a similar Egyptian withdrawal from the Palestine territory which they had occupied as aggressors.

"We should urgently suggest that the United States Government at this crucial juncture use its good offices with the United Kingdom Government, prevailing upon it to desist from its present course which can only lead to the perpetuation of strife, further misery, and even worse.

Chaim Weizmann"

Tel Aviv, Israel
January 11, 1949

B. Fi

מדינת ישראל
הממשלה הזמנית
STATE OF ISRAEL
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

5th November, 1948

Honourable Harry S. Truman,
President of the United States of America,
White House,
Washington.



Dear Mr. President,

Permit me to extend to you most hearty congratulations and good wishes on your re-election. We in this country have been watching the progress of the Presidential contest with bated breath and I am sure that I am speaking the mind of the bulk of my people when I say that we feel deeply thankful that the people of the United States have given you the opportunity of shaping the policies of your country and the affairs of humanity at large during the next critical four years. We interpret their vote as an emphatic endorsement of the policy of peace, security and ordered progress in world affairs for which you have stood since you assumed your high office and for the continued prosecution of which men and women in every part of the globe pray with all their hearts. May you be granted health and strength to carry out your noble purpose.

We have special cause to be gratified at your re-election because we are mindful of the enlightened help which you gave to our cause in these years of our struggle. We particularly remember your unflinching advocacy of the admission of Jewish refugees to Palestine, your determined stand against the attempts to deflect you from your course, your staunch support of our admission to statehood at Lake Success, and your recognition of the fact of its establishment within an hour of our proclamation of independence. We pray that your assistance and guidance may be extended to us also in the coming years. We have succeeded in the past twelve months in defending our independence against enemies from every quarter - north, south and east, as in Biblical times - and in setting up the framework of our State. Enemy armies are still on the borders of our country, maintained there, I regret to say, by the vacillating attitude of the United Nations which have imposed a truce that is becoming ever more, not a forerunner of peace, but an instrument of war. Our essential aim is peace and reconstruction. While the eyes of the world have been turned on to the battlefields in the south and the north, we have succeeded in liquidating one refugee camp after another in Europe and bringing the chance of a new life to thousands of ruined men and women whom the world has all but forgotten. We have brought over 62,000 since we attained independence. To develop this great effort at human rehabilitation we need, above all, three things: first peace; second recognition; and third financial and economic support for the execution of those large projects of agricultural

and industrial development which are essential for the absorption of newcomers and the economic progress of the country.

The most important requirement at this moment is that this unreal and untenable truce be brought to an end and be supplanted by a speedy and enduring peace. Over two months ago we asked the Mediator to call both sides to the conference table, but the other side rejected our offer. We have no aggressive designs against anyone and we are at any moment ready to negotiate a peace settlement. Our enemies have failed in their efforts to beat us by brute force although they outnumbered us by 20 to 1. They are now endeavouring through the medium of the Security Council to undermine the decision taken by the General Assembly last November and to deprive us of the undeveloped areas of the Negev which offer space for new homes for many thousands of our uprooted people, and which will remain a desert land if they are annexed by the neighbouring Arab States, as is evidently intended. This is the real purpose behind the Security Council's Resolution introduced by Great Britain which to my deep regret was supported by the American Delegation. We have no choice but to oppose this design which would destroy last November's decision of the General Assembly and would reduce us to a state of permanent insecurity and vulnerability.

I pray with all my heart that you, Mr. President, may use your high authority to put an end to these hostile manoeuvres. We have successfully withstood the onslaught of the Arab States, who were sent against us by the British, almost like a pack of hired assassins. I am saying this with deep pain because I have throughout my life been deeply attached to Great Britain and have suffered for that attachment. But the evidence unfortunately all points in this direction, and even as I write we are receiving constant reports of Great Britain rearming the Arabs to enable them to re-start hostilities against us. Having failed in her efforts to wipe out our young commonwealth, she now appears bent on detaching the Negev from our State. I feel emboldened to ask for your intervention in this matter, remembering the deep sympathy and understanding which you displayed when I had the privilege of stating to you our case on the Negev and displaying to you maps showing its potentialities for settlement. It was with a deep feeling of elation that I left you on that day and it is this which now encourages me to plead for your intervention to prevent this part of the country, which was allotted to us last November, from being detached from our State. Sheer necessity compels us to cling to the Negev. Our pioneers have done yeoman work in opening up this semi-arid country; they have built pipe lines through the desert, set up agricultural settlements, planted gardens and orchards

B File

Honorable Harry S. Truman

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5.11.48

in what was for many centuries a barren land. They will not give up this land unless they are bodily removed from it.

I venture to hope that clear and firm instructions be issued on this vital matter to the American Delegation in Paris which has of late, apparently, not received directives corresponding to the views which, I know, you hold on the subject. I would further plead that you may find it possible to direct the competent authorities to enable us to secure that long-term financial assistance which is urgently needed for the execution of the great scheme of reconstruction which I had the privilege of submitting to you in the Summer.

With every good wish,

Sincerely yours,



A. T. Wetzman



B. File

Filed by WJH
AUG 22 1949
May 25, 1948
Palestine

THE BRITISH AND MR. BEVIN

Bevin's stand on Palestine is being criticized in England from many quarters and in growing volume.

The Manchester Guardian today says editorially that the foreign office arguments are "childish" and that on Palestine Mr. Bevin suffers from "obsessions".

Attached are three issues of the London Times published within the last few days - May 21, 21 and 22.

Two of the issues have letters from Members of Parliament and one has a letter from an Englishman who was in Palestine within the week prior to May 15.

1. Letter from Major Lyall Wilkes of the House of Commons:

Major Wilkes quotes General Glubb Pasha, writing in 1944, that all the Arabs trained by the British deserted during World War II. Major Wilkes states that British G.H.Q. recognized during the war that Hagana was the only reliable support of the Allies in the Middle East.

2. Letter from John Connell condemns the use of an English General to direct the bombardment of the Holy City, as "this ultimate dishonor."

3. Letter from Robert Boothby of the House of Commons demands the recall of all British officers from the Arab Army.

4. There have been previous condemnations of British policy, e.g., the letter to the London Times from Amery of the House of Commons holds Bevin responsible for the destruction in Palestine.

STATE OF ISRAEL
MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

G. F.
*State
Palestine*

No. 5765

January 12, 1949

My dear Mr. Connelly:

I have the honor to convey to the President the
enclosed message from Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of
the State Council of the Provisional Government of Israel.

Sincerely yours,

W. Reptin

Special Representative

Mr. Matthew J. Connelly
The White House
Washington, D. C.

x State Dept.

B Fi

April 8th, 1948.

Foreign Report

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Middle East Morass

If the Russians are checked in Europe during the next few months, they are likely to redouble their efforts in the Middle East. We have just received the following candid account of the state of that area from one of our correspondents there.

The whole belt of countries along the underbelly of Russia, our correspondent writes, is in a political mess that beggars description. Their leaders will not heave themselves out of it because (a) they do not think beyond the popular yell of the moment, and (b) there is no impulse to pull up their socks and resist Communism. On the one hand, the pashas are blinded by avarice to the evils of privilege, and on the other the poor could not be worse off than they are. The position in all the Middle East countries—most marked in Egypt and least in Iraq—is as follows.

A. The government in power consists of rich and elderly men who cannot keep in unless they produce circuses. The best rallying cry is "Down with the foreigner."

B. The Russians do not need to combat this cry because they are so largely invisible. They are in fact fomenting nationalism, because it helps to cut the countries' established links with the West. They do not do much of this themselves; the spade-work falls to the Yugoslav legations (which are chiefly staffed with Moslems).

C. The men in power have no other means of attracting popular support than by lambasting the foreigner because, although they talk a lot about attractive social programmes, they do little since:

1. They are entirely taken up with outbidding one another in the fanaticism that pleases the crowd, in order to keep office—a money-making affair.
2. They are wholly unwilling to lose popularity with their friends and relations by imposing the first requisite of social reform, which is some curtailment of the endless privileges of the rich.
3. They are sunk in corruption which has grown much worse with the war, when enormous sums were there for the making. Saudi Arabia, always imagined to be so pure, is no exception. A site for a new port

B File

PALESTINE

1. The United States should recognize the fact that the Jewish State will be proclaimed May 15th or 16th. No position should be taken between now and then which commits the United States to oppose such a State or which would encourage the Arab States to seek to overthrow it. In other words we must be very careful not to substitute ourselves for the British as opponents of Jewish aspirations for independence.
2. It is probable that the Arabs will also proclaim an Arab State for all of Palestine on May 15 or 16.
3. Since trusteeship will not be accepted by the General Assembly, the United States should guard against committing itself to any new plan which is inconsistent with the actual existence of a Jewish State on May 16th. This situation will not only include the proclamation of the Jewish State but the reality of the partition of Palestine, as the British statement yesterday in the Political Committee seemed to recognize.
4. The United States should make known publicly before the Security Council and otherwise that the use of force by the Arab States against the November 29th Resolution constitutes a violation of the Charter and threatens world peace. Our failure to do this contributes to the continuation of such threats. Clarification of our position in this respect is needed. This would not be a commitment by the United States to use armed force to prevent aggression. Other means would be available to the United Nations

BBFile

of the Russians, and would be turning themselves into targets for them. The only young people to whom the British appeal successfully are the tiny minority who have been sent to England by the British Council.

Force is always needed to back goodwill in the East. And friends of the West are clear that this must be maintained, if only by the less obvious means, such as visitors in mufti, employees engaged by local armies and so on. It has been pointed out that a good example of the local respect for force is that newspapers, xenophobes and student crowds revile and cheek the West, but never Stalin. It is the devil you placate. Hitler was not taunted either, till after 1943.

CROSSROADS OF THE WORLD

The Middle East presents a vast belt of people open to invasion without effort—except at any point in or near Turkey (see the last issue of FOREIGN REPORT). Having pillowed their heads on Allah for 1,300 years, these people have lost the power of thinking in any terms other than those of the moment. Yet they sit on a crossroads of the world, and an oilfield to which the West cannot afford to be denied.

Were Turkey to collapse, or American help there to be too little or too late, the whole rotten structure to the south would crumble. And the people would kowtow to a new and determined master with a knout.



B. File

or refinery has but to be mentioned, and the land around it falls overnight into the hands of highly placed speculators who are in a position to "see the telegrams." Huge blocks of new flats, called by the names of their politician owners, break the skyline.

4. There is a complete sense of frustration which has turned civil servants, whose profession was in any case always overcrowded and bad, into coffee house frequenters. This is not quite true of Iraq, where British example still affects the methods of men at the top levels; but in Egypt, the Lebanon and Syria no work is done at all.

D. The Egyptian budget, which is nicely balanced and shows a good little surplus of £10 million to be spent on the Ministry of Social Services for the "campaign against poverty and disease," looks wonderful. In fact, owing to the unwillingness even of the white-collared unemployed to work in the provinces, the only outlet for people with a social conscience is not through the government but through charity. This habit (Ladies' Red Crescent, etc.) has greatly increased, which shows that there is some good feeling somewhere. The official effort consists of about 40 social centres built in Egypt's 4,000 villages. Our correspondent went to one; it was shut and had never been opened as "no staff was available." In Syria and the Lebanon it is impossible to understand what happens to the money voted for social services.

E. Again, in Egypt, the schools and universities, having been allowed to enter the political swim, do too little work. Sons are ignorant compared with their fathers. Every reasonable parent in Egypt's upper class pays heavy fees for private tuition as nothing is learnt at school. The masters, even in State schools, are given no authority to countermand orders issued by the student secretaries of political parties. This does not happen, however, in Syria or the Lebanon, where French or American traditions of scholarship prevail; but it could happen in Iraq.

TREATIES MEAN NOTHING

The British treaty mania is out of touch with realities. Far more important than signed documents with red seals "done in good and due form and in duplicate" is goodwill. The British have gained nothing by their two recent efforts:

1. It was a grave mistake to announce, when the abortive Iraq treaty was signed at Portsmouth, that this was a model for more treaties (see FOREIGN REPORT of January 22nd, 1948). This created an impression, even among enemies of the Russians, that the British were only waiting to pop unsuspecting countries in the bag.
2. The treaty with Transjordan was brought off only because Transjordan needs the British annual £2 million to balance its budget.

The Iraqis are not now likely to be caught again. And the Egyptians, hoping for neutrality as the Belgians once did, will not sign in any circumstances except the actual appearance of a Russian force in Palestine.

Goodwill leads to help from all sorts of people who are still well disposed towards the British—though not to the sight of British uniforms in their streets. Yet until some way is found of avoiding the appearance of being friends only with the rich and elderly who want to guard their millions, those who want to help the British cannot afford to tie themselves up beyond all hope of neutrality. They are afraid

B File

5. Every effort should be made to extend the Jerusalem truce and the international trusteeship for Jerusalem, with free access of supplies and communications. If a trusteeship for Jerusalem is not now possible, the creation of a neutral authority for Jerusalem should be supported.

6. Efforts should continue for a general truce but on terms entirely consistent with separate and independent Jewish and Arab States. Since it is clear that no general solution which would override the November 29 Resolution is possible, our policy should now revert to support for that Resolution.

7. The course of events obviated the need for the U.N. to implement partition by force. Rather the U.N. needs to make clear to the Arab States that they must not use force against it.

8. With a trusteeship or neutral authority for Jerusalem, then a Good Offices Commission for the whole of Palestine should be created to deal with the two proclaimed States.

B. File

and wires started coming in from all over America, all telling me what a terrible traitor my friend, Harry S. Truman, turned out to be, and how he betrayed the Jewish people and how he had violated his promises. This bombardment kept on throughout the weekend. There wasn't one human being in Kansas City or elsewhere during those terrible days who expressed faith and confidence in the word of the President of the United States. No one would listen to me, and all blamed Truman for Austin's statement, made scarcely twenty-four hours after Dr. Weizmann walked out of the Oval Room. I told them all that I had explicit faith in my friend and that that faith would remain unshaken until he, himself, told me differently with his own lips. I kept on telling all who would listen that I would not and could not believe that President Truman knew or had any reason whatever to believe on Thursday what Mr. Warren Austin was going to say on Friday. I have thanked God many times for being absolutely right in the faith I had in the word of Harry Truman.

Heartsick and worried, I stayed home all day Saturday and all day Sunday — in bed — wondering what had happened from the time Dr. Weizmann walked out of the President's office to the time, on the very next day, when Austin got up to speak at the United Nations and made his sensational announcement, which would reverse United States policy on Palestine. On Monday I went to the store and there received a call from you, announcing that Dr. Weizmann wanted to speak to me. This telephone call I shall never forget as long as I live, because it not only proved Dr. Weizmann to be a great statesman, but, as it turned out, he was the only human being outside of myself who expressed the utmost faith in the word of President Truman. Our telephone conversation was so unforgettable that here, too, I believe I can set down what the good Doctor said to me, practically word for word. As I listened, here is what he said:

Mr. Jacobson,* don't be disappointed and do not feel badly. I do not believe that President Truman knew what was going to happen in the United Nations on Friday when he talked to me the day before. I am seventy-two years old, and all my life I have had one disappointment after another. This is just another letdown for me. Don't forget for a single moment that Harry S. Truman is the most powerful single man in the world. You have a job to do; so keep the White House doors open.

How right he was!! In the first place, he told me something that no other man in the world in those dark days even thought of. He was kind, he had no resentment against anyone. He criticized no one. He had the

* He got to calling me "Eddie" later on.

I TOO HAVE A HERO

EDDIE JACOBSON'S
Menswear
VALENTINE 3506
Main at 39th Street
Kansas City 2, Missouri

Mar[ch] 30, 1952

Dr. Josef Cohn
c/o Industrial Institute of Israel
15 East 58th Street
New York 22, New York

Dear Josef:

I am sorry I was forced to delay giving you the information you requested on the part which I through fate played from about the middle of February in 1948 to June of the same year, insofar as Dr. Weizmann is concerned. From the moment I received your request, I thought that I would find ample time to carefully prepare a statement which would be absolutely accurate, but I haven't been able to find the necessary time. So I at last decided to take my notes and give you a somewhat rambling account of those historic days. What I will be putting down in this letter will not be in the form I wanted it to be, but I hope it will serve your purposes, and I am going to do my best to be as accurate as the pressure of time will permit.

Here is my story:

To begin with, perhaps I should note that I never had been a Zionist in the sense that I never belonged to any Zionist organization. This statement I can make even today. But I was always deeply interested in the welfare of my suffering people across the seas and hoped that the day would come when they would have a homeland of their own. I think you know that, up to the time which I will later mention, I had never met Dr. Weizmann.

A telephone call from Frank Goldman, President of B'nai B'rith, on February 20, 1948, was the first incident which led to my eventual meeting with wonderful Dr. Weizmann. On that day he called me and said that President Truman had been turning down all the political leaders in New York City who had been begging him to see Dr. Weizmann. Goldman told me that on that day or a day or so earlier, he, the President, even turned down Mr. Ed Flynn, and that the President was very, very bitter against Zionist leaders for unbecoming conduct and unusual discourtesies. This call came in the middle of the night and got me out of bed. In short, Frank wanted me to charter a plane in order to see President Truman before his departure to Key West, and to beg him to see Dr. Weizmann, who, I was also told, came to the United States especially to see the President, and every effort had failed and that I was the last hope. Unfortunately, it was too late for me to make the necessary arrangements to see the President before his departure, and so I did the next best thing by wiring Mr. Matt Connelly, Appointment Secretary to the President. . . .

I waited impatiently for a reply, which came in the form of a letter from the President, mailed from the Submarine Base, Key West, Florida, on February 27, 1948. . . . Knowing the President as I did, the letter gave me a feeling that he would not change his mind. I decided that the best thing to do was to wait until the President returned to the White House.

My anxiety increased during these intervening days, because I briefed myself in preparing to see the President. I soon realized that the British were hoping for an Arab victory which would drive the Jews into the sea. It also seemed that, when the British would withdraw from Palestine on May 15, the settlements in the Negev and other spots might be wiped out by the Arabs and also expose Haifa to danger. The situation facing my people in Palestine was extremely dangerous even to my inexperienced eye, and so I determined to do all that I could as soon as possible.

It seemed ages until the President returned to the White House, but at last he did. On Friday, March 12, 1948, I left for Washington. As usual, I do not think I made an appointment, but took my chances. I came to the White House on Saturday, March 13, and was greeted by Mr. Matt Connelly, who advised and urged and begged me not to discuss Palestine with the President. I quickly told Matt that that's what I came to Washington for, and that I was determined to discuss this very subject with the President. When I entered the President's office, I noticed with pleasure that he looked well, that his trip to Florida did him much good. For a few minutes we discussed our families, my business in which he has always shown a brother's interest, and other personal things.

I then brought up the Palestine subject. He immediately became tense in appearance, abrupt in speech, and very bitter in the words he was throwing my way. In all the years of our friendship, he never talked to

me in this manner or in any way even approaching it. He made it almost impossible for me to continue when he said sharply that he didn't want to discuss Palestine or the Jews or the Arabs or the British; that he was satisfied to let these subjects take their course through the United Nations. I then actually argued with him, and I am now surprised at myself that I had the nerve to do that. I argued with him from every possible angle, reminding him of his feelings for Dr. Weizmann, which he often expressed to me, telling him that I could not understand why he wouldn't see him; [I] told him that Dr. Weizmann, an old and a sick man, had made his long journey to the United States especially to see the President of the United States. I probably used other arguments which now escape me. But the President remained immovable. He replied how disrespectful and how mean certain Jewish leaders* had been to him. I suddenly found myself thinking that my "war friend, the President of the United States, was at that moment as close to being an anti-Semite as a man could possibly be, and I was shocked that some of our own Jewish leaders should be responsible for Mr. Truman's attitude. I could not think of any arguments to give him in order to soften his anger, because, after all, he had been slandered and libeled by some of the leaders of my people whom he had tried to help while he was in the Senate and from the moment he stepped into the White House. His turn down of my request, firmly and in anger, left me completely crushed, and then, believe it or not, I happened to rest my eyes on a beautiful model of a statue of Andrew Jackson mounted on a horse which I had noted passingly the many previous times I had been to the White House. I then found myself saying this to the President, almost word for word:

Harry, all your life you have had a hero. You are probably the best read man in America on the life of Andrew Jackson. I remember when we had our store together and you were always reading books and papers and pamphlets on this great American. When you built the new Jackson County Court House in Kansas City, you put this very statue, lifesize, on the lawn right in front of the new Court House, where it still stands. Well, Harry, I too have a hero, a man I never met, but who is, I think, the greatest Jew who ever lived. I too have studied his past and I agree with you, as you have often told me, that he is a gentleman and a great statesman as well. I am talking about Chaim Weizmann; he is a very sick man, almost broken in health, but he travelled thousands and thousands of miles just to see you and plead the cause of my people. Now you refuse to see him because you were insulted by some of our American Jewish leaders, even though

* I am deliberately withholding the names of these "leaders," but I will furnish them to you on request.

you know that Weizmann had absolutely nothing to do with these insults and would be the last man to be a party to them. It doesn't sound like you, Harry, because I thought that you could take this stuff they have been handing out to you. I wouldn't be here if I didn't know that, if you will see him, you will be properly and accurately informed on the situation as it exists in Palestine, and yet you refuse to see him.

Just as I finished, I noticed that the President began drumming on his desk with his fingers, and as I stopped talking, he abruptly turned around while still sitting in his swivel chair and started looking out the window into what in the summer is a beautiful rose garden, gazing out the window just over the pictures of his mother, his wife, and his daughter. I knew the sign. I knew that he was changing his mind. I don't know how many seconds passed in silence, but it seemed like centuries. All of a sudden he swiveled himself around again, facing his desk, looked me straight in the eyes and then said the most endearing words I had ever heard from his lips and this is what he said word for word:

You win, you baldheaded — — — ——. I will see him. Tell Matt* to arrange this meeting as soon as possible after I return from New York on March 17.**

But as I was telling him goodbye, he pressed the button for Matt and himself told him that he would see Dr. Weizmann and requested Matt to make the proper arrangements for the meeting, which, I might say here, was to be off the record and on condition that the press and public would know absolutely nothing about it.

When I left the White House, I was excited and very nervous. I started for my hotel where Frank Goldman and [B'nai B'rith National Secretary] Maurice Bisgyer were waiting for the President's verdict. I walked to the hotel, because it was only a few blocks away. I now remember how the fresh air refreshed me. I was still nervous and excited when I reached the Statler, and before I knew it, I found myself at the bar and drank

* Meaning Mr. Matt Connelly, his Appointment Secretary.

** The President was going to New York to make an address at a Saint Patrick's Day dinner at the Astor Hotel. He had invited me to come to a reception and cocktail party on the afternoon of the coming Wednesday, which happened to be Saint Patrick's Day. I remember asking him what business a Jew has at a Saint Patrick's Day party, and, characteristically, he replied that a Jew had the same business there as he, a Baptist, had. I accepted the invitation.

two double Bourbons alone, something I never did before in my life. But even then I didn't go up to my room, but went outdoors and walked around for another ten minutes and then went up to the room. I remember that, as I entered, Maurice Bisgyer was sitting on a chair and Frank Goldman was pacing the floor. When I told them the good news that the President would see Dr. Weizmann, Frank Goldman ran over and kissed me, and Maurice Bisgyer was absolutely speechless — for Maurice to be speechless under any circumstances was to me quite a miracle!

When the excitement died down a little, we made arrangements to leave for New York to see Dr. Weizmann at the Waldorf. We arrived in New York the next morning. You arranged the meeting. I remember that Sunday, March 14, very well, because that is the first time I met you and Dr. Weizmann.

The dear Doctor was in bed when I was introduced to him by you. When I told him of the success of my mission, he gave me the sweetest smile I have ever seen. When I told him that the meeting was arranged, so that it would not be too much of a strain on his health, he replied that he was ready to go at any time. But I told him there was no hurry, because we could not see the President until after Saint Patrick's Day, so that he would have several days to recover his strength for the journey to Washington; on that day I met Mrs. Weizmann for the first time, a very lovable and gracious lady, and she was also very appreciative of what I had done and assured me that she would have the Doctor in good shape to make his important trip. I was invited to have tea with Dr. Weizmann the next day, Monday, at 11:00 o'clock in the morning. At this meeting, over a cup, I was inspired by Dr. Weizmann to do everything I could for this great man and the great cause he was representing. My feeling now is that not another person in the whole world could have "sold" me as Dr. Weizmann did that day. I say now that, as a non-Zionist, I needed the inspiration which I received that day over a cup of tea. We were together only about half an hour. We were alone, and yet this half hour is indelibly stamped on my mind.

On Monday — which was March 15 — I called Matt Connelly from New York, and the meeting between the President and Dr. Weizmann was set for Thursday, March 18, with the strict understanding that it would be off the record. So that Dr. Weizmann would not be seen by representatives of the press, I was instructed to see to it that he would enter the White House through the East gate rather than the Northwest gate. I then had tea with the Doctor after this call, and he was most happy to have the appointment definitely set. The Doctor wanted me to come along with him. But this idea was abandoned for several good reasons. The major reason was due to the fact that I was well known to the representatives of the press and had to guard against being seen going into the White House even through the East gate. Someone furnished another reason

which I did not consider very important, and that was that I should be "saved" to see the President again in case, God forbid, the meeting between the President and Dr. Weizmann did not turn out well. As things turned out, I couldn't have come to Washington anyway, because on Wednesday I received a call that my brother, A[be]. D. Jacobson, had been taken to the Menorah Hospital, which alarming news made it absolutely necessary for me to return to Kansas City immediately. But I am a little ahead of my story.

On Wednesday I went to the reception for the President. Matt was there, and that is when Matt was good enough to suggest that I shouldn't come along with Dr. Weizmann because of the possibility that I might be spotted by the press. To avoid obvious complications, everyone was anxious to abide by the President's expressed wish that his meeting with the Doctor should be strictly off the record. I was grateful to Matt for his advice.

I left for Kansas City and arrived there on Thursday, March 18, completely exhausted and very much worried about my brother, A. D. Naturally, I went to the hospital and then went home to catch up on my loss of sleep and to recover from the tensions which almost made a wreck of me.

While I was at home resting, Maurice Bisgyer tried to reach me Thursday morning. I finally got to talk to him late on that day when he told me the good news that Dr. Weizmann was happy and gratified after seeing the President.*

When I reached home on Thursday night — that was March 18 — it took me a long time to go to sleep even though I was a thoroughly exhausted human. Bluma, my wife, knowing of my condition, let me sleep until very late on Friday. When I reached my store at about noon, I was rested and happy. But about 5:30 in the afternoon of that day — Black Friday, it will always remain — [Kansas City lawyer] A. J. Granoff called me on the telephone and told me of our country's reversal of position at the United Nations as announced that afternoon by [our ambassador] Mr. Warren Austin. I was speechless and could not believe what I had just heard. I was as dazed as a man could be. Almost immediately calls

* It might be interesting to note that Dr. Weizmann made his trip to Washington incognito, accompanied by Maurice Bisgyer and a Kansas Citian who happened by coincidence to be in New York. It is perhaps also interesting to note here that Dr. Weizmann had requested and received twenty-five minutes for an interview with the President. On finding this time to be insufficient, the President graciously and kindly extended it. The meeting lasted approximately forty-five minutes. In practically no time, I found out that President Truman pledged Dr. Weizmann *his word* that the Negev would become and remain a part of the Jewish State, a pledge he kept regardless of the many, many pressures for him to either modify or abandon it.

Two Presidents and a Haberdasher — 1948 .

A day after Edward (Eddie) Jacobson's death on October 25, 1955, at the age of sixty-four, the Kansas City Star editorialized that he would have "an enduring place as one of the practical creators of the nation of Israel." How this Kansas City haberdasher gained such a place for himself is one of the happier chapters in Jewish history. It was Jacobson's "fate" — a favorite word of his — to have enjoyed a long and warm friendship with the thirty-third President of the United States. Jacobson and his friend, a fellow Missourian named Harry Truman, had served together at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, during World War I, and the two subsequently opened a haberdashery in Kansas City. "Hopelessly in debt," Mr. Truman would remember, they had to close the business in 1922. Jacobson went on ultimately to a successful career as a merchant; Harry Truman went on to the United States Senate and the White House. Through it all, they remained friends, and a few months before Jacobson's death, his onetime partner referred to him as "the next thing to kin folks."

Surely, there has never been a more significant friendship between a Christian and a Jew. What that friendship came to in 1948, and how it brought within its ambit the first President of the State of Israel, is the substance of the two letters which appear below. The Editors of American Jewish Archives, grateful to former President Truman for permission to reproduce his statement about the late Chaim Weizmann, offer both letters as a salute to the Jewish State on the twentieth anniversary of its establishment.

fullest faith in the word of Harry S. Truman, "the most powerful single man in the world." He recognized the need for retaining and maintaining my relationship to the White House, because the lives of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children depended upon it. Even now I cannot speak without emotion. My gratitude to Dr. Weizmann for his faith in President Truman cannot be described in words; nor can I properly express my admiration for the bigness of his soul and for his foresight. When the telephone conversation was finished, I knew I was not alone in believing in the President. You cannot imagine how this encouraged me to go on with the work which fate put on my shoulders.

I next saw Dr. Weizmann in New York on April 11. Up to that time I had not heard from President Truman, I had not tried to contact him, and of course did not see him. Of course, in the meantime it did not take me long to find out that President Truman was in *no* way responsible for the Austin statement and he had known *absolutely nothing* about it until it was publicly announced.

After seeing and talking to Dr. Weizmann on the 11th, I went to Washington. That was on the next day, April 12. This time I too used the East gate, something I had never done before. I also wanted to guard against any one seeing me come to the White House. Now, for the first time, I heard from my friend's own lips what really happened (What the President of the United States told me will have to be noted later, if ever). I feel at liberty to give you only a smattering of what the President told me on this occasion. He reaffirmed, very strongly, the promises he had made to Dr. Weizmann and to me; and he gave me permission to tell Dr. Weizmann so, which I did. You will remember that at this particular time the British had already definitely decided to pull out of Palestine and had fixed a date for their withdrawal, May 15 (our time, May 14). It was at this meeting that I also discussed with the President the vital matter of recognizing the new state, and *to this he agreed with a whole heart*. History tells us now how well he kept his words. The echo of British feet had hardly died away when the United States of America recognized Israel, on Friday, May 14, 1948. Even now I cannot put down in words my feelings on Friday, May 14. After all, I did play my small part in the historic event. Maybe the day will come when I will be able to express with at least becoming modesty my part in having been able to be on the inside of the events which led to the glorious hour on May 14, 1948.

On Saturday, May 15, you called and told me that Dr. Weizmann was most anxious to see me at once. Of course, I dropped everything and left Kansas City at 2:00 o'clock in the morning of Sunday, May 16, via air. After a rough and hard flight, I arrived in New York a little late, about 8:30 in the morning. You had reserved a room for me at the Waldorf, and when I arrived, you called me to say that Dr. Weizmann would see

D 7:1

me at tea late that day because he was still a very sick man and it wasn't thought best to disturb him until later on. You will recall that this was the evening of the big rally in Madison Square Garden. Instead of going there, I spent a very interesting evening with the good Doctor. Since the new State of Israel had no representative in Washington as yet, Dr. Weizmann wanted me to discuss several matters with the President, as follows:

1. The Arms Embargo.
2. A Loan.
3. The British.

In other words, he wanted me to be the temporary spokesman for the baby state. I could not refuse Dr. Weizmann's request even if I wanted to, and I didn't. I promised him that I would leave for Washington early the next day, Monday, May 17, and would talk these three matters over with the President. I left very early that morning, but before I left you called and told me that Dr. Weizmann had just been elected President of the new state and as such he also wanted me to present his greetings to the President of my country. What a thrill that was! I left for Washington, arriving there in time to see President Truman about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

The first thing I did was to deliver President Weizmann's greetings to President Truman. My friend's reaction to these greetings was such that I am sure he got as big a thrill out of the incident as did I. I then told him my reasons for coming to see him, that the new little state had no ambassador or anyone else to speak for it as yet. I then told him that Dr. Weizmann asked me to please be a sort of spokesman, this time to discuss three matters, namely, the arms embargo, a loan, and the British. I explained how badly the arms embargo was hurting Israel in its defense of its territory, that our country should in all fairness revise its policy in this important phase of the situation. I then brought up the matter of a loan, for \$100,000,000, and tried in my own limited way to explain how important it was to the survival of the new state. I urged him to assist in every proper way to see to it that the Import and Export Bank should make this loan. Then I discussed some of the pertinent facts regarding the arming of the Arabs by the British, and Britain's apparent desire to see the new little state destroyed before it even got to its feet.

All in all, the President was very patient and understanding in his discussions on these three matters. Our talks were thorough, even detailed. He was sympathetic and understanding. Characteristically, he made no definite promises, but indicated that he would do everything possible to further favorable action if he found that doing so would in no way be detrimental to the best interests of our country. This led me to say once

again, as I said many times, that I never wanted him to do anything for the oppressed Jewish people abroad if doing so would result in the slightest damage to the best interests of my country. On this subject, my friend and I could never have any disagreement because I was willing to do everything I could for the remnants of my people if my own country was not hurt in the process. I then again expressed the gratitude of President Weizmann and the Jews of the world, and as I was about to leave, he suddenly asked me when President Weizmann was planning to return to Israel. I told him he was planning to leave the following Wednesday, which was May 19, 1948. He then said he would certainly like to see the President of Israel before he went abroad. I then had to tell my friend that I wasn't familiar with protocol, and he immediately answered me that he certainly would take care of all formalities and that he would do so through Mr. David Niles, one of his administrative assistants.*

I returned to New York immediately, by plane, very much pleased with the results of my mission which President Weizmann had asked me to undertake. When the airport limousine approached the Waldorf, I noticed a tremendous crowd in the streets, faces raised upward. I also looked up and saw the flag of Israel beside the Stars and Stripes of my own country — that was the pay-off! I went up to President Weizmann's apartment. He was awake, sitting up, and I even now remember the most beautiful collection of roses I have ever seen, sent to the new President of the new state by his friends and admirers. I lost no time in telling the Doctor of my conversation with President Truman. He was most gratified with my report. I also told him in guarded language of the President's desire to see him, but I could not tell him that he would receive an invitation because I was cautioned not to do that. However, the old gentleman was bound and determined to sail the following Wednesday, and so I had

* It may be of interest if I recorded here a funny bit of by-play which happened as I arrived at the White House on April 12. As I entered Matt Connelly's office, he, Matt, jumped up and came towards me on those long legs of his and said, "Hello, Mr. Drew Pearson." This was his way of telling me that he had heard Drew Pearson's broadcast the Sunday before when Pearson mentioned in his broadcast that I had lately made frequent trips to Washington and that I was the one who had pressed the President of the United States to recognize Israel. How Pearson found out about it, I will never know, but I could make a good guess if I wanted to. So, when Matt opened the door of the President's office to let me in, he said with a broad grin, "Mr. President, here's Drew Pearson!" My heart sank into my shoes because I knew then that the President and Matt must have been discussing Pearson's broadcast. But my fears immediately left me because the President, with a smile on his face, said, "Matt, you are wrong. This is not Drew Pearson. This is the ambassador from Israel." Of such little incidents, history is made. I will leave you to imagine my feelings when President Truman said that.

to hint to you, Josef, that he should postpone the trip several days. I believe it was the following day that Mr. David Niles arrived in New York with a formal invitation to the President of Israel to be the guest of the President of the United States, when of course Israel's President would be received on the same high level as all other heads of governments. You will remember how President Weizmann stayed at the Blair House, as befitted his high position. On parting, I bade the Doctor goodbye and wished him a pleasant journey home. I returned to Kansas City the following Friday, when I received a call from Dr. Weizmann, again thanking me for everything I had done for him and for the Jewish people abroad, and I remember his saying that he "was sailing with a light heart and was a very happy man."

* * *

I think that what I have just written covers the important happenings from the moment I received the call from Frank Goldman in the middle of the night of February 20, 1948, to about June 1, of the same year. My recitation has been long, and in it I purposely put in some of my own mental and emotional reactions, very important to me, but perhaps not important to anybody else. Maybe the time will come when I will be able to sit down and write up my little part in the drama from beginning to the end. There is always the possibility that history will be interested in the part Dr. Weizmann played in the historic events which led up to the realization of a 2,000-year-old dream of a persecuted people. But I would be less than frank if I did not here note that I want eventually to write the story in my own way and in my own words, so that history will record the fact that there would be no State of Israel today except for Harry S. Truman, whose name should be daily blessed in every synagogue and every temple the world over. Did you expect this Magelah [lengthy account] when you made your harmless request for my version of Dr. Weizmann's part in the vital weeks preceding the establishment of Israel?

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

[Eddie Jacobson]

P. S. I think I need hardly say that I withheld most of the details of my conversations with President Truman, giving the essence of some of our conversations and quoting him once or twice. I felt free to do this, and maybe the future will also permit me to be much freer in giving the other details.

ONE OF THE GREAT MEN OF THIS AGE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 28, 1952

Dear Eddie:

I am certainly happy that you expect to have a Memorial Service for President Chaim Weizmann.

In my opinion, he was one of the great men of this age. He was not only a scientist but was a leader of men. He understood people and he knew how to get the most out of them for their own good and for the peace of the world.

I felt as if I had lost a close personal friend when he died. He and I have had some wonderful conversations on the world situation and the necessary remedies to meet conditions and maintain peace in the world.

I wish he could have lived longer. It would have been a great benefit to his own country and to all of the rest of us who are working for world peace.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY TRUMAN

Mr. Edward Jacobson
Main at 39th Street
Kansas City 2, Missouri

American Jewish Archives

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EDDIE JACOBSON'S
Main at 39th Street
Kansas City 2, Missouri

April 1, 1952

Dr. Josef Cohn
Industrial Institute of Israel
15 East 58 Street
New York City

Dear Josef:

I am sorry I was forced to delay giving you the information you requested on the part which I through Fate played from about the middle of February in 1948 to June of the same year insofar as Dr. Weizmann is concerned. From the moment I received your request, I thought that I would find ample time to carefully prepare a statement which would be absolutely accurate but I haven't been able to find the necessary time. So I at last decided to take my notes and give you a somewhat rambling account of those historic days. What I will be putting down in this letter will not be in the form I wanted it to be but I hope it will serve your purposes and I am going to do my best to be as accurate as the pressure of time will permit.

Here is my story:

To begin with, perhaps I should note that I never had been a Zionist in the sense that I never belonged to any Zionist organization. This statement I can make even today. But I was always deeply interested in the welfare of my suffering People across the seas and hoped that the day would come when they would have a homeland of their own. I think you know that up to the time which I will later mention, I had never met Dr. Weizmann.

A telephone call from Frank Goldman, President of B'nai B'rith, on February 20, 1948, was the first incident which led to my eventual meeting with wonderful Dr. Weizmann. On that day he called me and said that President Truman had been turning down all the political leaders in New York City who had been begging him to see Dr. Weizmann. Goldman told me that on that day or a day or so earlier, he, the President, even turned down Mr. Ed Flynn, and that the President was very, very bitter

PALESTINE

1. The United States should recognize the fact that the Jewish State will be proclaimed May 15th or 16th. No position should be taken between now and then which commits the United States to oppose such a State or which would encourage the Arab States to seek to overthrow it. In other words we must be very careful not to substitute ourselves for the British as opponents of Jewish aspirations for independence.
2. It is probable that the Arabs will also proclaim an Arab State for all of Palestine on May 15 or 16.
3. Since trusteeship will not be accepted by the General Assembly, the United States should guard against committing itself to any new plan which is inconsistent with the actual existence of a Jewish State on May 16th. This situation will not only include the proclamation of the Jewish State but the reality of the partition of Palestine, as the British statement yesterday in the Political Committee seemed to recognize.
4. The United States should make known publicly before the Security Council and otherwise that the use of force by the Arab States against the November 29th Resolution constitutes a violation of the Charter and threatens world peace. Our failure to do this contributes to the continuation of such threats. Clarification of our position in this respect is needed. This would not be a commitment by the United States to use armed force to prevent aggression. Other means would be available to the United Nations

BBFile

of the Russians, and would be turning themselves into targets for them. The only young people to whom the British appeal successfully are the tiny minority who have been sent to England by the British Council.

Force is always needed to back goodwill in the East. And friends of the West are clear that this must be maintained, if only by the less obvious means, such as visitors in mufti, employees engaged by local armies and so on. It has been pointed out that a good example of the local respect for force is that newspapers, xenophobes and student crowds revile and cheek the West, but never Stalin. It is the devil you placate. Hitler was not taunted either, till after 1943.

CROSSROADS OF THE WORLD

The Middle East presents a vast belt of people open to invasion without effort—except at any point in or near Turkey (see the last issue of FOREIGN REPORT). Having pillowed their heads on Allah for 1,300 years, these people have lost the power of thinking in any terms other than those of the moment. Yet they sit on a crossroads of the world, and an oilfield to which the West cannot afford to be denied.

Were Turkey to collapse, or American help there to be too little or too late, the whole rotten structure to the south would crumble. And the people would kowtow to a new and determined master with a knout.



B. File

or refinery has but to be mentioned, and the land around it falls overnight into the hands of highly placed speculators who are in a position to "see the telegrams." Huge blocks of new flats, called by the names of their politician owners, break the skyline.

4. There is a complete sense of frustration which has turned civil servants, whose profession was in any case always overcrowded and bad, into coffee house frequenters. This is not quite true of Iraq, where British example still affects the methods of men at the top levels; but in Egypt, the Lebanon and Syria no work is done at all.

D. The Egyptian budget, which is nicely balanced and shows a good little surplus of £10 million to be spent on the Ministry of Social Services for the "campaign against poverty and disease," looks wonderful. In fact, owing to the unwillingness even of the white-collared unemployed to work in the provinces, the only outlet for people with a social conscience is not through the government but through charity. This habit (Ladies' Red Crescent, etc.) has greatly increased, which shows that there is some good feeling somewhere. The official effort consists of about 40 social centres built in Egypt's 4,000 villages. Our correspondent went to one; it was shut and had never been opened as "no staff was available." In Syria and the Lebanon it is impossible to understand what happens to the money voted for social services.

E. Again, in Egypt, the schools and universities, having been allowed to enter the political swim, do too little work. Sons are ignorant compared with their fathers. Every reasonable parent in Egypt's upper class pays heavy fees for private tuition as nothing is learnt at school. The masters, even in State schools, are given no authority to countermand orders issued by the student secretaries of political parties. This does not happen, however, in Syria or the Lebanon, where French or American traditions of scholarship prevail; but it could happen in Iraq.

TREATIES MEAN NOTHING

The British treaty mania is out of touch with realities. Far more important than signed documents with red seals "done in good and due form and in duplicate" is goodwill. The British have gained nothing by their two recent efforts:

1. It was a grave mistake to announce, when the abortive Iraq treaty was signed at Portsmouth, that this was a model for more treaties (see FOREIGN REPORT of January 22nd, 1948). This created an impression, even among enemies of the Russians, that the British were only waiting to pop unsuspecting countries in the bag.
2. The treaty with Transjordan was brought off only because Transjordan needs the British annual £2 million to balance its budget.

The Iraqis are not now likely to be caught again. And the Egyptians, hoping for neutrality as the Belgians once did, will not sign in any circumstances except the actual appearance of a Russian force in Palestine.

Goodwill leads to help from all sorts of people who are still well disposed towards the British—though not to the sight of British uniforms in their streets. Yet until some way is found of avoiding the appearance of being friends only with the rich and elderly who want to guard their millions, those who want to help the British cannot afford to tie themselves up beyond all hope of neutrality. They are afraid

B File

5. Every effort should be made to extend the Jerusalem truce and the international trusteeship for Jerusalem, with free access of supplies and communications. If a trusteeship for Jerusalem is not now possible, the creation of a neutral authority for Jerusalem should be supported.

6. Efforts should continue for a general truce but on terms entirely consistent with separate and independent Jewish and Arab States. Since it is clear that no general solution which would override the November 29 Resolution is possible, our policy should now revert to support for that Resolution.

7. The course of events obviated the need for the U.N. to implement partition by force. Rather the U.N. needs to make clear to the Arab States that they must not use force against it.

8. With a trusteeship or neutral authority for Jerusalem, then a Good Offices Commission for the whole of Palestine should be created to deal with the two proclaimed States.

B. File

"Harry, all your life you have had a hero. You are probably the best read man in America on the life of Andrew Jackson. I remember when we had our store together and you were always reading books and papers and pamphlets on this great American. When you built the new Jackson County Court House in Kansas City, you put this very statue, lifesize, on the lawn right in front of the new Court House, where it still stands. Well, Harry, I too have a hero, a man I never met but who is, I think, the greatest Jew who ever lived. I too studied his past and I agree with you, as you have often told me, that he is a gentleman and a great statesman as well. I am talking about Chaim Weizmann. He is a very sick man, almost broken in health, but he travelled thousands and thousands of miles just to see you and plead the cause of my People. Now you refuse to see him because you were insulted by some of our American Jewish leaders, even though you know that Weizmann had absolutely nothing to do with these insults and would be the last man to be a party to them. It doesn't sound like you, Harry, because I thought that you could take this stuff they have been handing out to you. I wouldn't be here if I didn't know that if you will see him you will be properly and accurately informed on the situation as it exists in Palestine, and yet you refuse to see him".

Just as I finished, I noticed that the President began drumming on his desk with his fingers and as I stopped talking, he abruptly turned around while still sitting in his swivel chair and started looking out the window into what in the summer is a beautiful rose garden, gazing out the window just over the pictures of his mother, his wife and his daughter. I knew the sign. I knew that he was changing his mind. I don't know how many seconds passed in silence but it seemed like centuries. All of a sudden he swiveled himself around again, facing his desk, looked me straight in the eyes and then said the most endearing words I had ever heard from his lips and this is what he said word for word:

(Note: I am deliberately withholding the names of these "leaders", but I will furnish them to you on request.)

the President's office, I noticed with pleasure that he looked well, that his trip to Florida did him much good. For a few minutes we discussed our families, my business in which he has always shown a brother's interest, and other personal things.

I then brought up the Palestine subject. He immediately became tense in appearance, abrupt in speech and very bitter in the words he was throwing my way. In all the years of our friendship he never talked to me in this manner or in any way even approaching it. He made it almost impossible for me to continue when he said sharply that he didn't want to discuss Palestine or the Jews or the Arabs or the British; that he was satisfied to let these subjects take their course through the United Nations. I then actually argued with him and I am now surprised at myself that I had the nerve to do that. I argued with him from every possible angle, reminding him of his feelings for Dr. Weismann which he often expressed to me, telling him that I could not understand why he wouldn't see him; told that Dr. Weismann, an old and a sick man, had made his long journey to the United States especially to see the President of the United States. I probably used other arguments which now escape me. But the President remained immovable.

He replied how disrespectful and how mean certain Jewish leaders had been to him. I suddenly found myself thinking that my dear friend, the President of the United States, was at that moment as close to being an anti-Semite as a man could possibly be, and I was shocked that some of our own Jewish leaders should be responsible for Mr. Truman's attitude. I could not think of any argument to give him in order to soften his anger because, after all, he had been slandered and libeled by some of the leaders of my People whom he had tried to help while he was in the Senate and from the moment he stepped into the White House... His turn down of my request, firmly and in anger, left me completely crushed and then, believe it or not, I happened to rest my eyes on a beautiful model of a statue of Andrew Jackson mounted on a horse which I had noted passingly the many previous times I had been to the White House. I then found myself saying this to the President, almost word for word:

against Zionist leaders for unbecoming conduct and unusual discourtesies. This call came in the middle of the night and got me out of bed. In short, Frank wanted me to charter a plane in order to see President Truman before his departure to Key West, and to beg him to see Dr. Weizmann, who, I was also told, came to the United States especially to see the President, and every effort had failed and that I was the last hope. Unfortunately, it was too late for me to make the necessary arrangements to see the President before his departure, and so I did the next best thing by wiring Mr. Matt Connolly, Appointed Secretary to the President. A copy of the wire, dated February 21, 1948 (it was sent after midnight) is attached to this letter.

I waited impatiently for a reply which came in the form of a letter from the President, mailed from the Submarine Base, Key West, Florida, on February 27, 1948. A copy of this letter is attached. Knowing the President as I did, the letter gave me a feeling that he would not change his mind. I decided that the best thing to do was to wait until the President returned to the White House.

My anxiety increased during these intervening days because I briefed myself in preparing to see the President. I soon realized that the British were hoping for an Arab victory which would drive the Jews into the sea. It also seemed that when the British would withdraw from Palestine on May 15, the settlements in the Negev and other spots might be wiped out by the Arabs and also expose Haifa to danger. The situation facing my People in Palestine was extremely dangerous even to my inexperienced eye, and so I determined to do all that I could as soon as possible.

It seemed ages until the President returned to the White House, but at last he did. On Friday, March 12, 1948, I left for Washington. As usual, I do not think I made an appointment but took my chances. I came to the White House on Saturday, March 13, and was greeted by Mr. Matt Connolly who advised and urged and begged me not to discuss Palestine with the President. I quickly told Matt that that's what I came to Washington for and I was determined to discuss this very subject with the President. When I entered

"You win, you baldheaded ----- . I will see him.
Tell Matt ^{x)} to arrange this meeting as soon as possible
after I return from New York on March 17." xx)

x) Meaning Mr. Matt Connelly, his Appointed Secretary.)

xx) The President was going to New York to make an address at a Saint Patrick's Day dinner at the Astor Hotel. He had invited me to come to a reception and cocktail party on the afternoon of the coming ~~sat~~ Wednesday, which happened to be Saint Patrick's Day. I remember asking him what business has a Jew at a Saint Patrick's Day party and, characteristically, he replied that a Jew had the same business there as he, a Baptist, had. I accepted the invitation.)

But as I was telling him goodbye, he pressed the button for Matt and himself told him that he would see Dr. Weizmann and requested Matt to make the proper arrangements for the meeting which, I might say here, was to be off the record and on condition that the press and public would know absolutely nothing about it.

When I left the White House I was excited and very nervous. I started for my hotel where Frank Goldman and Maurice Bisgyer were waiting for the President's verdict. I walked to the hotel because it was only a few blocks away. I now remember how the fresh air refreshed me. I was still nervous and excited when I reached the Statler and before I knew it, I found myself at the bar and drank two double Bourbons alone, something I never did before in my life. But even then I didn't go up to my room but went outdoors and walked around for another ten minutes and then went up to the room. I remember that as I entered Maurice Bisgyer was sitting on a chair and Frank Goldman was pacing the floor. When I told them the good news that the President would see Dr. Weizmann, Frank Goldman ran over and kissed me and Maurice Bisgyer was absolutely speechless - for Maurice to be speechless under any circumstances was to me quite a miracle!

When the excitement died down a little, we made arrangements to leave for New York to see Dr. Weizmann at the Waldorf. We arrived in New York the next morning. You arranged the meeting.

I remember that Sunday, March 14, very well because that is the first time I met you and Dr. Weizmann.

The dear Doctor was in bed when I was introduced to him by you. When I told him of the success of my mission, he gave me the sweetest smile I have ever seen. When I told him that the meeting was arranged so that it would not be too much of a strain on his health, he replied that he was ready to go at any time. But I told him there was no hurry because we could not see the President until after Saint Patrick's Day, so that he would have several days to recover his strength for the journey to Washington. On that day I met Mrs. Weizmann for the first time, a very lovable and gracious lady, and she was also very appreciative of what I had done and assured me that she would have the Doctor in good shape to make his important trip. I was invited to have tea with Dr. Weizmann the next day, Monday, at 11.00 - o'clock in the morning. At this meeting, over a cup, I was inspired by Dr. Weizmann to do everything I could for this great man and the great cause he was representing. My feeling now is that not another person in the whole world could have "sold" me as Dr. Weizmann did ~~that~~ that day. I say now that as a non-Zionist I needed the inspiration which I received that day over a cup of tea. We were together only about half an hour. We were alone and yet this half hour is indelibly stamped on my mind.

On Monday - which was March 15 - I called Nat Connolly from New York and the meeting between the President and Dr. Weizmann was set for Thursday, March 18, with the strict understanding that it would be off the record. So that Dr. Weizmann would not be seen by representatives of the press, I was instructed to see to it that he would enter the White House through the East gate rather than the Northwest gate. I then had tea with the Doctor after this call, and he was most happy to have the appointment definitely set. The Doctor wanted me to come along with him. But this idea was abandoned for several good reasons. The major reason was due to the fact that I was well known to the representatives of the press and had to guard against being seen going into the White House even through the East gate. Someone furnished another reason which I did not consider very important, and that

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was that I should be "saved" to see the President again in case, God forbid, the meeting between the President and Dr. Weizmann did not turn out well. As things turned out, I couldn't have come to Washington anyway because on Wednesday I received a call that my brother, A.D. Jacobson, had been taken to the Menorah Hospital, which alarming news made it absolutely necessary for me to return to Kansas City immediately. But I am a little ahead of my story.

On Wednesday I went to the reception for the President. Matt was there and that is when Matt was good enough to suggest that I shouldn't come along with Dr. Weizmann because of the possibility that I might be spotted by the press. To avoid obvious complications everyone was anxious to abide by the President's expressed wish that his meeting with the Doctor should be strictly off the record. I was grateful to Matt for his advice.

I left for Kansas City and arrived there on Thursday, March 18, completely exhausted and very much worried about my brother, A.D. Naturally I went to the hospital and then went home to catch up on my loss of sleep and to recover from the tensions which made a wreck of me.

While I was at home resting, Maurice Biggier tried to reach me Thursday morning. I finally got to talk to him late on that day when he told me the good news that Dr. Weizmann was happy and gratified after seeing the President.^{x)}

- x) It might ~~be~~ be interesting to note that Dr. Weizmann made his trip to Washington incognito, accompanied by Maurice Biggier and a Kansas Citizen who happened by coincidence to be in New York. It is perhaps also interesting to note here that Dr. Weizmann had requested and received 25 minutes for an interview with the President. On finding this time to be insufficient, the President graciously and kindly extended it. The meeting lasted approximately 45 minutes. In practically no time I found out that President Truman pledged Dr. Weizmann his word that the Negev would become and remain a part of the Jewish State, a pledge he

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kept regardless of the many, many pressures for him to either modify or abandon it.)

When I reached home on Thursday night - that was March 18 - it took me a long time to go to sleep even though I was thoroughly exhausted humanly. Bluma, my wife, knowing of my condition, let me sleep until very late on Friday. When I reached my store at about noon, I was rested and happy. But about 5.30 in the afternoon of that day - Black Friday it will always remain - A.J. Granoff called me on the telephone and told me of our country's reversal of position at the United Nations as announced that afternoon by Mr. Warren Austin.

I was speechless and could not believe what I had just heard. I was as dazed as a man could be. Almost immediately calls and wires started coming in from all over America. All telling me what a terrible traitor my friend, Harry S. Truman, turned out to be, and how he betrayed the Jewish People and how he had violated his promises. This bombardment kept on throughout the weekend. There wasn't one human being in Kansas City or elsewhere during these terrible days who expressed faith and confidence in the word of the President of the United States. No one would listen to me and all blamed Truman for Austin's statement, made scarcely 24 hours after Dr. Weizmann walked out of the Oval Room. I told them all that I had explicit faith in my friend and that that faith would remain unshaken until he, himself, tells me differently with his own lips. I kept on telling all who would listen that I would not and could not believe that President Truman knew or had any reason whatever to believe on Thursday what Mr. Warren Austin was going to say on Friday. I have thanked God many times for being absolutely right in the faith I had in the word of Harry Truman.

Heart sick and worried, I stayed home all day Saturday and all day Sunday - in bed - wondering what had happened from the time Dr. Weizmann walked out of the President's office to the time, on the very next day, when Austin got up to speak at the United Nations and made his sensational announcement which would reverse United States policy on Palestine. On Monday I went to the store and there received a call from you announcing that

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Dr. Weismann wanted to speak to me. This telephone call I shall never forget as long as I live because it not only proved Dr. Weismann to be a great statement but, as it turned out, he was the only human being outside of myself who expressed the utmost faith in the word of President Truman. Our telephone conversation was so unforgettable that here, too, I believe I can set down what the good Doctor said to me, practically word for word. As I listened, here is what he said:

"Mr. Jacobson^{x)}, don't be disappointed and do not feel badly. I do not believe that President Truman knew what was going to happen in the United Nations on Friday when he talked to me the day before. I am 72 years old, and all my life I have had one disappointment after another. This is just another letdown for me. Don't forget for a single moment that Harry S. Truman is the most powerful single man in the world. If you have a job to do so keep the White House doors open'.

x) He got to calling me "Eddie" later on.)

How right he was. In the first place, he told me something that no other man in the world in those dark days even thought of. He was kind, he had no resentment against anyone. He criticized no one. He had the fullest faith in the word of Harry S. Truman, "the most powerful single man in the world." He recognized the need for retaining and maintaining my relationship to the White House because the lives of hundreds of thousands of men, women and children depended upon it. Even now, I cannot speak without emotion. My gratitude to Dr. Weismann for his faith in President Truman cannot be described in words; nor can I properly express my admiration for the bigness of his soul and for his foresight. When the telephone conversation was finished, I knew I was not alone in believing in the President. You cannot imagine how this encouraged me to go on with the work which Fate put on my shoulders.

his way of telling me that he had heard Drew Pearson's broadcast the Sunday before when Pearson mentioned in his broadcast that I had lately made frequent trips to Washington and that I was the one who had pressed the President of the United States to recognize Israel. Now Pearson found out about it, I will never know, but I could make a good guess if I wanted to. So, when Matt opened the door of the President's office to let me in, he said with broad grin, "Mr. President, here's Drew Pearson!" My heart sank into my shoes because I knew then that the President and Matt must have been discussing Pearson's broadcast. But my fears immediately left me because the President, with a smile on his face said "Matt, you are wrong. This is not Drew Pearson. This is the Ambassador from Israel". Of such little incidents history is made. I will leave you to imagine my feelings when President Truman said that.)

I returned to New York immediately, by plane, very much pleased with the results of my mission which President Heissmann had asked me to undertake. When the airport limousine approached the Waldorf I noticed a tremendous crowd in the streets, faces raised upwards. I also looked up and saw the flag of Israel beside the stars and stripes of my own country - that was the pay off! I went up to President Heissmann's apartment. He was awake, sitting up, and I even now remember the most beautiful collection of roses I have ever seen, sent to the new President of the new state by his friends and admirers. I lost no time in telling the Doctor of my conversation with President Truman. He was most gratified with my report. I also told him in guarded language of the President's desire to see him but I could not tell him that he would receive an invitation because I was cautioned not to do that. However, the old gentleman was bound and determined to sail the following Wednesday and so I had to hint to you, Josef, that he should postpone the trip several days.

morning. You had reserved a room for me at the Waldorf and when I arrived, you called me to say that Dr. Weizmann would see me at tea late that day because he was 'still a very sick man and it wasn't thought best to disturb him until later on. You will recall that this was the evening of the big rally in Madison Square Garden. Instead of going there, I spent a very interesting evening with the good Doctor. Since the new State of Israel had no representative in Washington as yet, Dr. Weizmann wanted me to discuss several matters with the President, as follows:

1. The Arms Embargo
2. A Loan
3. The British

In other words, he wanted me to be the temporary spokesman for the baby state. I could not refuse Doctor Weizmann's request even if I wanted to, and I didn't. I promised him that I would leave for Washington early the next day, Monday, May 17, and would talk these three matters over with the President. I left very early that morning but before I left you called and told me that Dr. Weizmann had just been elected President of the new state and as such he also wanted me to present his greetings to the President of my country. What a thrill that was! I left for Washington arriving there in time to see President Truman about 1.00 o'clock in the afternoon.

The first thing I did was to deliver President Weizmann's greeting to President Truman. My friend's reaction to these greetings was such that I am sure he got as big a thrill out of the incident as did I. I then told him my reasons for coming to see him, that the new little state had no ambassador or anyone else to speak for it as yet. I then told him that Dr. Weizmann asked me to please be a sort of spokesman, this time to discuss three matters, namely, the arms embargo, a loan and the British. I explained how badly the arms embargo was hurting Israel in its defense of its territory, that our country should in all fairness revise its policy in this important phase of the situation.

I then brought up the matter of a loan, for \$135,000,000, and tried in my own limited way to explain how important it was to the survival of the new state. I urged him to assist in every proper way to see to it that the Import and Export Bank should make this loan. Then I discussed some of the pertinent facts regarding the arming of the Arabs by the British, and Britain's apparent desire to see the new little state destroyed before it even got on its feet.

All in all, the President was very patient and understanding in his discussions on these three matters. Our talks were thorough, even detailed. He was sympathetic and understanding. Characteristically, he made no definite promises but indicated that he would do everything possible to further favorable action if he found that doing so would in no way be detrimental to the best interests of our country. This led me to say once again, as I said many times, that I never wanted him to do anything for the oppressed Jewish people abroad if in doing so would result in the slightest damage to the best interests of my country. On this subject my friend and I could never have any disagreement because I was willing to do everything I could for the remnants of my People if my own country was not hurt in the process.

I then again expressed the gratitude of President Weizmann and the Jews of the world and as I was about to leave, he suddenly asked me when President Weizmann was planning to return to Israel. I told him he was planning to leave the following Wednesday, which was May 19, 1948. He then said he would certainly like to see the President of Israel before he went abroad. I then had to tell my friend that I wasn't familiar with protocol and he immediately answered me that he certainly would take care of all formalities and that he would do so through Mr. David Niles, one of his administrative assistants.^{x)}

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- x) It may be of interest if I recorded here a funny bit of by-play which happened as I arrived at the White House on April 12. As I entered Matt Connelly's office he, Matt, jumped up and came towards me on those long legs of his and said, "Hello, Mr. Drew Pearson". This was
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I next saw Dr. Weismann in New York on April 11. Up to that time I had not heard from President Truman, I had not tried to contact him, and of course did not see him. Of course, in the meantime it did not take me long to find out that President Truman was in NO way responsible for the Austin statement and he had known absolutely nothing about it until it was publicly announced.

After seeing and talking to Dr. Weismann on the 11th, I went to Washington. That was on the next day, April 12. This time I too used the East Gate, something I had never done before. I also wanted to guard against any one seeing me come to the White House. Now for the first time I heard from my friends own lips what really happened (What the President of the United States told me will have to be noted later, if ever). I feel at liberty to give you only a smattering of what the President told me on this occasion. He reaffirmed, very strongly, the promises he had made to Dr. Weismann and to me; and he gave me permission to tell Dr. Weismann so, which I did. You will remember that at this particular time the British had already definitely decided to pull out of Palestine and had fixed a date for their withdrawal, May 15 (our time May 14).

It was at this meeting that I also discussed with the President the vital matter of recognizing the new State, and to this he agreed with a whole heart. History tells us now how well he kept his words. The echo of British feet had hardly died away when the United States of America recognized Israel, on Friday, May 14, 1948. Even now I cannot put down in words my feelings on Friday, May 14. After all, I did play my small part in the historic event. Maybe the day will come when I will be able to express with at least becoming modesty my part in having been able to be on the inside of the event which led to the glorious hour on May 14, 1948.

On Saturday, May 15, you called and told me that Dr. Weismann was most anxious to see me at once. Of course, I dropped everything and left Kansas City at 2.00 o'clock in the morning of Sunday, May 16, via air. After a rough and hard flight I arrived in New York a little late, about 8.30 in the

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I believe it was the following day that Mr. David Niles arrived in New York with a formal invitation to the President of Israel to be the guest of the President of the United States, when of course Israel's President would be received on the same high level as all other heads of ~~xxx~~ governments. You will remember how President Weizmann stayed at the Blair House, as befitted his high position. On parting I bid the Doctor goodbye and wished him a pleasant journey home. I returned to Kansas City the following Friday when I received a call from Dr. Weizmann, again thanking me for everything I had done for him and for the Jewish People abroad and I remember his saying that he "was sailing with a light heart and was a very happy man."

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I think that what I have just written covers the important happenings from the moment I received the call from Frank Goldman in the middle of the night of February 20, 1948 to about June 1 of the same year. My recitation has been long and in it I purposely put in some of my own mental and emotional reactions, very important to me but perhaps not important to anybody else. Maybe the time will come when I will be able to sit down and write up my little part in the drama from beginning to the end. There is always the possibility that history will be interested in the part Dr. Weizmann played in the historic events which led up to the realization of a 2000 year old dream of a persecuted people. But I would be less than frank if I did not here note that I want eventually to write the story in my own way and in my own words so that history will record the fact that there would be no State of Israel today except for Harry S. Truman whose name should be daily blessed in every synagogue ^{when} and every Temple the world over. Did you expect this Megalah/you made your harmless request for my version of Dr. Weizmann's part in the vital weeks preceding the establishment of Israel?

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With kindest regards and best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

/sgd/ Edward Jacobson

P.S. I think I need hardly say that I withheld most of the details of my conversations with President Truman, giving the essence of some of our conversations and quoting him once or twice. I felt free to do this and maybe the future will also permit me to be much freer in giving the other details.

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UNITED HEBREW CONGREGATION

BRINKER BLVD. NEAR WYDOWN

SAINT LOUIS,

MISSOURI

SAMUEL THURMAN, RABBI

May 13, 1948

Honorable Harry S. Truman
White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear President:

My visit with you last week is now a most cherished memory. It is more than a memory. It is a deep faith which your words inspired in me, that the courageous sons and daughters of Israel, who are now bravely defending the soil which they have reclaimed as the new Zion, will have your support in the United Nations' decision for the partition plan in Palestine.


We do want to stop the shedding of blood, and this can be done, if the Puppet-King of Trans-Jordania, as well as the other feudal lords of the Arab League, will be given to understand and to know that the United States stands behind its word, and will help the new young democracies in Palestine. Who knows, but what the Arabs of Palestine will in time learn to live with their neighboring Jewish State not only in harmony, but as the United States of Palestine.

An authentic report has just come to me that Russia will recognize the New Judaea. Shall we let her get ahead of us?

Of course, my offer of service is always at your command. You must know how deeply grateful I am for the high privilege of my visits with you. I am happy to call you my President and my friend.

Devotedly yours,

B. File


Samuel Thurman

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Misc.

May 15, 1948

Filed
5-26-48

Dear Doctor Weizmann:

I appreciated very much your
letter of May thirteenth and I sincerely hope
that the Palestine situation will eventually
work out on an equitable and peaceful basis,

x204
x204-10

Sincerely yours,



HARRY S. TRUMAN

Dr. Chaim Weizmann x pp22/98
The Waldorf-Astoria x Gen.
Park and Lexington Avenues
New York 22, New York

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The WALDORF-ASTORIA

PARK AND LEXINGTON AVENUES / 40TH AND 50TH STREETS / NEW YORK

May 13, 1948

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.



Dear Mr. President:

The unhappy events of the last few months will not, I hope, obscure the very great contributions that you, Mr. President, have made toward a definitive and just settlement of the long and troublesome Palestine question. The leadership which the American government took under your inspiration made possible the establishment of a Jewish State, which I am convinced will contribute markedly toward a solution of world Jewish problems, and which, I am equally convinced is a necessary preliminary to the development of lasting peace among the peoples of the Near East.

So far as practical conditions in Palestine would permit, the Jewish people there have proceeded along the lines laid down in the United Nations Resolution of November 29, 1947. Tomorrow midnight, May 15th, the British Mandate will be terminated, and the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, embodying the best endeavors of the Jewish people and arising from the Resolution of the United Nations, will assume full responsibility for preserving law and order within the boundaries of the Jewish State; for defending that area against external aggression; and for discharging the obligations of the Jewish State to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law.

Considering all the difficulties, the chances for an equitable adjustment of Arab and Jewish relationship are not unfavorable. What is required now is an end to the seeking of new solutions which invariably have retarded rather than encouraged a final settlement.


It is for these reasons that I deeply hope that the United States, which under your leadership has done so much to

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May 13, 1948

find a just solution, will promptly recognize the Provisional Government of the new Jewish State. The world, I think, would regard it as especially appropriate that the greatest living democracy should be the first to welcome the newest into the family of nations.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Ch. Weizmann".

Chaim Weizmann

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VERBATIM TEXT

PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY

TEL AVIV

NIACT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 1(E) and 1(D) or (E)
Dept. of State Letter, Aug 9, 1975
By NLT, [signature], NARS Date 6-21-75

President desires you deliver following note immediately to Ben-Gurion.

QUOTE Excellency: I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the President of the US has instructed me to inform the Govt of Israel as follows:

The Govt of the US is seriously disturbed by the attitude of Israel with respect to a territorial settlement in Palestine and to the question of Palestinian refugees, as set forth by the representatives of Israel at Lausanne in public and private meetings. According to Dr. Eytan, the Israeli Govt will do nothing further about Palestinian refugees at the present time, although it has under consideration certain urgent measures of limited character. In connection with territorial matters, the position taken by Dr. Eytan apparently contemplates not only the retention of all territory now held under military occupation by Israel, which is clearly in excess of the partition boundaries of Nov 29, 1947, but possibly

poss'ibly an additional acquisition of further territory within Palestine.

As a member of the UN PCC and as a nation which has consistently striven to give practical effect to the principles of the UN, the US Govt has recently made a number of representations to the Israeli Govt, concerning the repatriation of refugees who fled from the conflict in Palestine. These representations were in conformity with the principles set forth in the resolution of the GA of Dec 11, 1948, and urged the acceptance of the principle of substantial repatriation and the immediate beginnings of repatriation on a reasonable scale which would be well within the numbers to be agreed in a final settlement. The US Govt conceded that a final settlement of the refugee problem must await a definitive peace settlement. These representations, as well as those made concurrently to the Arab States concerning the resettlement outside of Palestine of a substantial portion of Palestine refugees, were made in the firm conviction that they pointed the way to a lasting peace in that area.

In the interests of a just and equitable solution of territorial questions the US Govt, in the UN and as a member of the PCC, has supported the position that Israel should be expected to offer territorial compensation for

any territorial acquisition which it expects to effect beyond the boundaries set forth in the resolution of the GA of November 29, 1947. The Govt of Israel has been well aware of this position and of the view of the US Govt that it is based upon elementary principles of fairness and equity.

The US Govt is deeply concerned to learn from Dr. Eytan's statements that the suggestions both on refugees and on territorial questions which have been made by it for the sole purpose of advancing prospects of peace have made so little impression upon the Govt of Israel.

The US attitude of sympathy and support for Israel has arisen out of broad American interests and principles, particularly out of its support for the UN and its desire to achieve peace and security in the Near East on a realistic basis. The US Govt and people have given generous support to the creation of Israel because they have been convinced of the justice of this aspiration. The US Govt does not, however, regard the present attitude of the Israeli Govt as being consistent with the principles upon which US support has been based. The US Govt is gravely concerned lest Israel now endanger the possibility of arriving at a solution of the Palestine problem in such a way

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way as to contribute to the establishment of sound and friendly relations between Israel and its neighbors.

The Govt of Israel should entertain no doubt whatever that the US Govt relies upon it to take responsible and positive action concerning Palestine refugees and that, far from supporting excessive Israeli claims to further territory within Palestine, the US Govt believes that it is necessary for Israel to offer territorial compensation for territory which it expects to acquire beyond the boundaries of the Nov 29, 1947 resolution of the GA.

The Govt of Israel must be aware that the attitude which it has thus far assumed at Lausanne must inevitably lead to a rupture in those conversations. The US Govt must state in candor that it considers that the Govt of Israel must provide a basis for a continuation of such talks under the auspices of the PCC and that a rupture arising out of the rigid attitude of the Govt of Israel would place a heavy responsibility upon that Govt and people.

If the Govt of Israel continues to reject the basic principles set forth by the resolution of the General Assembly of Dec 11, 1948 and the friendly advice offered

by the

by the US Govt for the sole purpose of facilitating a genuine peace in Palestine, the US Govt will regretfully be forced to the conclusion that a revision of its attitude toward Israel has become unavoidable. UNQUOTE



B. File

~~INCOMING~~ TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE—DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

TELEGRAPH

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Control 3911

Rec'd September 13, 1948
8:12 a.m.Action: SS
Info :
DCR
LOG

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO : Secretary of State

NO : 104, September 12, 7 p.m.

URGENT

PERSONAL ATTENTION PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY.

In your letter July 21, Mr. President, among other points you instructed me to report to you on "appropriate time for full recognition" PGI. That time has, I believe, now come.

After more than four weeks intensive study here and further to my telegram to you (70, August 24) that indefinite truce cannot lead to peace without positive action to clarify situation, I am convinced that full recognition by the US now of PGI would accomplish four major US objectives:

One. Strengthen PGI moderates who want if humanly possible avoid renewal warfare.

Two. Give Arab moderates, especially Abdullah (who knew past months decision battlefield was gravely adverse and who fear renewed warfare might result personal and national debacle), additional reason accelerated move towards settlement.

Three. Remove major obstacle to peace negotiations by demonstrating to Arab intransigents fact that Israel's existence cannot longer be denied or ignored.

Four. Encourage British relax its non-recognition policy.

Unless US makes up own mind as in original recognition

DECLASSIFIED

without waiting

C. O. 11632, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)

1 pr. of State letter, 7-6-1971

1 in Y. , NARS Date 9-26-71~~TOP SECRET~~

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INFORMATION COPY

their own and purchasing the most deadly modern weapons. A few weeks ago squadrons of British Vampire jet fighters were flown to the Suez Canal Zone - half an hour's air flight from our frontier - ready for instant delivery when wanted, while Egyptian pilots are being trained in their use close by. Egypt has also ordered British destroyers with 4" and 6" guns and submarines, while there is hardly any secret about the French rearming the Syrians. This rearmament, Mr. President, constitutes a direct threat to the peace of the Middle East and thereby also to the peace of the world. With this open threat of war hanging over us, can we ignore the security aspect of the admission of a large Arab population who, whatever their individual feelings might be, are likely to turn against us if war restarts?

Apart from the security question, which to my mind is paramount, there is the economic difficulty. When the United Nations in November 1947 voted in favour of a Jewish State, it was motivated pre-eminently by the purpose of solving once and for all the Jewish question in Europe, to get rid of the concentration camps and of the aftermath of Hitler's holocaust. I know, Mr. President, that this purpose was uppermost in your mind when you gave us your staunch and steady support in those critical days. We are now doing exactly what we were expected to do. We are liquidating one camp after another and have already brought over many thousands of their former inmates. Can we be expected at the same time to build up, alongside this big effort of reconstruction, a new Arab economy to absorb undreds of thousands of Arabs? For let there be no mistake about it: the Arab economic and social structure as it was prior to last year's exodus has ceased to exist. The Arab refugee question can be solved in a big way only by a comprehensive effort of reconstruction. The crucial question is: is that effort to be undertaken in Israel, with all the political, security and economic stresses and strains arising therefrom, or in the neighbouring Arab countries where vast fertile areas are available for such resettlement and where these people can find a home in the congenial surroundings of an Arab society?

Our policy, as I stated before, is not one of absolute refusal to readmit Arabs and we may, if real peace is established, be able to do more in this respect than if the present atmosphere of latent war and hostility continues. But an all-round solution can only be found as part of a general development scheme for the benefit of the Middle East as a whole. Towards such a development scheme Israel is ready to make its contribution: I hope it will be a significant contribution. But to achieve all this there must be negotiation, agreement and peace. The most vital need at the present hour is for Arabs and Jews to enter into direct negotiations and hammer out an agreed settlement. I plead with you, Mr. President, that you may use your unique influence to induce the Arab States to face the realities of the situation and to take that decisive step.

With affectionate greetings,

Yours very sincerely,

/s/

Ch. Weizman

The Hon. Harry S. Truman,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

B. File

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-, #104, September 12, 7 p.m., from Tel Aviv

Bernadotte and staff's urgent recommendation peace effort at UNA and their conviction that otherwise truce must lead to war within few weeks (REFMYTEL 101, September 10) are additional reasons immediate full recognition. There can be no fruitful peace negotiations until Arab states see that Israel is definitely established.

Although legal differences between de facto and de jure recognition are regarded by some distinguished lawyers as slight, it would be difficult exaggerate practical value US decision full recognition advance UN Assembly.

Mr. President, your and Secretary's action May 15 was highest statesmanship because it courageously set constructive example. Completion now of what you both then began might be decisive for peace in Palesting and Middle East.

Department please reply direct to Tel Aviv.

MCDONALD

NRH:MHP

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (F)

Dept. of State letter, 7-15-75

By NLT, HCL, NARS, Date 6-26-75

B File

~~TOP SECRET~~

B File

04-10

February 16, 1949

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to the raising of the American Mission at Tel Aviv and the Israeli Mission at Washington to the rank of embassies, the Israeli Government has now inquired whether this Government would approve the appointment of Mr. Eliahu Epstein, the present Special Representative of Israel at Washington, as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States. x20-B

Mr. Epstein has recently changed his name to Eliahu Elath and has been Special Representative of Israel at Washington since June 1948. x w.c.

I believe the appointment of Mr. Elath as Ambassador would be entirely satisfactory and, if you approve, I will be glad to inform the American Mission at Tel Aviv that your views may be communicated to the Israeli Government. n.c.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

x20

"APPROVED

HARRY S. TRUMAN"

Feb. 16, 1949

The President,
The White House.

B File

Crowds Cheer and Weep

Dr. Weizmann Is Inaugurated As Israel's First President

Jerusalem, Feb. 17 1949. Chaim Weizmann was inaugurated today as the first President of the young State of Israel in a ceremony filled with ancient Hebrew symbolism.

Thousands of spectators lining Jerusalem's streets cheered and wept for joy as they viewed the procession held for the 70-year-old scientist who has devoted a lifetime to the Zionist cause.

Weizmann took the oath in the Jewish Agency Building before the recently elected Israel Parliament. The 120-member Parliament named him President last night on the first ballot after adopting a new constitution.

He had been provisional President since last May, when the British surrendered their League of Nations mandate over Palestine and Israel proclaimed herself an independent nation. Weizmann is pro-Western and outspokenly anti-Russian in his views.

As Weizmann entered the cham-

ber for the ceremony today, the ceremonial ram's horn was sounded. Joseph Sprinzak, 63, Speaker of the House, administered the oath in Hebrew.

Solemnly raising his right hand, the man who heads the first Jewish state in 2000 years said:

"I Chaim ben Ozer Weizmann, as President of the State, swear allegiance to the State of Israel and its laws."

"Chaim ben Ozer" means Chaim, son of Ozer.

Weizmann stood before a huge portrait of Theodor Herzl, founder of the World Zionist Organization.

On each side of the portrait was a blue and white national flag. The hall was decorated by the flickering candles in seven-armed candelabra, a State emblem.

At the close of the ceremony, the Speaker of the House exclaimed: "Yehi Hanassi!" (Long live the President).

The audience cheered and broke into "Hatikvah," the Jewish national anthem.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE—DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

TELEGRAPH BRANCH

2-L

SECRET

Action: NEA

Info:

SS

C

EUR

UNA

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DCR

LOG

Control 3168

Rec'd February 8, 1949
5:54 p.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 113, February 8, 8 p.m.

US URGENT

ATTENTION PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY

Inaugural ceremony in Jerusalem of first Jewish constituent assembly in more than 3000 years will be epic historic occasion. Perhaps President may wish send President Weizmann and Jewish people special greetings. Invitation attend formal assembly received today. Hope Department will authorize my acceptance because non-attendance would deeply hurt Jewish sensibilities and in likely event that Yershov attends my absence would hurt our interests here.

If felt necessary my acceptance could be with formal written statement that it must not be taken to imply any change US position status of Jerusalem as declared UN resolutions.

MCDONALD

DES:PAB



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (G)

Dept. of State letter, 2-16-75

By NLT, HCC, NARS Date 2-26-75

PALESTINE MILITARY SITUATION 6 APRIL 1949


-  Armistice Line
-  Approximate Area under Israeli Civil or Military Control


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DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 10501

MEDITERRANEAN
SEA





DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



204-B

December 11, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CONNELLY



Referring to our telephone conversation, I am sending you herewith some suggestions as to what the President might say to the American members of the Joint Palestine Committee, who will be in Washington later this week, beginning Friday. We believe it to be most important that he speak very frankly to them about the serious responsibilities which they have undertaken.

Some of the persons appointed by the President to the Committee have expressed a desire to defer entering on their duties and have suggested, for example, that they might stay at home until after Christmas. In view of this feeling on their part it is believed that it would be most helpful for the President in conferring with the group to impress upon them the importance and urgency of their task. The American and British Governments attach the greatest importance to this inquiry and the members should be left in no doubt as to the fact that they have a full-time job before them which will be a real challenge to their energies. They have undertaken serious responsibilities involving the welfare of possibly millions of persons, lives of many thousands, the prestige of the United States and peace and stability in Europe and the Near East.

Both aspects of the inquiry are of the greatest importance. The continued indecision with regard to the future of Palestine is a contributing factor to the prevailing tension in Palestine as well as in the Near East as a whole and it is no exaggeration to say that no lasting peace can be expected in the area until an equitable solution is found to the Palestine problem.

The situation of the displaced Jews in Europe is no less a cause of the gravest concern, although some improvement has taken place since the Harrison report. The existing uncertainty as to the fact of these unfortunate victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution is most unfortunate and must be resolved as soon as possible.

There

There have been a number of commissions in the past which have gone to Palestine. They have not found a lasting solution, but this fact only serves to emphasize the importance of the inquiry which the present group is undertaking.

The Committee will undoubtedly receive a flood of petitions and material on the various aspects of its terms of reference and there will be many persons desiring to make their views known to the American group. While the Committee will have to draw up its own rules of procedure it is hoped that the members will take care not to receive petitioners except when sitting as a committee.

The members will pay particular attention to the request of the two Governments that they submit their report within 120 days. The problems with which they will be dealing are so urgent in character that it is to be hoped that the Committee will be able to complete its work well within that time limit.

The President may care to add that the terms of reference of the Committee have been worked out carefully between the British and American Governments. He had no reason to believe that the British Government was giving any private instructions to the British members of the Committee of Inquiry with regard to the interpretation of these terms. He had no comment to make with regard to these terms other than that they constituted all instructions which he had to give them with regard to the purpose of the inquiry.

Loy W. Henderson
Loy W. Henderson X
Director, Office of X20
Near Eastern and African Affairs

B. File

204-13


STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED AT THE WHITE HOUSE, MONDAY, JAN. 7, BY MR. ROSS:

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry is commencing this

morning to hold hearings on Palestine and the European Jews.

The President is glad to note that the Committee has started its proceedings so promptly. It is to be hoped that the Committee will be able successfully to complete its examination of the various matters contained in its terms of reference.

The fact that the British Members of the Committee have agreed that the inquiry should begin in Washington is also particularly welcome as evidence of the spirit of cooperation which the President is confident will characterize all the operations of the Committee.



x204
x76-6

B. File

and Department

File

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JANUARY 7, 1946

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry is beginning this morning to hold hearings on Palestine and the European Jews.

The President is glad to note that the Committee has started its proceedings so promptly. It is to be hoped that the Committee will be able successfully to complete its examination of the various matters contained in its terms of reference.

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- - -

January 7, 1946.

~~STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED AS PER WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, JAN. 7, 1946, BY MR. ROSS.~~

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry ^{*beginning*} is commencing this morning to hold hearings on Palestine and the European Jews.

The President is glad to note that the Committee has started its proceedings so promptly. It is to be hoped that the Committee will be able successfully to complete its examination of the various matters contained in its terms of reference.

The fact that the British Members of the Committee have agreed that the inquiry should begin in Washington is also particularly welcome as evidence of the spirit of cooperation which the President is confident will characterize all the operations of the Committee.

B..File

May 21

5/21/48

Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden Named As United Nations Mediator for Palestine

Lake Success, May 20 (AP)—Count Folke Bernadotte, of Sweden, was chosen tonight as United Nations mediator for Palestine.

Count Bernadotte, vice president

of the Swedish Red Cross, was picked by the five great powers after he had accepted a proffer of the assignment.

His selection came after the U. N. Security Council wrangled in

two sessions today over whether to use strong measures against warring Arabs and Jews in Palestine or adopt peaceful mediation.

The Council adjourned until tomorrow without a decision.

Count Bernadotte, 53, will go to Palestine as United Nations mediator backed by the authority of the 58-nation General Assembly.

The Swedish count, nephew of King Gustav, acted as intermediary between Heinrich Himmler and the Allied authorities in the closing days of World War II.

He will receive \$26,000 annually, tax free, with traveling expenses.

If the Security Council finally decides to resort to mediation, as asked by Sir Alexander Cadogan of Britain, that assignment likely will be entrusted to Count Bernadotte.

In the Security Council today, the Soviet Ukraine charged that the British are attacking Israel through the Arab Legion of Trans-Jordan.

Vasily A. Tarasenko, Ukrainian

Named Mediator For Palestine



COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE

delegate, declared Britain is a belligerent in the Palestine war.

The delegates must choose between a United States resolution calling for strong measures to stop the fighting in Palestine or for Cadogan's plan.

Neither proposal so far has enough votes pledged to pass the Council.

Tarasenko said the British-trained Arab Legion of King Abdullah is in reality an armed force of the British. He said the Legion nominally belongs to Trans-Jordan but has a British commander and British officers and is financed by Britain. The British contribute eight million dollars annually to support Trans-Jordan's forces.

The three-member U.N. truce commission reported from Jerusalem that all peace efforts had been rebuffed. The commission said the council could stop the fighting only by strong diplomatic and military pressure upon the Jews and Arabs.

B File



THE MAN BEHIND THE MAN BEHIND THE GUN

Shame, Britannia, Shame!

Great Britain's open connivance in Arab aggression in Palestine, its support of the Arab legions now seeking to level Jerusalem with their bombs, is a shameful blot upon that nation's history.

British-paid mercenaries in the Trans-Jordan army are the spearhead of the invading forces in the Holy Land. They are commanded by officers in the British army headed by Brigadier John Bagot Glubb Pasha. They are armed and equipped by the British. Their king, Abdullah, is on the payroll of the British Empire.

And while British policy in the Near East makes Great Britain a co-belligerent of the Arabs in their war against the new State of Israel, British policy in the United Nations seeks to hinder in every way every move that might stop the uneven conflict and prevent further bloodshed.

It is the British who have taken the lead in fighting the American proposal for a United Nations-enforced truce in Palestine, backed up if need be by the imposition of economic sanctions and the use of armed force.

When this measure was presented by the U. S. delegate, this newspaper predicted that it would be immediately enmeshed in debate and disputation that would subject it to endless delay. What was forecast has happened—with the British leading the way in opposition to the resolution.

No steps toward truce, but every possible move to help the Arabs execute their plans for extermination of the Jews: that has become the key policy of Great Britain.

England's traditional sportsmanship, even evidenced when her landed gentry ride to the hounds and allow the fox some opportunity for escape and freedom, is missing. Surely the hunted, the beaten, the depressed Jews might be given a sporting chance to escape the annihilation the world's most educated people are prescribing for them, even if they deny them any shading of humanitarianism.

There have been other chapters in world history when bands of colonists had to battle for their lives against the overwhelming odds

Britain massed against them. We doubt most earnestly that if Winston Churchill were leading that government he would be employing Mr. Bevin's tactics.

They are tactics established to support alleged Allies who deserted them in World Wars I and II. Tactics established to maintain a divide-and-rule formula. Tactics established by cold-blooded expediency and without moral justice. Tactics established by Mr. Bevin in setting up the Jew as a scapegoat to divert minds from Bevin's monstrous failures. Tactics established to maintain the economic supremacy and complete control that British capital possesses in the Middle East, so that it shall not be disturbed in any respect.

It is British policy to pay annual subsidies to support King Abdullah's troops. It is British policy to continue sending arms to the Arabs, in accordance with its treaties with the Arab states, unless the United Nations should designate them aggressors. And it is British policy to do everything possible at Lake Success to make sure the Arabs will not be termed aggressors—even as they march into Palestine.

The shameful unfairness of British support for the Arabs and British hostility toward the Jews, which leaves the latter defenseless while arming their enemies, is made even worse by the fact that it is the American taxpayer who is footing the bill for the British supplies sent the Arabs.

American funds granted under the Marshall Plan are intended for European recovery, not for the purpose of maintaining the frail framework of far-flung British equities in all the corners of the earth. The American taxpayer never intended his money to be employed to help Britain's Arab mercenaries kill Jews.

If, because of British hamstringing, we cannot act through United Nations machinery to stop this war, the Government of the United States should take immediate steps to prevent the outrageous diversion of its own funds for the implementation of this ghastly aggression.

Reprinted from The Philadelphia Inquirer, May 21, 1942.

B. File

January 31, 1949

REVISED DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

On October 24, 1948, the President stated that when a permanent government was elected in Israel, it would promptly be given de jure recognition. Elections for such a government were held on January 25th. The votes have now been counted, and this Government has been officially informed of the results. The United States Government is therefore pleased to extend de jure recognition to the Government of Israel as of this date.

Approved Jan. 31, 1949
Harry S. Truman

BRIEF

November 19, 1947

Dear Senator:

I certainly appreciated yours of the fifteenth in regard to Palestine. #

As you know, I have been wrestling with the Palestine problem for two and one-half years. I thought we had the matter settled but the federal autonomous state proposition last year by the New York Jews knocked that out and the matter had to finally be turned over to the United Nations. They have offered a settlement, which is practical, but I have my doubt as to whether it will be put into effect.

x 76-c

x 85-A

The Arabs are now asking for the same sort of program which the American - British Commission recommended a year and a half ago.

x 48 three

I have about come to the conclusion that the Palestine program is insoluble but I suppose we will have to keep working with it.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Honorable Elbert D. Thomas

United States Senate

Washington, D. C.

x 807 1988

x Gen

B. File

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

November 15, 1947

THE WHITE HOUSE
NOV 18 8 29 AM '47
RECEIVED

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear President Truman:

I do not know Palestine from first-hand knowledge today, but during the days that I wandered over the earth, I did cover Palestine quite carefully and I do know the country. It now appears that a solution of the Palestine problem is to be attempted again.

The wisdom of the solution is not my point. The division, though, may and undoubtedly will bring trouble. Is it, therefore, not time to be thoughtful about our distribution of arms to either side? Surely the logical action for us to take after the division has been consummated so that we will not see the equivalent of civil war will be the control of the sale of our arms. Both sides, of course, have enough to do great damage now, but we should endeavor to limit the bloodshed. At least we should not be a party to it. And above all, we should not take sides after United Nation's action; we should sustain that action.

Since I saw you, I have driven through most of the states by car, taking it slowly, and I have met scores of people. I have many reactions. It was good to do again a bit of political scouting on my own. I suppose I cannot get a bet out of anybody because no one seems to be interested, but I am.

I trust you are fine.

Most sincerely yours,



Elbert D. Thomas

B File

204
Misc.

May 5, 1948

7
5

Dear Congressman Klein:

I read your telegram of May third with a great deal of interest and appreciate your calling the matter to my attention.

x967

Of course, it seems to me that what's sauce for the goose ought to be sauce for the gander. As far as I am concerned, I don't think there has ever been any more lobbying and pulling and hauling than has been carried on by the Jews in this Palestine difficulty with which we have been faced. I have no objection to their lobbying - neither have I any objection to the Arabs doing so if they feel like it but, in neither case, does it affect my decisions or judgment.

x76-6
x204
x508

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Honorable Arthur G. Klein
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

x Men.
xPP72613

R. E.

MAY 3 3 15 PM '63
BU WASHINGTON DC MAY 3 151P

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

DISCLOSURE MADE IN A NEW YORK MAGISTRATE'S COURT THIS MORNING BEFORE JUDGE HYMAN RUSHEL BY BEN FREEDMAN, A NOTORIOUS FRONT MAN FOR THE ARAB OFFICE, INDICATING A CLOSE LIAISON BETWEEN HIM AND MR LOY HENDERSON, CHIEF OF THE DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS, MUST SURELY PROVE HENDERSON'S TOTAL UNFITNESS. TO OPERATE THAT DIVISION

x 508-Misc.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TRUE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

THIS IS BUT THE LAST IN A LONG SERIES OF DISCLOSURES OF HENDERSON'S BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE MOSLEM BLOC, THE MURDEROUS MUFTI OF JERUSALEM, HAJ AMIN EL HUSSEINI, AND THE ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL COMPANY AND ITS AFFILIATES AND ASSOCIATES, DEMONSTRATING HIS UNFITNESS TO ADMINISTER AMERICAN POLICY IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS.

THE DUPLICITY OF HENDERSON'S OFFICIAL ACTIONS IS PROVED, IN MY BELIEF.

B

I URGE YOU TO SUSPEND LOY HENDERSON AND HIS IMMEDIATE
SUBORDINATES FROM THEIR OFFICES AT ONCE
AND TO INITIATE A THOROUGH DEPARTMENTAL INVESTIGATION INTO
THE INCREDIBLE WEB OF ARABIAN AND MONOPOLY INTRIGUE WHICH
HAS FRUSTRATED HIGH AMERICAN POLICY, JEOPARDIZED THE
AUTHORITY AND THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
STULTIFIED OUR INTERNATIONAL MORAL POSITION, BETRAYED THE
HOPES OF THE DESPERATE JEWS OF EUROPE AND ASIA, AND
ENDANGERED THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.

AT THE SAME TIME, I MOST SOLEMNLY IMPORE YOU TO RESTORE

AT ONCE THE NOBLE AIMS PRESENTED BY THE UNITED STATES LAST
NOVEMBER WHICH RESULTED IN THE DECISION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS TO ENFORCE PARTITION AND MAKE POSSIBLE THE
CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT JEWISH STATE IN PALESTINE UNDER
PROTECTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND ALSO TO REMOVE THE
ARMS EMBARGO.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS

ARTHUR G KLEIN MEMBER OF CONGRESS.

B. F.

204-H

May 15, 1948

72
5-26

Misc.

Dear Mr. Crum:

I appreciated very much your letter of May eleventh.

You, of course, are familiar with all the effort put forth by me to get a peaceable and satisfactory settlement of the Palestine question. I am still hoping for just that.

x204

I think the report of the British American Commission on Palestine was the correct solution and, I think, eventually we are going to get it worked out just that way.

x204-B

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Mr. Bartley C. Crum x
164 Duane Street
New York 13, New York

x204-Misc.

R E

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CONNELLY:

Dear Matt:

Perhaps the President would be interested in reading this letter which is from Bartley C. Crum, as the new owner-publisher of the newspaper PM. Incidentally, it was left at the basement door, instead of coming in by mail.

E. A. A.

May 11, 1948

The President,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

I simply want you to know that I have been, since you appointed me a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, deeply conscious of the tremendous burden you have borne.

I have steadfastly asserted that I knew it was your deep desire that the displaced persons camps of Europe were cleaned out, and the victims of Hitler be given a chance to rebuild their lives in decency. x127

Now that I have become publisher of PM, I should like to reaffirm my conviction concerning you and my hope -- my very deep hope -- that your wishes will come true. It will mean so much to so many people who have needed a chance, and it will help to rebuild confidence in the moral integrity of our own country. //

Very sincerely yours,


Bartley C. Crum

BCC:mh

B File

WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL DETACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WTE V WHW

WHITE TWO TWO SEVEN

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

DTG : 231805Z

FROM: MR. CLIFFORD

TO : THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (B)
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973
By NLT-HC; NARS Date 5-26-79

AFTER READING STATEMENT OF DEWEY ON ISRAEL, I CONTACTED LOVETT AND HAVE SPENT MOST OF MORNING WITH HIM. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT YOUR INTEGRITY HAS BEEN ATTACKED BY DEWEY WHOSE PURPOSE IS TO INFER THAT YOU HAVE RENEGED ON DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM. I SUGGESTED TO LOVETT THAT BY REASON OF DEWEY'S ACTION, YOU HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO REAFFIRM YOUR SUPPORT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM. LOVETT AGREES COMPLETELY. I SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO GIVE OUT STATEMENT CLEARLY STATING YOUR POSITION ON ISRAEL. LOVETT AGREES. HE SENT MARSHALL A CABLE STATING IN SUBSTANCE THAT DEWEY HAS VIOLATED BIPARTISAN APPROACH ON ISRAEL. AND THAT LOVETT FEELS THAT PRESIDENT HAS TO REAFFIRM HIS SUPPORT OF DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM. I AM WORKING ON A STATEMENT ON ISRAEL NOW AND WILL HAVE IT READY TO SUBMIT TO YOU ON SUNDAY MORNING. I CONSIDER DEWEY'S ACTION A SERIOUS ERROR ON HIS PART AND THE BEST THING THAT HAS HAPPENED TO US TO DATE. AFFECTIONATE REGARDS.

RECD : 231825Z/VZ

~~secret~~

B. File
~~secret~~

MAY 10 7 01 1948

NEW YORK NY MAY 9 1948

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

*204
miscel.*

DEAR MR PRESIDENT IT IS MY SINCERE BELIEF AND OPINION THAT THE BLOODY CONFLICT IN PALESTINE SCHEDULED TO ERUPT INTO FULL SCALE HOSTILITIES MAY 16 CAN BE AVERTED BY ONE IMMEDIATE STEP WITHOUT WAITING FOR MAY 15 WHEN THE JEWISH STATE WILL COME INTO OFFICIAL EXISTANCE PURSUANT TO THE STILL VALID DECISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON PARTITION THE UNITED STATES MUST

no reference to Mr. Niles is in file 6-28-49

IMMEDIATELY EXTEND "DEFACTO" RECOGNITION TO THE JEWISH GOVERNMENT NOW ESTABLISHED IN TELAVIV THIS SINGLE STEP WILL BE FULL NOTICE TO ABDULLAH OF TRANS JORDAN AND THE OTHER ARAB AGGRESSORS THAT THEY MUST NOT INVADE IT WOULD BE A FORMAL NOTICE TO THE WORLD THAT OUR GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THAT JEWISH GOVERNMENT HAS "EQUITABLE" TITLE TO THE JEWISH AREAS ON PALESTINE WHICH "EQUITABLE" TITLE WILL BECOME FORMALIZED AT THE END OF THIS WEEK THE PRESTIGE OF OUR BELOVED COUNTRY IS AT STAKE ACT AND ACT NOW BEFORE THE BLOOD OF MORE INNOCENT SHALL HAVE BEEN SPILLED VERY SINCERELY

PHILIP J SCHUPLER

MEMBER OF NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY.

B 51

1395
May 17, 1948

Dear Rabbi Thurman:

I enjoyed the visit with you very much and appreciated most highly your letter of May thirteenth.

It looks as if the Palestine situation is very dark this morning although we recognized the Jewish free state as soon as they organized a Government and asked us for recognition.

x204
x204-10

I shall remember your offer of service and expect to make use of it if the going gets any rougher.

I hope you had a pleasant visit here and a good trip home.


Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Rabbi Samuel Thurman #
United Hebrew Congregation
Skinker Boulevard, near Wydown
Saint Louis, Missouri

x204-10 M. sec.
x204- M. sec.
x76-6

B. Fil



UNITED HEBREW CONGREGATION

BANKER BLDG. NEAR WYDORN

SAINT LOUIS,

MISSOURI

*as per
5-17-48
JH*

SAMUEL THURMAN, RABBI

May 17, 1948

Honorable Harry S. Truman
White House
Washington, D. C.

*File
C. new to the
President's file
by May 20, 1948*

Dear Mr. President:

May I add a word to the telegram which I sent you last Friday. My heart is full of thanksgiving for the courageous and noble action which you took by your immediate recognition of "Israel".

America is now at Israel's cradle-virtually, as its mother. As such, it has a high responsibility - born, I trust, of no little maternal affection and concern.

There is much nursing and nurturing to be done to make the new nation live and grow to fulfill the two-thousand years old dream, hope and prayer of the Children of Israel.

You know better than anyone else the decisive measures which are needed to make America's recognition the key that shall open the doors of worldwide acceptance of Israel.

The new Jewish State must look to us and to the United Nations for immediate help to withstand this unwarranted act of aggression on the part of the non-Palestinian Arabs. You, in your wisdom and in your high humanity, together with your chosen counselors and administrators, will surely find a way in which to render this help.

May God bless you, and the nation which is blessed by your high and dauntless leadership.

Devotedly,

Samuel Thurman
Samuel Thurman

ST:bf

B File

WB1272 PD

STLOUIS MO MAY 14 1948 455P

HON HARRY S TRUMAN, PERSONAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

GOD BLESS YOU AND OUR GREAT NATION FOR RECOGNIZING ISRAEL

RABBI SAMUEL THURMAN.

TRUMAN LIBRARY
of
S. TRUMAN
of
PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL FILE

The White House
Washington

WB1272 PD

MAY 14 8 35 PM 1948

ST LOUIS MO MAY 14 1948 455P

HON HARRY S TRUMAN, PERSONAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

GOD BLESS YOU AND OUR GREAT NATION FOR RECOGNIZING ISRAEL

RABBI SAMUEL THURMAN.

5-18-48
JH

~~Truman Library~~
File in
view of the
President's letter
of May 17, 1948

B. File

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

It is vital that the American people have a clear understanding of the position of the United States in the United Nations regarding Palestine.

This country vigorously supported the plan for Partition with Economic Union recommended by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and by the General Assembly. We have explored every possibility consistent with the basic principles of the Charter for giving effect to that solution. Unfortunately, it has become clear that the partition plan cannot be carried out at this time by peaceful means. We could not undertake to impose this solution on the people of Palestine by the use of American troops, both on Charter grounds and as a matter of national policy.

The United Kingdom has announced its firm intention to abandon its mandate in Palestine on May 15. Unless emergency action is taken, there will be no public authority in Palestine on that date capable of preserving law and order. Violence and bloodshed will descend upon the Holy Land. Large scale fighting among the people of that country will be the inevitable result. Such fighting would infect the entire Middle East and could lead to consequences of the gravest sort involving the peace of this nation and of the world.

These dangers are imminent. Responsible governments in the United Nations cannot face this prospect without acting promptly to prevent it. The United States has proposed to the Security Council a temporary United Nations trusteeship for Palestine to provide a government to keep the peace. Such trusteeship was proposed only after we had exhausted every effort to find a way to carry out partition by peaceful means. Trusteeship is not proposed as a substitute for the partition plan but as an effort to fill the vacuum soon to be created by the termination of the mandate on May 15. The trusteeship does not prejudice the character of the final political settlement. It would establish the conditions of order which are essential to a peaceful solution.

If we are to avert tragedy in Palestine, an immediate truce must be reached between the Arabs and Jews of that country. I am instructing Ambassador Austin to urge upon the Security Council in the strongest terms that representatives of the Arabs and Jews be called at once to the Council table to arrange such a truce.

The United States is prepared to lend every appropriate assistance to the United Nations in preventing bloodshed and in reaching a peaceful settlement. If the United Nations agrees to a temporary trusteeship, we must take our share of the necessary responsibility. Our regard for the United Nations, for the peace of the world and for our own self-interest does not permit us to do less.

With such a truce and such a trusteeship, a peaceful settlement is yet possible; without them, open warfare is just over the horizon. American policy in this emergency period is based squarely upon the recognition of this inescapable fact.

Washington, D.C.
May 7, 1943

Mr. Peter Bergson
Committee for a Jewish Army of
Stateless and Palestinian Jews
New York City

Dear Mr. Bergson:

Senator Lucas yesterday called my attention to an advertisement in the New York Times to which was signed the names of some dozen or so Senators and to which the name of Senator Edwin C. Johnson was signed as Chairman.

Senator Johnson informs me this advertisement was never submitted to him for approval, and I have the same information from a number of other Senators.

I am withdrawing my name from your Committee, and you are not authorized under any circumstances to make use of it for any purpose in the future.

This does not mean my sympathies are not with the down-trodden Jews of Europe, but when you take it on yourself without consultation to attack members of the Senate and House of Representatives who are working in your interest I cannot approve of that procedure.

Sincerely yours,

HST:MLD

Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.

B. File



2317-15TH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Telephone: ADams 0840

COMMITTEE FOR A JEWISH ARMY
OF STATELESS AND PALESTINIAN JEWS

My Dear Senator:

From our wire and newspaper headlines you must be aware of the serious situation now in the Middle East.

We are therefore taking the liberty of enclosing a short memorandum covering the main points of our plan for the immediate creation of a Jewish Army in that threatened area.

Sincerely yours,

Baruch E. Rabinowitz

BARUCH E. RABINOWITZ

Honorable Harry S. Truman
Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C.

June 22nd, 1942

Washington, D.C.
May 7, 1943

Mr. Baruch E. Rabinowitz
Committee for a Jewish Army
2317 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rabinowitz:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of letter which I have just sent Mr. Peter Bergson.

Sincerely yours,

HST:MLD
encl.

Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.

Washington, D.C.
June 26, 1942

Mr. Baruch S. Rabinowitz
Committee for a Jewish Army
2317 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Rabinowitz:

I appreciate very much your sending me the memorandum
on the highlights of the Jewish Army.

Sincerely yours,

HST:MLD

Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.

May 6, 1943

Mr. Peter Bergson,
Committee for a Jewish Army of
Stateless and Palestinian Jews,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Bergson:

I have before me a copy of an advertisement appearing in the May 4th issue of the New York Times in which, among other things, the recent Bermuda Conference is discussed adversely.

In this advertisement there appeared in a separate column the names of prominent Americans, including many Senators. My name appears as National Chairman of this organization. While there is nothing to indicate that this group of distinguished citizens endorses the specific advertisement, the inference might be made that they do. I did not see it until it was called to my attention the next day.

The Committee and I must come to an understanding at once that greater caution be exercised in publishing the names of Senators who favor our cause.

The State Department appointed our distinguished colleague, Senator Scott W. Lucas, one of the three representatives of the United States to the Bermuda Conference. For reasons which appear important to this Conference, no report has been issued as yet. I am advised that one will be forthcoming as soon as it is deemed certain that such report will be of no advantage to our enemies.

My colleagues and I have great respect for Senator Lucas and we do not deem it fair to him to prejudge or condemn the work of the committee until after it has had sufficient opportunity to make a report. None of the work of the Conference has been disclosed to me in confidence or otherwise, and in all fairness I must therefore withhold my judgment until such time as I know what actually took place in the Conference.

As you know, I have been very hopeful that the Conference would find a practical way to save five million Jews in Central Europe from death by torture.

Sincerely,

B. File

Rommel's break-through in Libya brings into sharp attention the need for a Jewish Army in the Middle East, as constantly demanded through the medium of the Committee for a Jewish Army of Palestinian and Stateless Jews.

1. This demand is now more than ever of primary importance because 100,000 men can be instantly mobilized into a Jewish Army in Palestine and the Near East. No shipping is necessary to transport this army because the borders of Palestine are but 75 miles from the banks of the Suez Canal. Another 100,000 stateless Jews, driven from their homes and countries, can also be mobilized.
 2. The only population in the Near East upon which the Allied Nations can rely with utmost certainty are the Jews of Palestine and the surrounding countries. The Arabs have proven in Syria, Iraq and Egypt that they are easily molded by Axis fifth-column activities, and that many of them will openly side with the Axis when the opportunity presents itself.
 3. Palestine is the gateway to the Persian Gulf, the back-door to Russia. It is also where Hitler and Hirohito hope to join hands and thus have complete access to the oil and minerals of the heart of the "World Island", which is the Middle East.
 4. The Italian navy suffered a major setback in the latest Mediterranean sea battle, but it also achieved its objective, which was to prevent reinforcements reaching Libya, in the Middle East. The crisis of manpower, which destroyed Singapore, Malaya, Burma, Crete, Hongkong and other positions now threatens the Middle East.
- 100,000 men on the spot are worth 3,000,000 men yet to be drafted and transported. The bitter defeats which the United Nations have suffered in this war can be traced almost exclusively to the lack of manpower. The last time the British fell back in Libya, they were outnumbered by Rommel's 90,000 Axis troops; Singapore was lost to 100,000 Japanese; General Stillwell said that 50,000 more troops would have frustrated the Japanese attempt on Burma. 100,000 Jewish troops in the fight can decide the fate of the Near East.
- Prime Minister Churchill spotlighted this situation in the following words: "The crisis of equipment is largely over and an ever broadening flow is now assured. The crisis of manpower and womenpower is at hand and will dominate the year 1942."
5. The Jews of Palestine, united in their love for their country, their hate for Hitlerism, and their faith in democracy, provide the unbreakable morale that is the absolute condition of victory. It was Lord Beaverbrook who said: "Singapore was not lost to superior equipment. On the contrary, the weight of munitions was on our side -- unbreakable morale is the first necessity. It is the absolute condition of victory."
 6. The Jews of Palestine are determined to defend their homes against Hitler aggression. They will fight with their bare hands if need be. Armed, they will fight with a fanaticism and fervor unequalled in this struggle. If one lesson can be learned from the war to date, it is that the Axis hordes are best opposed by people defending their homes, families and native soil. The heroic stand of the Philipinos, the Chinese, the Yugoslav Chetniki, the Greeks, the Russians and the British themselves, prove this to be an irrefutable truth.
 7. If the Jews of the Middle East are slaughtered unarmed, it will be the greatest blow to Allied morale in this war because the aims of the Atlantic Charter will then be suspect wherever free men still breathe.
 8. There is no doubt in the minds of any of the military experts that if the Nazi Pincer Movement is successful in the Middle East and Suez is lost to the Allies, this war will take innumerable years to wage, and that victory for the democracies will be far from certain. The Axis nations will become the "haves", and the democracies will become the "have nots".

9. "From every point of view, military and moral, the Jewish Army must be formed immediately. Lord Davies expressed the moral point of view in a stern warning to the British people when he said in a letter to the Manchester Guardian: "In this tragic conflict we must be for or against the Jews; there can be no neutrality. Our attitude towards them becomes the test of our professions and the sincerity of our war aims. It strikes at the root of our morale, and if we abandon the Jews we abandon everything, because Hitler has chosen to make them his special target. Whether we like it or not, and however inconvenient it may be, the Jewish people has become the personification of the issues involved in this world struggle between right and wrong, between good and evil.

"If we desert the Jews it may result in our losing the war, because it is a betrayal of our avowed war aims. Surely, it is the height of folly to repudiate our principles and to cold-shoulder our friends in order to curry favor with neutrals or potential enemies."

10. The issue is plain and clear: 100,000 courageous Jews to face and to stem Rommel's 100,000 Nazis. It is therefore imperative to impress upon the English Prime Minister, now in Washington, that he must take this matter into his own capable hands and in accordance with his own wisdom and vision, act before it is too late.

THEREFORE:

The Committee for a Jewish Army of Stateless and Palestinian Jews makes the following urgent proposals:

- A. That the Imperial War Council adopt the decision to form a Jewish Army to be placed under the Supreme Allied Command.
- B. That the Middle Eastern High Command begin, without delay to recruit and train such a Jewish Army in whichever of the Middle Eastern countries they find most expedient from a military point of view. Volunteers for this army will come from amongst the million Jews residing in the Middle East, particularly from Palestine. Conservative estimates show that between 80,000 and 100,000 men will answer this call.

Submitted by:
Committee for a Jewish Army
535 Fifth Avenue
New York City

2317 - 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

B. File

Washington, D.C.
May 7, 1943

Mr. Pierre van Paassen, National Chairman
Committee for a Jewish Army
535 Fifth Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. van Paassen:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of letter which I have
just sent Mr. Peter Bergson.

Sincerely yours,

Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.

HST:MLD
encl.

Mr. Pierre van Paassen, National Chairman
Committee for a Jewish Army
535 Fifth Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. van Paassen:

I will be glad to talk with Dr. A. Hadani some time at his convenience, but I am not very strong for a Jewish Army.

I am enclosing you a copy of a letter which I wrote to Congressman Somers on the same subject some time in January.

Sincerely yours,

Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.

HST:MLD
encl.

B File
D

The rumor told of representatives of the United States and Great Britain, the leading champions of the United Nations, the protagonists of the Four Freedoms, assembling to save the hunted and tortured Jews of Europe. On the deliberations of this small convention on an island in the Atlantic were focused all the hopes of the doomed Jews of Europe; those, too, of the free well-meaning people the world over. Men and women of good will everywhere at last believed that the United Nations had decided to do something about the unprecedented disaster of a people put to death.

Wretched, doomed victims of Hitler's tyranny! Poor men and women of good faith the world over! have cherished an illusion. Your hopes have been in vain. Bermuda was not the dawn of a new era, of an era of humanity and compassion, of translating pity into deed. Bermuda was a mockery, and a cruel jest.

THIS is not our definition. It is the definition of the London Sunday "Observer"—one of the most influential and important newspapers in Great Britain.

Not only were ways and means to save the remaining four million Jews in Europe not devised, but their problem was not even touched upon, put on the agenda, or discussed. More than that—the name "Jews" was banished from the vocabulary of this convention, as *PM's* foreign editor, Alexander Uhl, reports: "It was regarded as almost improper to mention even the word Jew."

But not only the attention of the victims of Nazi atrocities and of their friends the world over was concentrated on the meeting at Bermuda: Hitler, too, was concerned with the United Nations' reply to his challenge to the extermination of the Jewish population in Europe. Alas! To him Bermuda was again convincing proof that the United Nations were neither ready nor willing to answer his threat with action. They were continuing to give him "cette blanche" in his extermination process, exactly as in the pre-war days they permitted him to deal with Jews in Germany, with Austria and Czechoslovakia, thus paving the way for aggression, invasion, and war.

Can it be possible that the United Nations do not understand that should Hitler succeed in exterminating the Jews as a people, they by their silence will pave the way to the extermination of the Czechoslovak, Polish, Greek or even the French peoples?

Now we are witnessing a variety of attempts to justify the Bermuda failure, to wrap it in secret formulae, such as "no dealing with Hitler," or "not to interfere with the prosecution of the war," or "not to undertake anything which should prolong the war," etc. All this is just throwing sand into the eyes of public opinion. All this has nothing to do with the real facts and the harrowing truth.

The facts, plain and simple, are the following:

(a) This is a specific problem of Jewish disaster. Hitler did not (as yet) decree the extermination of all the peoples of Europe, he decreed the extermination of the Jewish people in Europe and this process of extermination is unabated and steady. Two million or more have been put to death already!

The Jewish Problem Is Not a Refugee Problem

With the Bermuda Conference a thing of the past, not having even discussed the problem of the extermination of the Jewish people in Europe, now, more than ever, it is clear that we are dealing not only with a **refugee problem**, but with the **Jewish problem** of Europe. These two problems should not be confused. They are entirely distinct. Democracy cannot connive with the slaughter of millions of innocent civilian people—the Jews in Europe. There are ways and means to stop Hitler's wholesale murder and to evacuate those who can be evacuated. **But no one has been assigned to deal with this tremendous problem.** What is necessary is that the machinery for action be created. The United Nations, which have uttered so many words of pity must now **do** something if these words of pity are to be more than empty lies. They must create a United Nations Agency composed of military and diplomatic experts, which should have full authority to define and effectuate a realistic and stern policy of action, to save the remaining millions of Jewish people. **This Agency or Commission will deal, not with refugees outside Hitler's reach, but with the Jewish people under his yoke today.**

A Program of Action (... Not Pity!)

There are two broad areas in which this Agency can begin to operate without delay or procrastination.

1. Immediate utilization of all existing possibilities of transfer of Jews from Hitler-dominated countries to Palestine or to any temporary refuge and the initiation of all further possibilities in this program.

2. The immediate creation of a Jewish army of stateless and Palestinian Jews, including "suicide" Commando squads, and Air Squadrons for retaliatory bombing, which will raid deep into Germany, thus participating as an entity in the war and bringing their message of hope to Hitler's victims.

Join the Crusade for Decency

Sincerely yours,

COPY

Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.

HST:MLD

Washington, D.C.
January 28, 1942

Honorable Andrew L. Somers
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Dear Congressman Somers:..

Appreciate very much your good letter of the Twenty Sixth, regarding the proposed Jewish Army.

I have had a great deal of correspondence about this suggestion but so far as the United States is concerned I think the best thing for the Jews to do is to go right in to our Army as they did in the last war and make the same sort of good soldiers as they did before.

It is an honorable undertaking to organize an Army for Palestine but I think American citizens ought to serve in the American Army.

Sincerely yours,

HST:MLD

Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.

Honorable Andrew L. Somers
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

January 26, 1942

Honorable Harry S. Truman,
U. S. Senate,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator::


I have become very much interested in a movement which I believe will go far to end the persecutions of the Jewish Race by governments in the future.

We realize, of course, that the basic reason for this persecution is the defenselessness of the Jewish people. They have only in recent years established a homeland in Palestine. This was a necessary step, of course, but without the means of defending it through military preparedness, they cannot win the respect necessary to preserve them from persecution, nor can they claim a place in the conference of Nations.

To that end, I have advocated recently in a series of speeches throughout the United States, the organization of a Jewish Army for Palestine. Also, I have presented a Resolution asking the President to direct the Secretary of State to prevail upon the British Government to authorize such an Army.

I am sure that you will understand and will sympathize with these people who, for generations, have suffered persecution only because they were homeless. I would appreciate it very much if you would give me your reactions to these thoughts of mine. Any opinions you may express will be held in the strictest confidence if you feel it should be so.

Yours very truly,



Andrew L. Somers.

B. File

Washington, D.C.
May 7, 1943

Mr. William Rosenwald, National Chairman
United Jewish Appeal for Refugees, Overseas
Needs and Palestine
342 Madison Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. Rosenwald:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of letter which I have just
sent Mr. Peter Bergson.

Sincerely yours,

HST:MLD
endl.

Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.

To 5,000,000 Jews in the Nazi Death-Trap Bermuda Was a "Cruel Mockery"

THE VOICE OF AMERICA

"... We shall no longer witness with pity alone, and with passive sympathy, the calculated extermination of the ancient Jewish people by the barbarous Nazis."

(From the preamble of the Proclamation on the moral rights of the Stateless and Persecuted Jews.)

Major Gen. Charles E. Sayer
Rear-Admiral Charles B. Dyer
Rear-Admiral Richard E. Byrd
Major-Gen. Fox Connor
Major-Gen. William Crozier
Major-Gen. Robert G. Davis
Rear-Admiral Ralph Davies
Major-Gen. George S. Messersmith
Major-Gen. Charles R. Feltmeyer
Major-Gen. Robert E. Fox
Major-Gen. Sig. A. Harbo
Colonel A. E. Reynolds
Major-Gen. Roy A. Sullivan
Major-Gen. F. E. Thompson
Rear-Admiral H. F. Tabor
Gen. Edward M. Lewis
Major-Gen. Marshall Magruder
Major-Gen. Edw. M. McLaughlin, Jr.
Major-Gen. George W. Nelson
Major-Gen. James A. Nease
Major-Gen. H. H. Morris
Major-Gen. J. Earl Pratt
Major-Gen. John F. Purness
Major-Gen. Charles B. Reynolds
Vice-Admiral E. M. Sullivan
Rear-Admiral George H. Sayer
Major-Gen. A. E. Smith
Admiral Joseph Sweeney
Major-Gen. George S. Sweeney
Vice-Admiral R. B. Warden
Rear-Admiral Harry Ezra Tarrant
Gen. John H. Bushfield (USA)
Gen. Walter S. Brown (USA)
Gen. Theodore G. Brien (USA)
Gen. Arthur C. Brown (USA)
Gen. Albert S. Chandler (USA)
Gen. James J. Davis (USA)
Gen. Stephen Dwyer (USA)
Gen. Roy M. Gillis (USA)
Gen. Curtis G. Glavin (USA)
Gen. Joseph F. Gurney (USA)
Gen. John F. Johnson (USA)
Gen. Harry M. Johnson (USA)
Gen. William L. Ladd (USA)

When Will The United Nations Establish An Agency To Deal With The Problem of Hitler's Extermination of a Whole People?

SOMEHOW, through invisible, underground channels, one ray of shining hope might have penetrated the ghettos of Europe. A rumor might have spread and grown into a whisper among the agonized Jews of Hitler's hell. A whisper telling of deliverance from torture, death, starvation and agony in slaughter-houses. This ray of hope and this whisper were expressed in one word: *Bermuda!*

The rumor told of representatives of the United States and Great Britain, the leading champions of the United Nations, the protagonists of the Four Freedoms, assembling to save the hunted and tortured Jews of Europe. On the deliberations of this small convention on an island in the Atlantic were focused all the hopes of the doomed Jews of Europe; those, too, of the free well-meaning people the world over. Men and women of good will everywhere at last believed that the United Nations had decided to do something about the unprecedented disaster of a people put to death.

Wretched, doomed victims of Hitler's tyranny! Poor men and women of good faith the world over! You have cherished an illusion. Your hopes have been in vain. Bermuda was not the dawn of a new era, of an era of humanity and compassion, of translating pity into deed. Bermuda was a mockery, and a cruel jest.

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But not only the attention of the victims of Nazi atrocities, and of their friends the world over was concentrated on the

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With the Bermuda Conference a thing of the past, not having even discussed the problem of the extermination of the Jewish people in Europe, now, more than ever, it is clear that we are dealing not only with a *refugee problem*, but with the *Jewish problem* of Europe. These two problems should not be confused. They are entirely distinct. Democracy cannot connive with the slaughter of millions of innocent civilian people—the Jews in Europe. There are ways and means to stop Hitler's wholesale murder and to evacuate those who can be evacuated. But we can have

"We must learn to know that guerilla warfare against the Germans in Serbia helps us; that a successful Russian offensive against the Germans helps us and that British successes on land or sea in any part of the world strengthen our hands."

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

COMMITTEE FOR A JEWISH ARMY

(COMPOSED OF STATELESS AND PALESTINIAN JEWS)

535 FIFTH AVENUE

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Murray Hill 2-7237

"The decision of the war will be fought out in the Near East, over the Evangelic hills of Galilee . . . There will take place the ultimate clash between us and the evil forces of our time. That is why a Jewish army is not a matter of concern for the Jewish people alone. There is time to make the Jewish Army a reality. Now it can be done. Now it must be done."

PIERRE VAN PAASSEN

May 19, 1942

Hon. Chairmen

Dr. SAMUEL HARDEN CHURCH
Col. JOHN HENRY PATTERSON
D.S.O.

PIERRE VAN PAASSEN

Chairman

LOUIS FITCH, K. C.

Vice Chairman

ALFRED A. STRELSIN

Chairman-Executive Board

and Trustee

MEIR GROSSMAN

Vice Chairman-Executive Board

PETER H. BREGSON

National Director

GABRIEL A. WECHSLER

Secretary

Hon. Harry S. Truman

U. S. Senate

Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator:

I am sure that you will be interested to know that the Committee for a Jewish Army of Stateless and Palestinian Jews has established new headquarters in Washington, (2317 - 15th Street, N.W.).

I am taking the liberty to ask that you grant an interview to Dr. A. Hadani, one of our representatives in Washington. I know how busy you are, but still I hope that you will find time to listen to our representative on our aims and the significance of our movement for the best interests of the United Nations' strategy.

Dr. Hadani is a member of the Palestinian delegation which came to this country to promote the Jewish Army plan. He is a brilliant scholar and authority on Middle Eastern affairs. Dr. Hadani will call upon your secretary in order to arrange for an appointment.

Thanking you for your courtesy in advance, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

Pierre van Paassen

Pierre van Paassen
National Chairman

Committee

Very Rev. H. P. ALMON ABBOTT

Bishop of Lexington, Ky.

HALLEY ABEND

Foreign Correspondent

Rabbi AARON ASHINSKY

Pittsburgh, Pa.

Repr. WILLIAM B. BARRY

(N. Y.)

Dr. CARL BECK

Surgeon, Chicago

Y. BEN-AMI

Palestine

Repr. GEORGE H. BENDER, (Ohio)

A. BEN-ELIEZER

Palestine

Rabbi BERNARD BERGMAN

New York, N. Y.

Rabbi JOSHUA BLOCH

New Hyde Park, N. Y.

Rabbi PHILIP D. BOOKSTABER

Harrisburg, Pa.

Rabbi JACOB BOGNIAC

Brooklyn, N. Y.

Repr. FRED BRADLEY, (Mich.)

Repr. MICHAEL J. BRADLEY

(Pa.)

JOSEPH BRADIN

Publicist

Rabbi WILLIAM G. BRAUDE

Providence, R. I.

Hon. MILLER M. BRISTER

Chairman,

N. Y. City Fusion Party

LOUIS BROMFIELD

Author

SENATOR PRENTISS M. BROWN

(Mich.)

Rev. DUNCAN H. BROWNE

St. James Church, Chicago

Continued on Page Three

B Eile

Can it be possible that the United Nations do not understand that should Hitler succeed in exterminating the Jews as a people, they by their silence will pave the way to the extermination of the Czechoslovak, Polish, Greek or even the French peoples?

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(a) This is a specific problem of Jewish disaster. Hitler did not (as yet) decree the extermination of all the peoples of Europe, he decreed the extermination of the Jewish people in Europe and this process of extermination is unabated and steady. Two million or more have been put to death already!

(b) Five million Jews in Europe still live. The governments of Roumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, all satellites of Germany, are willing to release their Jews any time the United Nations are willing to take part in the deliverance. By doing so, they hope to find grace and pardon in the eyes of the United Nations whom they consider as the inevitable victors in this world struggle.

(c) The United Nations have taken no advantage of these offers. They have not done so for one reason: the British government has prevented them, fearing that public opinion will demand that these refugees be admitted into Palestine—a practical place of salvation only a few days away from the Axis countries by short water route, train or even bus, where the new Hebrew Nation awaits them with open arms.

... to define and effectuate a realistic and stern policy of action, to save the remaining millions of Jewish people. **This Agency or Commission will deal, not with refugees outside Hitler's reach, but with the Jewish people under his yoke today.**

A Program of Action (... Not Pity!)

There are two broad areas in which this Agency can to operate without delay or procrastination.

1. Immediate utilization of all existing possibilities of transfer of Jews from Hitler-dominated countries to Palestine or to any temporary refuge and the initiation of all possibilities in this program.

2. The immediate creation of a Jewish army of land and Palestinian Jews, including "suicide" Commandos and Air Squadrons for retaliatory bombing, which will deep into Germany, thus participating as an entity in it and bringing their message of hope to Hitler's victims.

Join the Crusade for Decency

The crime of Europe calls for the mobilization of every shred of righteousness and spiritual power left in the world. **On the field of battle soldiers die. On the field of massacre civilization dies.** The thunder of civilization against the swamp-like antics of the German government is alone capable of stopping the German crime against life. Such a thunder unleashed by our own representatives and by all the nations that serve the cause of God would strike terror into the souls of the German people.

Therefore we dedicate ourselves to this fight and we call upon every American to join hands with us in this crusade for humanity and decency.

Every citizen is part of the collective conscience of America; this conscience has never been found wanting. Demand action from your government against the German massacre of the Jews.

COMMITTEE FOR A JEWISH ARMY OF STATELESS AND PALESTINIAN JEWS

NATIONAL CHAIRMAN:

Hon. EDWIN C. JOHNSON, United States Senator, Colorado

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

515 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. MUrray Hill 2-7237
2317 FIFTEENTH STREET, N. W., WASHINGTON, D. C. ADams 0840

REGIONAL OFFICES

Pennsylvania Division
116 Walnut St., Philadelphia, Pa.

New England Division
133 Washington St., Boston, Mass.

South-Western Division
1108 Congress St., Houston, Tex.

Mid-Western Division
129 So. Clark St., Chicago, Ill.

Pacific Coast Division
416 W. 8th St., Los Angeles, Calif.



I want to help your campaign "Save European Jewry by action—not pity." You have my support in carrying your fight through the press, the radio, and in public meetings throughout the country, as well as in your endeavors in Washington and London—capitals of the United Nations.

S.....

Name

Address

PLEASE MAKE YOUR CHECK PAYABLE TO THE COMMITTEE FOR A JEWISH ARMY OF STATELESS AND PALESTINIAN JEWS.

515 FIFTH AVENUE, N. Y. C.

January 26, 1942

Honorable Harry S. Truman,
U. S. Senate,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator::

I have become very much interested in a movement which I believe will go far to end the persecutions of the Jewish Race by governments in the future.

We realize, of course, that the basic reason for this persecution is the defenselessness of the Jewish people. They have only in recent years established a homeland in Palestine. This was a necessary step, of course, but without the means of defending it through military preparedness, they cannot win the respect necessary to preserve them from persecution, nor can they claim a place in the conference of Nations.

To that end, I have advocated recently in a series of speeches throughout the United States, the organization of a Jewish Army for Palestine. Also, I have presented a Resolution asking the President to direct the Secretary of State to prevail upon the British Government to authorize such an Army.

I am sure that you will understand and will sympathize with these people who, for generations, have suffered persecution only because they were homeless. I would appreciate it very much if you would give me your reactions to these thoughts of mine. Any opinions you may express will be held in the strictest confidence if you feel it should be so.

Yours very truly,



Andrew L. Somers.

B. File

Sincerely yours,

COPY

Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.

HST:MLD

Washington, D.C.
January 28, 1942

Honorable Andrew L. Somers
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Dear Congressman Somers:..

Appreciate very much your good letter of the Twenty Sixth,
regarding the proposed Jewish Army.

I have had a great deal of correspondence about this suggestion but so far as the United States is concerned I think the best thing for the Jews to do is to go right in to our Army as they did in the last war and make the same sort of good soldiers as they did before.

It is an honorable undertaking to organize an Army for Palestine but I think American citizens ought to serve in the American Army.

Sincerely yours,

HST:MLD

Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.

Honorable Andrew L. Somers
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

"We must learn to know that guerilla warfare against the Germans in Serbia helps us; that a successful Russian offensive against the Germans helps us and that British successes on land or sea in any part of the world strengthen our hands."

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

COMMITTEE FOR A JEWISH ARMY

(COMPOSED OF STATELESS AND PALESTINIAN JEWS)

535 FIFTH AVENUE

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Murray Hill 2-7237

"The decision of the war will be fought out in the Near East, over the Evangelic hills of Galilee . . . There will take place the ultimate clash between us and the evil forces of our time. That is why a Jewish army is not a matter of concern for the Jewish people alone. There is time to make the Jewish Army a reality. Now it can be done. Now it must be done."

PIERRE VAN PAASSEN

Hon. Chairmen

Dr. SAMUEL HARDEN CHURCH
Col. JOHN HENRY PATTERSON
D.S.O.

PIERRE VAN PAASSEN

Chairman

LOUIS FITCH, K. C.

Vice Chairman

ALFRED A. STRELSIN

Chairman-Executive Board

and Trustee

MEIR GROSSMAN

Vice Chairman-Executive Board

PETER H. BREGSON

National Director

GABRIEL A. WECHSLER

Secretary

Committee

Very Rev. H. P. ALMON ABBOTT

Bishop of Lexington, Ky.

HARLEY ABEND

Foreign Correspondent

Rabbi AARON ASHINSKY

Pittsburgh, Pa.

Repr. WILLIAM B. BARRY

(N. Y.)

Dr. CARL BECK

Surgeon, Chicago

Y. BEN-AMI

Palestine

Repr. GEORGE H. BENDER, (Ohio)

A. BEN-ELIEZER

Palestine

Rabbi BERNARD BERGMAN

New York, N. Y.

Rabbi JOSHUA BLOCH

New Hyde Park, N. Y.

Rabbi PHILIP D. BOOKSTABER

Harrisburg, Pa.

Rabbi JACOB BOINIAK

Brooklyn, N. Y.

Repr. FRED BRADLEY, (Mich.)

Repr. MICHAEL J. BRADLEY

(Pa.)

JOSEPH BRADIN

Publicist

Rabbi WILLIAM G. BRAUDE

Providence, R. I.

Hon. MILLER M. BRISTER

Chairman,

N. Y. City Fusion Party

LOUIS BROMFIELD

Author

SENATOR PRENTISS M. BROWN

(Mich.)

Rev. DUNCAN H. BROWNE

St. James Church, Chicago

Hon. Harry S. Truman

U. S. Senate

Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator:

I am sure that you will be interested to know that the Committee for a Jewish Army of Stateless and Palestinian Jews has established new headquarters in Washington, (2317 - 15th Street, N.W.).

I am taking the liberty to ask that you grant an interview to Dr. A. Hadani, one of our representatives in Washington. I know how busy you are, but still I hope that you will find time to listen to our representative on our aims and the significance of our movement for the best interests of the United Nations' strategy.

Dr. Hadani is a member of the Palestinian delegation which came to this country to promote the Jewish Army plan. He is a brilliant scholar and authority on Middle Eastern affairs. Dr. Hadani will call upon your secretary in order to arrange for an appointment.

Thanking you for your courtesy in advance, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

Pierre van Paassen

Pierre van Paassen
National Chairman

B Eile

Washington, D.C.
May 7, 1943

Mr. William Rosenwald, National Chairman
United Jewish Appeal for Refugees, Overseas
Needs and Palestine
342 Madison Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. Rosenwald:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of letter which I have just
sent Mr. Peter Bergson.

Sincerely yours,

HST:MLD
endl.

Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.

The rumor told of representatives of the United States and Great Britain, the leading champions of the United Nations, the protagonists of the Four Freedoms, assembling to save the hunted and tortured Jews of Europe. On the deliberations of this small convention on an island in the Atlantic were focused all the hopes of the doomed Jews of Europe; those, too, of the free well-meaning people the world over. Men and women of good will everywhere at last believed that the United Nations had decided to do something about the unprecedented disaster of a people put to death.

Wretched, doomed victims of Hitler's tyranny! Poor men and women of good faith the world over! have cherished an illusion. Your hopes have been in vain. Bermuda was not the dawn of a new era, of an era of humanity and compassion, of translating pity into deed. Bermuda was a mockery, and a cruel jest.

THIS is not our definition. It is the definition of the London Sunday "Observer"—one of the most influential and important newspapers in Great Britain.

Not only were ways and means to save the remaining four million Jews in Europe not devised, but their problem was not even touched upon, put on the agenda, or discussed. More than that—the name "Jews" was banished from the vocabulary of this convention, as *PM's* foreign editor, Alexander Uhl, reports: "It was regarded as almost improper to mention even the word Jew."

But not only the attention of the victims of Nazi atrocities and of their friends the world over was concentrated on the meeting at Bermuda: Hitler, too, was concerned with the United Nations' reply to his challenge to the extermination of the Jewish population in Europe. Alas! To him Bermuda was again convincing proof that the United Nations were neither ready nor willing to answer his threat with action. They were continuing to give him "cette blanche" in his extermination process, exactly as in the pre-war days they permitted him to deal with Jews in Germany, with Austria and Czechoslovakia, thus paving the way for aggression, invasion, and war.

Can it be possible that the United Nations do not understand that should Hitler succeed in exterminating the Jews as a people, they by their silence will pave the way to the extermination of the Czechoslovak, Polish, Greek or even the French peoples?

Now we are witnessing a variety of attempts to justify the Bermuda failure, to wrap it in secret formulae, such as "no dealing with Hitler," or "not to interfere with the prosecution of the war," or "not to undertake anything which should prolong the war," etc. All this is just throwing sand into the eyes of public opinion. All this has nothing to do with the real facts and the harrowing truth.

The facts, plain and simple, are the following:

(a) This is a specific problem of Jewish disaster. Hitler did not (as yet) decree the extermination of all the peoples of Europe, he decreed the extermination of the Jewish people in Europe and this process of extermination is unabated and steady. Two million or more have been put to death already!

The Jewish Problem Is Not a Refugee Problem

With the Bermuda Conference a thing of the past, not having even discussed the problem of the extermination of the Jewish people in Europe, now, more than ever, it is clear that we are dealing not only with a **refugee problem**, but with the **Jewish problem** of Europe. These two problems should not be confused. They are entirely distinct. Democracy cannot connive with the slaughter of millions of innocent civilian people—the Jews in Europe. There are ways and means to stop Hitler's wholesale murder and to evacuate those who can be evacuated. **But no one has been assigned to deal with this tremendous problem.** What is necessary is that the machinery for action be created. The United Nations, which have uttered so many words of pity must now **do** something if these words of pity are to be more than empty lies. They must create a United Nations Agency composed of military and diplomatic experts, which should have full authority to define and effectuate a realistic and stern policy of action, to save the remaining millions of Jewish people. **This Agency or Commission will deal, not with refugees outside Hitler's reach, but with the Jewish people under his yoke today.**

A Program of Action (... Not Pity!)

There are two broad areas in which this Agency can begin to operate without delay or procrastination.

1. Immediate utilization of all existing possibilities of transfer of Jews from Hitler-dominated countries to Palestine or to any temporary refuge and the initiation of all further possibilities in this program.

2. The immediate creation of a Jewish army of stateless and Palestinian Jews, including "suicide" Commando squads, and Air Squadrons for retaliatory bombing, which will raid deep into Germany, thus participating as an entity in the war and bringing their message of hope to Hitler's victims.

Join the Crusade for Decency

Can it be possible that the United Nations do not understand that should Hitler succeed in exterminating the Jews as a people, they by their silence will pave the way to the extermination of the Czechoslovak, Polish, Greek or even the French peoples?

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(b) Five million Jews in Europe still live. The governments of Roumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, all satellites of Germany, are willing to release their Jews any time the United Nations are willing to take part in the deliverance. By doing so, they hope to find grace and pardon in the eyes of the United Nations whom they consider as the inevitable victors in this world struggle.

(c) The United Nations have taken no advantage of these offers. They have not done so for one reason: the British government has prevented them, fearing that public opinion will demand that these refugees be admitted into Palestine—a practical place of salvation only a few days away from the Axis countries by short water route, train or even bus, where the new Hebrew Nation awaits them with open arms.

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Join the Crusade for Decency

The crime of Europe calls for the mobilization of every shred of righteousness and spiritual power left in the world. **On the field of battle soldiers die. On the field of massacre civilization dies.** The thunder of civilization against the swamp-like antics of the German government is alone capable of stopping the German crime against life. Such a thunder unleashed by our own representatives and by all the nations that serve the cause of God would strike terror into the souls of the German people.

Therefore we dedicate ourselves to this fight and we call upon every American to join hands with us in this crusade for humanity and decency.

Every citizen is part of the collective conscience of America; this conscience has never been found wanting. Demand action from your government against the German massacre of the Jews.

COMMITTEE FOR A JEWISH ARMY OF STATELESS AND PALESTINIAN JEWS

NATIONAL CHAIRMAN:

Hon. EDWIN C. JOHNSON, United States Senator, Colorado

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

515 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. MUrray Hill 2-7237
2317 FIFTEENTH STREET, N. W., WASHINGTON, D. C. ADams 0840

REGIONAL OFFICES

Pennsylvania Division
116 Walnut St., Philadelphia, Pa.

New England Division
133 Washington St., Boston, Mass.

South-Western Division
1108 Congress St., Houston, Tex.

Mid-Western Division
129 So. Clark St., Chicago, Ill.

Pacific Coast Division
416 W. 8th St., Los Angeles, Calif.



I want to help your campaign "Save European Jewry by action—not pity." You have my support in carrying your fight through the press, the radio, and in public meetings throughout the country, as well as in your endeavors in Washington and London—capitals of the United Nations.

S.....

Name

Address

PLEASE MAKE YOUR CHECK PAYABLE TO THE COMMITTEE FOR A JEWISH ARMY OF STATELESS AND PALESTINIAN JEWS.
515 FIFTH AVENUE, N. Y. C.

September 8, 1948


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The President's Press Conference on
September 9, 1948 - De jure Recognition
of Israel

Reference is made to my secret memorandum of August 30, 1948, relating to the de jure recognition of the Governments of Israel and Transjordan.

For your background guidance, I am attaching press clippings relating to my press conference on September 8 at which I was questioned concerning the extension of de jure recognition to Israel by the United States. I became committed to a reply of the nature made by me because of my ill-advised use of the expression that the de jure recognition was "a matter of timing".

If you are also questioned on this subject, it is suggested that the press correspondents be informed that the question of de jure recognition of Israel will not be finally decided until a recommendation is received from the State Department. It might also be stated that a recommendation is not expected from the State Department until elections have been held in Israel, now scheduled to take place about October 1.



Attachments:

2 press clippings relating to
September 8th press conference

B File

May 6, 1948

Hon. Joseph F. Guffey,
2929 Benton Place, N. W.,
Washington 8, D. C.

Dear Joe:



Referring to our conversation on the telephone today, I think it would be most constructive on the part of The President if he were to announce ~~that~~ the United States Government, as soon as the Jewish State is formally established, will recognize it.

*204

It is important that the announcement be made in advance of May 15th when the British Mandate will come to an end. I fear it is generally understood that Russia will recognize the Jewish State immediately after it is established. All of us here, friends of President Truman, are loath to see him put in the embarrassing position of following, rather than leading in this historic moment.

You will recall that I am not a political Zionist, but it is no longer a matter of ideology. It is a condition and not a theory, and all realists in the United States know that a Government de facto does exist in Jewish Palestine.

As a Democrat of long standing, a Delegate-at Large to the National Convention and as a sincere friend of President Truman, I know of no pronouncement he could make that would so electrify the American people as the one suggested above.

As you know, I am a member of the Board of Directors of City Trusts and therefore will be one of the hosts to The President, on May 20th, when he has I think said that he will come to Philadelphia in honor of the Centennial Anniversary of the Founding of Girard College. I hope to be lunching with The President and my fellow Trustees on that day, and should be glad to have a further word with him on any subject that he may wish to discuss with me.

I do hope that you will be able to get across clearly to The President the importance of the suggestion in unifying the American people behind him and behind his vigorous and constructive foreign policy with which he would once again capture the imagination and goodwill of the democratic peoples of the world.

I enjoyed hearing your voice on the telephone today and learning that you are so much better.

Hoping to have the pleasure of seeing you soon in Philadelphia, believe me as always

/s/ Sincerely yours,
Albert M. Greenfield

B.F.

204
Misc.

May 12, 1948

Dear Joe:

I am returning Mr. Greenfield's letter which you left with me to read. It is most interesting.

You'd be surprised how many letters of this sort I get and how easy it is for people on the outside to settle this almost insoluble question.

Sincerely yours,

Harvey

Honorable Joseph F. Guffey
2929 Benton Place, N.W.
Washington 8, D. C.

* Sen
* PP71077

ISRAEL

WASHINGTON--SECRETARY MARSHALL SAID TODAY THE UNITED STATES HOPES TO GRANT FULL DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO THE NEW REPUBLIC OF ISRAEL AFTER THE OCTOBER ELECTIONS IN THAT COUNTRY.

MARSHALL TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE THE FINAL DECISION WILL BE MADE BY THE WHITE HOUSE AFTER RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

THE UNITED STATES HAS EXTENDED PARTIAL--OR DE FACTO--RECOGNITION TO THE NEW JEWISH NATION. BUT IT HAS DELAYED GIVING IT "DE JURE" OR FULL LEGAL RECOGNITION WHICH IS NECESSARY BEFORE DIPLOMATIC ENVOYS CAN BE EXCHANGED.

ANSWERING QUESTIONS, THE SECRETARY SAID THE GRANTING OF FULL RECOGNITION TO ISRAEL IS A MATTER OF TIMING.

MARSHALL SAID ELECTIONS MUST BE HELD NEXT MONTH IN ISRAEL UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS PARTITION PLAN. HE INDICATED IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO GIVE THIS RECOGNITION BEFORE THESE ELECTIONS ARE HELD, BUT DECLINED TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION MORE SPECIFICALLY.

FR1241P 9/8

B. File

WASHINGTON 3RD ADD BERLIN (PA55)

MARSHALL SAID ALSO:

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT PROBABLY WILL REPLY THIS AFTERNOON TO RUSSIA'S PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING OF THE BIG FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS COUNCIL BEFORE SEPT. 15 CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF ITALY'S FORMER COLONIES. HE DECLINED TO SAY WHETHER SUCH TALKS WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE COLONIES ISSUE OR COULD TAKE UP THE BERLIN CRISIS AND OTHER MATTERS.

2. THE U.S. HOPES AT THE PROPER TIME TO EXTEND FULL LEGAL RECOGNITION TO THE NEW STATE OF ISRAEL. THE RECOGNITION ANNOUNCED BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN WAS ONLY PARTIAL OR "DE FACTO." MARSHALL SAID TIMING OF THE ACTION WAS IMPORTANT. HE SAID A FACTOR IS AN ELECTION SCHEDULED IN ISRAEL IN OCTOBER.

3. THE AMERICAN ENVOY IN BUCHAREST HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO ROMANIA'S COMMUNIST-LED GOVERNMENT ON THE NATIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN-OWNED PROPERTY IN ROMANIA. MARSHALL SAID DETAILS WOULD BE DISCLOSED LATER.

4. AMERICAN MILITARY AID FOR WESTERN EUROPE IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION. MARSHALL SAID HE ASSUMED THE TALKS ON THE SUBJECT WITH BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE BENELUX COUNTRIES ARE FARTHER ALONG NOW THAN DURING THE SUMMER.

FR1246P 9/8

B.F. Mc

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

By NLT. *[Signature]*, NAR

September 8, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The President's Press Conference on
September 9, 1948 - De jure Recognition
of Israel

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B File

PA56

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FR1241P 9/8

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FR1246P 9/8

B. F. H. e

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certainly no one in the State Department has yet suggested that the "Provisional Government of Israel" does not fairly meet the historical tests of recognition. What appears to have happened is that those who were loath to recognize Israel seized on the word "Provisional" in the title of the government and then developed a legalistic thesis that since the government was "provisional", American recognition would only be "de Facto". From the viewpoint of reason and precedent this is an absurd non sequitur.

S. Mr. Charles Fahy, with whom I discussed this question briefly, is largely responsible for the foregoing analysis. It is fully supported, I think, by the discussion of the problem both in Hackworth and Lauterpacht.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1948

Respectfully referred to

Hon. Matthew J. Connelly

DAVID K. NILES

x 502

204-22

File
mac

X

DE FACTO AND DE JURE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL~~##~~

I. There are several instances in the last few decades in which the United States has recognized a provisional government without waiting upon elections or upon the establishment of a permanent government:

(a) Russia after the Revolution when we recognized the "Provisional Government" established by Kerensky. Full recognition was granted -- despite the fact that the government itself was de facto in character, weak and later overthrown by the Soviet authorities. See I Hackworth 135-136.

(b) Poland after the recent war. The Potsdam Declaration specifically indicates that recognition was granted by Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States to the "Polish Provisional Government of National Unity." The interesting thing here is that recognition was unqualified at a time when future elections were contemplated and Poland's borders remained to be delimited.

(c) France after liberation. We unqualifiedly recognized the "Provisional Government of the French Republic", although it was understood that elections remained to be held and a new constitution framed and adopted.

2. There would seem to be no reason or warrant for making the nature of our recognition — de facto or de jure — turn on whether the particular government is provisional or final. What a new sovereignty chooses to call its government — whether it decides to regard it as provisional or otherwise — is irrelevant from the viewpoint of another country which must determine whether or not to recognize that government. The Provisional Government of Israel is the legal, de jure government of that country, and what procedure the Israelis choose to follow before drafting a constitution, establishing a permanent government, etc. has no bearing whatever on the issues before the United States.

3. The United States is properly concerned with matters such as these: Whether in fact the Israeli government is in possession of the machinery of the state; whether it governs with the assent of the people; whether it can fulfill its international obligations. But assuming these tests are met — and so far as I am aware no one has denied that Israel can meet these tests — to withhold full or so-called de jure recognition because the Israelis happen to have described their own government as provisional is an act of political expediency not law.

4. American history offers illustrations where appropriate use has been made of limited recognition. For example, in the case of various South American republics established by revolution; where power has been transferred from one to another group and where the authority of the government in power is under obvious challenge — de facto recognition may be appropriate. But

certainly no one in the State Department has yet suggested that the "Provisional Government of Israel" does not fairly meet the historical tests of recognition. What appears to have happened is that those who were loath to recognize Israel seized on the word "Provisional" in the title of the government and then developed a legalistic thesis that since the government was "provisional", American recognition would only be "de Facto". From the viewpoint of reason and precedent this is an absurd non sequitur.

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204-D
Misc.

May 18, 1948

Dear Jimmy:

Many thanks for your telegram of May
fifteenth which I have read with a lot of interest.
It was good of you to send me this expression of
your approval.

Very sincerely yours,

(Sgd) HARRY S. TRUMAN

Honorable James Roosevelt,
623 North Bedford Drive,
Beverly Hills,
California.

2347
PP72535

MR. NILES: Congrats Pres on recognition of State of Israel;
appeals for 2 further immed steps - first, to lift embargo
against shipmt of military supplies to Palestine; second, to
fight for swift and just solution of Palestine problem in UN.

ap

B. F.

~~Not to be~~ ~~Print copy not attached~~ ~~to Retention~~

LOSANGELES CALIF MAY 15 1948

MAY 16

THE PRESIDENT



THE WHITE HOUSE

PLEASE ACCEPT MY GRATITUDE AND CONGRATULATIONS FOR YOUR COURAGE IN GRANTING THIS GOVERNMENTS RECOGNITION TO THE NEW STATE OF ISRAEL, PERMIT ME ALSO TO APPEAL TO YOU FOR TWO FURTHER IMMEDIATE STEPS. THE FIRST OF THESE TWO IS TO LIFT BY EXECUTIVE ORDER THE PRESENT EMBARGO AGAINST THE SHIPMENT OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO PALESTINE. THE SECOND IS

TO FIGHT WITH ALL OF THE POWER AND PRESTIGE OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR A SWIFT AND JUST SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN THE COUNCILS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. RECOGNITION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL BY OUR COUNTRY CARRIES WITH IT THE MORAL DUTY FOR US TO LEAD THE BATTLE WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS AGAINST ANY AGGRESSION ENDANGERING THE PEOPLE AND THE TERRITORY OF THIS NEW AND STRUGGLING NATION. WHEN THESE TWO STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN YOU WILL FULFILL THE HOPES OF EVERY AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO BELIEVES IN THE FREEDOM OF ALL SMALL NATIONS RESPECTFULLY AND SINCERELY

JAMES ROOSEVELT.

BB

The Palestine Arab State contemplated in the U.N. Resolution of 29th November 1947 has not come into being - not through any fault of ours - and there is no reason whatever why the neighbouring Arab States who invaded Palestine in flagrant defiance of their obligations under the Charter, should be appeased by territorial "compensation" at our expense. Incidentally, all these demands for compensation in the end boil down to the same old question on which you took so firm a stand last year - the Negev. It is the Negev, particularly the southern Negev, which appears again to be demanded from us. The reasons against it are just as potent as they were last year when you so strongly opposed our being deprived of that area which contains the country's sole mineral resources and which, in addition, is our only gateway to the East. What importance attaches to our having direct access to the Red Sea has been brought home to us strikingly by Egypt's closing of the Suez Canal to all ships - even British ships - carrying, or suspected of carrying, goods to Israel. Because of such closure we are compelled to bring vital supplies (wheat, etc.) from Australia and the Far East all the way via the Cape and Gibraltar. With the coast of Eilat in our possession and the Negev opened up by transport roads, we shall have free access to the sea routes which are vital to our existence.

Now as to the refugee problem. It is a grave issue, but it was not created by us. It was not the birth of Israel which created the Arab refugee problem, as our enemies now proclaim, but the Arab attempt to prevent that birth by armed force. These people are not refugees in the sense in which that term has been sanctified by the martyrdom of millions in Europe - they are part of an aggressor group which failed and which makes no secret of its intention to resume aggression. They left the country last year at the bidding of their leaders and military commanders and as part of the Arab strategic plan. But in spite of all this we are, for humanitarian reasons, ready to contribute as far as we can towards a solution of this problem. We have, in fact, done a good deal more under this head than could, for obvious reasons, be published. Your Ambassador has been given details under this head. We have been steadily re-admitting Arab refugees during the last few months. The number of those who have returned exceeds 25,000. We are ready to re-unite Arab families separated by the war, and we are now approaching the various Arab States through the Mixed Armistice Commissions for setting up special machinery to facilitate their return in organised form. We are prepared to re-admit more as part of a peace settlement. There are, however, two overriding considerations which limit what we can do in this sphere: we dare not again endanger our hard won independence and security and, with all the good will in the world, we cannot undertake tasks which are economically beyond our strength.

So many malicious charges have been levelled against us in connection with this Arab refugee question, that I cannot help drawing attention to the basic realities of the situation. We are a small State, nine hundred thousand Jews wedged in between forty million Arabs. We held our own last year by a terrific effort and at very heavy sacrifices, losing some of our finest youth and suffering heavy damage. The Arab States are making no secret of their intention of resuming war whenever they are ready for it. Only two days ago Faris el Khoury, the former Syrian member of the Security Council and Chairman of the Syrian Chamber, declared that the war against us "remains the corner-stone of Arab policy". Not a week passes without our being warned by authoritative Arab spokesmen of the coming "second round". The Arab States are rearming on a big scale, building up modern armament industries

B File

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Apart from the security question, which to my mind is paramount, there is the economic difficulty. When the United Nations in November 1947 voted in favour of a Jewish State, it was motivated pre-eminently by the purpose of solving once and for all the Jewish question in Europe, to get rid of the concentration camps and of the aftermath of Hitler's holocaust. I know, Mr. President, that this purpose was uppermost in your mind when you gave us your staunch and steady support in those critical days. We are now doing exactly what we were expected to do. We are liquidating one camp after another and have already brought over many thousands of their former inmates. Can we be expected at the same time to build up, alongside this big effort of reconstruction, a new Arab economy to absorb undreds of thousands of Arabs? For let there be no mistake about it: the Arab economic and social structure as it was prior to last year's exodus has ceased to exist. The Arab refugee question can be solved in a big way only by a comprehensive effort of reconstruction. The crucial question is: is that effort to be undertaken in Israel, with all the political, security and economic stresses and strains arising therefrom, or in the neighbouring Arab countries where vast fertile areas are available for such resettlement and where these people can find a home in the congenial surroundings of an Arab society?

Our policy, as I stated before, is not one of absolute refusal to readmit Arabs and we may, if real peace is established, be able to do more in this respect than if the present atmosphere of latent war and hostility continues. But an all-round solution can only be found as part of a general development scheme for the benefit of the Middle East as a whole. Towards such a development scheme Israel is ready to make its contribution: I hope it will be a significant contribution. But to achieve all this there must be negotiation, agreement and peace. The most vital need at the present hour is for Arabs and Jews to enter into direct negotiations and hammer out an agreed settlement. I plead with you, Mr. President, that you may use your unique influence to induce the Arab States to face the realities of the situation and to take that decisive step.

With affectionate greetings,

Yours very sincerely,

/s/ Ch. Weizman

The Hon. Harry S. Truman,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

B. File

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

C
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Y

Rehovoth, 24th June, 1949

Dear Mr. President,

The Government of Israel have communicated to me the text of the Note transmitted to them on your behalf on the 29th May, as well as their reply of June 8th. The matters raised in the Note are of such gravity that I feel impelled to address you personally on the subject. You have throughout taken such a warm and helpful interest in the affairs of our young State that I am most anxiously concerned that you, our great and good friend, should be under no misapprehension regarding our position and intentions concerning the issues now at stake. I wish, indeed, it were possible for me to talk matters over personally with you. That is always the best way of removing misunderstanding.

We have all been distressed at the slow progress made at Lausanne. It may be that the device of a Conciliation Commission, consisting not of officers of the U.N., but of delegates of three different countries, with different backgrounds and policies, was not the best way of promoting a speedy settlement. It certainly appears to have been less effective than the mediation of one man pursued in the name of the United Nations as a whole. But be that as it may, we are trying our best to work with this Commission and have submitted to them a number of proposals, to none of which we have so far received any reply from the other side. Indeed up till now the Arab States have altogether refused to sit with our delegates under the auspices of the Commission.

When our Delegation first arrived in Lausanne on April 30th, they immediately announced that they had come with full authorisation to negotiate a comprehensive peace settlement with the delegates of the Arab States covering all the matters referred to in the U.N. Resolution of 11th December, 1948. They specifically stated that Israel was ready to contribute towards solving the Arab refugee problem in cooperation with the United Nations and the Arab States. A few days later they submitted to the Commission a draft preamble and two articles of a proposed peace treaty to serve as a basis for discussion. In this draft they proposed, among other things, the final liquidation of the war, the establishment of normal political and economic relations between Israel and the Arab States, mutual guarantees of the frontiers, abstention from the use of force for the settlement of disputes, and international arbitration in case such disputes could not be settled by agreement.

To this day we have not received any reply to these basic proposals.

Coming to the question of the Arab refugees, our delegation gave repeated assurances to the Commission that Israel was ready to cooperate with the U.N. and the Arab States for a solution of the refugee problem. We pledged ourselves to guarantee the civil rights of all minorities within our territory; we accepted the principle of compensation for land abandoned by Arabs; we declared our readiness to unfreeze Arab accounts in our banks immediately on the conclusion of peace; we set up a Custodian of Absentee Property. Our delegation informed the Commission that the Government of Israel was ready to readmit members of Arab families separated by the war.

B. File 5110

In conformity with the General Assembly's Resolution of December 11th, relating to access to ports and means of communication our delegation has offered to create a free zone in the Haifa port for the benefit of Transjordan. Various proposals were made by our delegation for the delimitation of the frontiers of Israel with the Arab States. Our delegation also elaborated our attitude on the Jerusalem question.

All these constructive proposals have not elicited a single reply from the Arab delegations. It would, indeed, appear that these delegations did not come to Lausanne with authority to negotiate a peace settlement, but solely for the purpose of arranging for the repatriation of the Arab refugees to Israel.

Our delegation subsequently proposed the establishment of a number of sub-committees to deal with the general principles and conditions of peace, the territorial settlement, the refugee problem, the Jerusalem question, and the economic development of the Middle East, pursuant to Clause 10 of the U.N. Resolution of December 11th. We have not yet learnt the reaction of the Arab Delegations to these proposals. Finally, when members of the Commission suggested in a spirit of despondency that the Conference be suspended for a time, our delegation strongly opposed this course.

I feel sure you will agree, Mr. President, that in the light of these indisputable facts, we can hardly be charged with having failed to cooperate with the Commission. If so far nothing substantial has resulted from these talks, this is due essentially to the negative attitude of the Arab delegations and their persistent refusal to meet us under the auspices of the Commission. It is a great pity that the Commission failed to dislodge them from that negative attitude.

Permit me to add a few words on the two issues which are in the centre of the discussion: the territorial question and the refugee problem.

We have no aggressive designs against anyone and we are not looking for additional territory. But I think that no fair-minded man will deny us the right to retain that part of our ancient land which has become ours at a terrible cost of blood and treasure in the course of a war forced upon us by others. Most of the country which we hold beyond the boundaries set out on November 29th, 1947 was occupied by our forces during the second military campaign which was the result of the Arabs' defiant refusal to accept the Mediator's urgent plea for a continuation of the first truce. Bitter experience has shown that without that territory we are defenceless. Were we to give up the corridor to Jerusalem, that great city, whose people suffered so much and so heroically last year, would again be exposed to the danger of having its water supply cut off and of being starved into submission. In exactly the same way, Western Galilee holds the key to the defence of Haifa and the Valley of Jezreel, while the Ramleh area assures the safety of Tel Aviv from such menacing attacks as were launched upon it last year. None of these areas was ever allotted to any of the Arab States with which we are now negotiating. All of them are occupied by Israel legally under armistice agreements.

B File

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B...File

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With affectionate greetings,

Yours very sincerely,

/s/

Ch. Weizman

The Hon. Harry S. Truman,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

B. File

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT


As I pointed out last week, the American Government is not being represented at the present conversations in London relative to the future of Palestine. We are, however, deeply interested in the outcome of these conversations and hope that they will point the way to a settlement which may bring peace and prosperity to the people of Palestine. We also hope that before the conversations are concluded, representatives of the Jews, as well as of the Palestinian Arabs, may find it possible to participate.

In this regard, I am sure that the work of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, under the chairmanship of Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., and of the British and American group in which the alternates of the Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems participated under the chairmanship of Ambassador Henry F. Grady, will prove of real assistance to those who are now endeavoring to work out an equitable solution to the problem. I have already made it clear that this Government has not put forward any concrete proposals in connection with the present conversations, nor is it committed to any

single plan with regard to the future of Palestine. The United States would, however, be prepared to give its support to any concrete proposals calling for the eventual establishment of an independent state or of independent states in Palestine, provided such proposals would be in keeping with the basic principles of the Mandate for Palestine and would have a sufficient degree of acceptance among those most directly concerned to give good grounds for the hope that they could be successfully put into effect.

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Handwritten signature and initials



The WALDORF-ASTORIA

PARK AND LEXINGTON AVENUES / 40TH AND 50TH STREETS / NEW YORK 22

May 26, 1948

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Before leaving the shores of the United States, I should like to express to you my warmest thanks for the friendly reception which you accorded me yesterday and for the kind hospitality given to Mrs. Weizmann and myself and to the members of my party at Blair House. This official visit, coming soon after the recognition given to the new State of Israel, will be a source of satisfaction and encouragement to my people.

I trust that the two questions of military assistance, and of financial help for constructive work and for the absorption of Jewish Displaced Persons, will receive urgent and favorable consideration. I shall not go into the details here as these are contained in the aide memoire which I had the opportunity of leaving with you.

There is, however, one matter to which I only made brief reference and which is of some importance to us. We are anxious that the United States recognition of the State of Israel should be put on a regular basis by an exchange of diplomatic representatives. In anticipation of this arrangement, we have designated Mr. Elishu Epstein, who is now acting as the representative of the Provisional Government of Israel in this country, as the prospective Minister in Washington. Mr. Epstein, a Palestinian with intimate knowledge of the whole Middle East, has spent the last three years in Washington as the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and has done invaluable work in explaining our aims, problems and activities. I am confident that he will be successful in the new task of increasing the ties between Israel and the United States and of deepening the friendly relations between the two peoples. I hope, Mr. President, that it may be possible for the United States to appoint a Minister to Israel at a very early date.

In taking my leave of you, Mr. President, I should like warmly to commend Mr. Epstein in whom I have every confidence.

Yours very sincerely,

Ch. Weizmann

May 18, 1948

Personal and Confidential

Dear Dean:

Harry Vaughan handed me your letter of the fifth and I read it with a lot of interest. It looks as if things have turned out as you anticipated in your letter.

The main difficulty with our friends, the Jews in this country, is that they are very emotional - they, the Irish and the Latin-Americans have something in common along that line. The President of the United States has to be very careful not to be emotional or to forget that he is working for one hundred and forty-five million people primarily and for peace in the world as his next objective.

I certainly appreciated the chance to read your letter very much. My soul objective in the Palestine procedure has been to prevent bloodshed. The way things look today we apparently have not been very successful. Nobody in the country has given the problem more time and thought than I have. In 1946 when the British-American Commission on Palestine was appointed and Mr. Bevin had made an agreement with me that he would accept the findings of that Commission I thought we had the problem solved but the emotional Jews of the United States and the equally emotional Arabs in Egypt and Syria prevented that settlement from taking place, principally because of the immigration clause in that settlement. We are faced with an entirely new problem now and I sincerely hope that sanity will come to both sides so that a peaceful approach can be made to a settlement which should have been worked out by the British some twenty odd years ago.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Honorable Dean Alfange
Nine East 40th Street
New York, New York

B.F.

DEAN ALFANGE
NINE EAST 40th STREET
NEW YORK

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

May 5, 1948

Major General Harry H. Vaughan
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Vaughan:

I am sending you this confidential letter because I am interested in the President's political fortunes. Frankly, the President could not carry the State of New York in the present circumstances. The Jewish vote against him would be overwhelming.

Only a dramatic move on the President's part that would electrify the Jewish people could change the situation.

Such a move might well be the recognition of the Jewish State which will come into being on May 16, and the nomination of an American Minister to the new State. The President would be on firm legal ground in this respect because the UN decision which partitioned Palestine into Jewish and Arab states is still a legal fact. True, our government has proposed a temporary Trusteeship in place of immediate partition, presumably because the UN decision could not be carried out without bloodshed. However, recent events have knocked the props from under the Trusteeship proposal. The Trusteeship proposal is no longer tenable, not because neither side accepts it, but because the Jewish military forces have since demonstrated by their decisive victories over the Arabs, that they can implement partition singlehanded.

The President, therefore, can logically take the position that events and not he have reversed the Trusteeship plan and that the UN decision can be best carried out by recognizing the new Jewish State and according it the privileges of other states, including the fundamental right to defend itself. This

DEAN ALFANGE
NINE EAST 40TH STREET
NEW YORK

would also place the President in the commendable position of strengthening the hand of the United Nations.

Should the President for any reason find this move ill advised, the next best step would be to appoint a personal Ambassador or special Emissary and send him to Palestine with authority to negotiate a settlement, on the basis of the UN decision, between the Jewish Agency and King Abdullah of Transjordan. This move would be timely and appropriate.

In the first place, the Arabs have been rudely awakened to the fact that they cannot dispose of the Jews as easily as they had thought. Abdullah is a realist and he knows right well that his vaunted Arab Legion, some ten thousand mercenaries trained by the British, would be no match for the Jewish forces which, I understand, number some seventy-five thousand excellently disciplined and zealously devoted young men and women.

As a matter of fact I have been saying right along, and events are proving me right, that the combined forces of the whole Arab League would be no match for this Jewish Army which, even when divided, succeeded in driving seven British divisions behind barbed wires.

I am not a military man, but I think you will agree with me that outside of Abdullah's Legion, there is no other well-equipped, well-trained Arab Army. Moreover, the Arab chieftains are divided by deep rooted feuds. The ex-Mufti, Haj Amin al Husseini detests Abdullah and Abdullah is not on speaking terms with Ibn Saud who drove Abdullah's father, King Hussein, the Caliph, from his throne in Mecca. These feuds preclude any real unity on the part of leaders of the Arab League.

For this reason, I suggest that negotiations be carried on between the Jewish Agency and Abdullah, who is the

DEAN ALFANGE
NINE EAST 402 STREET
NEW YORK

most practical and best situated of all the Arab leaders insofar as Palestine is concerned. He aspires to extend his authority and influence over the Arab portion of Palestine, and would readily recognize partition in exchange for some concessions in Arab Palestine that would enhance his prestige; the more so in view of the impending disaster that faces his Arab Legion in the event of a prolonged war with the Jews.


I am confident that if President Truman succeeded in procuring Abdullah's recognition of partition on the basis above indicated, this grave problem would be solved. To the President would then belong the credit for upholding the authority of the United Nations while doing justice to the Jewish people and all parties concerned.

I am coming to Washington soon at which time I will pay you a visit; but meanwhile, I wish you would relay the foregoing to the President for his consideration.

I shall not forget the pleasant evening I spent in Washington recently with you and the President.

With kind personal regards.

Sincerely,



DEAN ALFANGE

DA:dn

PALESTINE



The Palestine problem was a continuing one throughout the greater part of President Truman's Administration. In this file are copies of numerous releases relating to the subject but no attempt is here made to go into details.

The White House files contain voluminous letters and other papers bearing on the subject and other sources are in the Department of State and elsewhere.

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PALESTINE



At a press conference on August 16, 1945, the President was asked about the United States position on Palestine and whether the question of a Jewish National State had been mentioned at the Potsdam conference. He said that it had been discussed with Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his successor, Prime Minister Clement Attlee but not with Premier Stalin as there was nothing that Stalin could do about it any way.

As to the American position on Palestine, the President said the United States's view was that we wanted to let as many of the Jews into Palestine as possible and still maintain civil peace. He said that it would have to be worked out with the British and the Arabs for a Jewish State. He said there was no idea in mind of sending a strong military force of, say 500,000 to keep peace in Palestine.

On October 18, 1945, at a press conference the President was asked if he had had any further correspondence with Prime Minister Attlee on the Palestine question and he said he had not recently but that he had had quite a voluminous correspondence at one time and that he made some suggestions to Attlee which were still being considered. He said he asked Attlee to admit 100,000 Jews into Palestine and he hoped that Attlee would comply with the request.

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B. J. Lie

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 28, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Palestine

It has come to our attention that the American Christian Palestine Committee has written all the members of Congress, asking them to write you urging that now the war in Europe is over, steps be taken to implement a pro-Zionist policy regarding Palestine with the aim of opening the country to unrestricted Jewish immigration and creating a Jewish state.

The American Christian Palestine Committee of which Senator Wagner is the chairman, includes among its members a number of distinguished non-Jews, both in Congress and elsewhere, who are interested in reaching a solution of the Palestine problem along Zionist lines. We have every reason to believe that a large number of the members of both Houses of Congress will comply with the Committee's request and will write you in the sense indicated above.

In considering this matter, you may wish to bear in mind the fact that Palestine may be included among the dependent areas for which a system of trusteeship is being evolved at San Francisco, and that definite arrangements regarding specific territories are to be considered later. You will also recall that there has been a marked growth of tension in the last few days in the Near East as a result of the crisis in Syria and Lebanon and renewed outbreaks of terrorism in Palestine itself. In the circumstances it is believed that any action on the part of the American Government along the lines desired by the American Christian Palestine Committee would increase the prevailing tension in the Near East.

Frank B. Row
Acting Secretary

URGENT

25 July 1946

From: Prime Minister Attlee, signed Bissell.

To : President Truman.

Nr : 3027. 251820Z.

PERSONAL AND ~~TOP SECRET~~.

The conversations between American and British officials on Palestine and related problems are now almost concluded and agreement has been reached on all matters of substance. I understand that their recommendations have been telegraphed to you. I am sure you will agree that the inhuman crime committed in Jerusalem on 22nd July calls for the strongest action against terrorism but having regard to the sufferings of innocent Jewish victims of Nazism this should not deter us from introducing a policy designed to bring peace to Palestine with the least possible delay. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to give urgent attention to the agreed recommendations of the two delegations and to let us have your views in the next few days. I have had some useful talks with Ambassador Grady and his colleagues, and I should like you to know that the British officials have paid a warm tribute to their energy and co-operative spirit in the discussions here.

B. File

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URGENT

March 23, 1946

Dear Congressman Celler:

I appreciated very much your letter of March twentieth in regard to the special Committee examining the Palestine situation.

I have heard nothing from them since they left here, officially or unofficially, and I am waiting patiently for the report which they were expected to make after a four month examination of the situation.

Of course, it is premature to make comments on this report until it is in the hands of Prime Minister Attlee and myself. We can then arrive at the conclusion which conditions warrant.

I highly appreciate your interest, of course, but a premature comment on a report that is not made will not help the situation one little bit.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Honorable Emanuel Celler
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

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WASHINGTON

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WHITE HOUSE
NEW YORK SECRETARIES
MARGARET BROOKS
MARY DOUGHERTY

March 20, 1946

The Honorable Harry S. Truman
President of the United States
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

It is clearly evident from the rift that has arisen between the American and British members of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine that the British are determined to control completely this inquiry. Mr. Bartley Crum was justified in demanding that an interim report be published, as had been previously promised, recommending that your request for the immediate entrance of 100,000 Jews into Palestine be complied with. The British have decided there is to be no interim report and the reason is readily discernible. The final report has already been written in Whitehall Street.

Mr. Crum's views are shared by other American members of the Committee, and their threat to resign is proof positive that the Inquiry is being hampered by established British colonial policy and that its much vaunted objectivity is entirely absent from its proceedings.

The apparent concern of the British for the Arabs, it is interesting to note, played no part in their activities in Indonesia, nor were Moslem feelings spared in Mr. Attlee's statement on India's independence. It appears that only in Palestine do the British fear to alienate the affection of the Moslems.

Can we with any honesty praise the Committee's objectivity when we learn that its official record of Tuesday, March 12th, did not contain the statement made by Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, Arab spokesman, to the effect that the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem cooperated with the Nazis because he thought they might win?

I believe it is time to give serious consideration as to whether we shall continue in this inquiry, thereby committing ourselves to a conclusion reached not by study, nor based on moral principles, but to one pre-formed by the foreign policy of Great Britain.

I respectfully submit that unless an interim report is published, recommending that 100,000 Jews be permitted entrance into Palestine immediately and unless the Committee is permitted

B. J. C.

to continue its inquiry in an unbiased, objective manner, unhampered by the British Foreign Office, that the American members of this Committee be withdrawn forthwith.

With assurances of highest esteem, I am

Sincerely yours,

Emanuel Celler
EMANUEL CELLER

B. File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 17, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

I have talked with Secretary Byrnes today about Palestine and his proposed statement for you to make. I presented my views, but they have not been at all persuasive. The Secretary adheres to the views expressed to you by him heretofore.

For obvious reasons, it is very embarrassing for me to be in disagreement with the State Department on this particular question. I really think that you should have someone else here in the White House handle it - and hope you will.

However as long as you have asked me to thus far, I wish to express to you the views which I expressed to Secretary Byrnes today:

(1) In view of the fact that you have not taken any position orally or in writing which would support President Roosevelt's letter of April 5th, I think that you should definitely not make the statement proposed.

I think it is proper for you to take the position that the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine is not a "change in the basic situation". There are now approximately 600,000 Jews and 1,200,000 Arabs in Palestine. For that reason, 100,000 additional Jews would not be a change in the basic situation.

(2) You should make it clear that the most that President Roosevelt stated was that he would "consult" with the Arab and Jewish leaders, but that there was no intention on his part that he would have to obtain their consent before he took action.

(3) Some further action should be taken by you immediately with respect to Atlee so as to show that you are really pressing the British for the additional certificates.

(4) That you or the Secretary of State call the Jewish and Arab leaders into conference at an early date, and "consult" with them so that the promise of consultation will be fulfilled

B. File

- and then you can take whatever action you wish.

(5) Immediate effort should be made by the State Department to postpone publication of the April 5th letter until the middle of November. At any rate, I do not see why we should publish it ourselves at any time.



S. I. R.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 303 and 5(D) or (E)

Dept. of State Letter, Aug. 10, 1972

By *11/12/88* NARS Date *2-16-75*

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Palestine.

According to information reaching us from Zionist sources at San Francisco, the Zionists desire to confer with you in the near future in anticipation of your meeting with Mr. Churchill, as they think it is likely that Palestine will be discussed at that meeting.

For your information, we are preparing some material for you on Palestine for possible use at the meeting, as we feel that it will be necessary for the British to make some decision regarding that country in the near future. It is not our belief that the question is one which will require detailed discussion, or any decision on your part, during the course of your meeting with Mr. Churchill. It would be most helpful, however, if we could have some idea of the intentions of the British Government with regard to the future of Palestine.

The Zionists will undoubtedly give you some memorials and some printed matter and will urge that you insist upon a settlement of the question in their favor. You may recall that our basic attitude on Palestine is that it is one of the problems which should come up for settlement after the war through the United Nations

Organization,

-2-

Organization, and that in any event no decision regarding it should be taken without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. It does not seem, therefore, that you need to go any further, unless you care to do so, than to thank the Zionist leaders for any material which they may give you and to assure them that their views will be given your careful consideration.



Acting Secretary

"Suggestion OK

HST"

Carbon initialed and returned to Acting Sec. of State 6/26/45, elb

P. 511

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

President's Secretary's
Files

Palestine

September 14, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: William L. Clayton
Acting Secretary of State

FROM: The President

In regard to a statement on
Palestine, I have been very hesitant about
saying anything on this subject.

I hope it will not be necessary
for me to have anything to say. If I do,
I'll certainly clear it with you.

H.S.T.

B...File!

B
F

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
September 12, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Statement in Connection with Palestine ✓

Rabbi Wise and certain other Zionists are urging that you should issue at once a statement in favor of partition in Palestine. It is apparently the idea of certain relatively moderate elements among the Zionists that if the American Government does this, the Jewish Agency may be able to persuade the British Government to accept partition as the basis for the present London talks on Palestine, thereby enabling the Agency to participate in the talks with a view to working out an eventual settlement of the problem. These elements also hope that a statement of this kind will strengthen them against the more extreme and anti-Administration Zionists who insist on all of Palestine being converted into an independent Jewish state.

Upon consideration of this matter we do not feel that it would be advisable for you to issue such a statement at this time, for the following reasons:

1. We do not believe that any statement at all should be issued by this Government during the course of the present conversations. The situation in London is very delicate and without full knowledge of all the complicated elements in the situation we might do more harm than good by intervening at this time. This is evidently the view of such observers on the spot as Secretary Byrnes and Ambassador Harriman. In this connection you may wish to bear in mind the recommendation of Secretary Byrnes at the time the decision was taken not to take part in the British announcement of the Morrison-Grady proposals, to the effect that you might wish to avoid making any further public statements with regard to Palestine, and specifically with regard to the 100,000 Jews, for the time being. Ambassador Harriman also, in a recent telegram, expressed the view after talking to Prime

Minister

B.E. File

Minister Attlee, Foreign Secretary Bevin and other British officials, that in the circumstances we should not involve ourselves in the matter beyond the steps which we have already taken.

2. If we yield to the pressure of highly organized Zionist groups just now and make statements calculated to give support to their policies of the moment, we shall merely be encouraging them to make fresh demands and to apply pressure in the future whenever they conceive it to be in their interest for this Government to make further statements on their behalf. In any event, we do not believe that, without sacrificing the public interests, we shall be able to go far and fast enough in rendering them support to keep them satisfied very long. It seems to us that it would be wiser to make it clear to them now in a most friendly manner that the Government itself must determine when it is in the interests of the United States to make statements with regard to Palestine and that in the present instance, the Government is of the opinion that it is in the best interests of the United States and for that matter of the Zionists themselves for it to remain silent.

3. Any statement by this Government approving partition would mean that we had gone contrary to the recommendations both of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and of the experts who drew up the Morrison-Grady scheme. This would undoubtedly give rise to the impression that we are adopting a policy on an important matter in order to satisfy a particular Zionist group.

4. The attitude of the Arab world toward the United States has become progressively hostile in the last few months. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff, who feel that the United States has a vital security interest in the Middle East, have urged that we take no action with regard to Palestine which might orient the peoples of the entire area away from the Western Powers. The Arabs have always been fundamentally opposed to the partition of Palestine and their adverse reaction to a statement by us favoring that solution would be intensified by the knowledge that we have taken such a position only after it has been adhered to by certain Zionist leaders.

It may be, however, that after considering the matter you may find that for other reasons it would be preferable for you to make another statement on the subject. We have accordingly prepared the attached draft, which in our opinion represents the most that should be said at this time.

Will Clayton

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft statement.

B. File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 12, 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You have received a copy of Documentary Record submitted to the United Nations. This contains very confidential material that is in the files of the State Department.

I think it is important to find out how it got out. It is very damaging evidence that the Arab representatives now at UNO were allies of Hitler. There is also included in this material the diary of the Grand Mufti, which Justice Jackson found at Nuremberg. Copies of this document have already gone to all the Members of Congress.

Document -

B File

ARAB HIGHAR Committee David K. Niles
DAVID K. NILES

Plastic

Dear - Thanks Glad you sent it. I knew ^{all about the perverted fact question} ~~it~~. And of course I don't like it. We could have settled this thing if U.S. politics had been kept out of it. Terror & Silver are

the contributing causes of some
^{not all} of our troubles. The document re-
ferred to could have been used
by us for the welfare of the world
had not our own political
situation come into the pic-
ture. I surely wish God Almighty
would give the Children of Israel
an Isaac, the Christians a
St. Paul and the Sons of ^{Ismael} ~~Ismael~~
a peep at the Golden Rule.

Maybe He will decide to do
that.

B. File

B. F.



WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL DETACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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WHITE 148
011600Z

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DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) of (E)

Dept. of State letter, Aug 5, 1973

By NLT-HC, NARS Date 12-1-75

URGENT - PERSONAL AND EYES ONLY

FROM: LOVETT FROM THE SECRETARY:::

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT:

"DULLES RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM DEWEY WEDNESDAY REQUESTING HIM TO MEET DEWEY ON HIS RETURN TO NEW YORK AND BRING HIM UP TO DATE ON DEVELOPMENTS HERE. HE LEAVES SUNDAY FOR QUICK TURN AROUND.

DULLES REFERRED THIS MORNING TO REPORTED ARTICLE IN NEW YORK POST THAT THERE WAS A SPLIT BETWEEN THE TWO OF US ON PALESTINE, OBSERVING THAT THIS WAS PROBABLY INSPIRED TO FORCE A STATEMENT OUT OF DULLES OR DEWEY.

I AM VERY GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR RESISTING WHAT I IMAGINE ARE GREAT PRESSURES TO QUALIFY THE STAND I HAVE TAKEN. OVER HERE I AM RECEIVING STRONG IF NOT VIOLENT JEWISH DEMANDS, PARTICULARLY FROM CONGRESSIONAL JEWS AND AT SAME TIME EQUAL PRESSURES INFORMAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS FROM ARAB DELEGATES IN CONVENTION ON OTHER SIDE OF THE QUESTION. THE JEWISH ATTACKS ARE GRADUALLY RESULTING IN MODIFYING THE ARAB RESISTANCE TO THE BERNADOTTE PLAN AS THEY ARE NOT NOW SO CONVINCED THAT I AM TAKING A PURELY PRO-JEWISH STAND. THE OPPOSITE, AND I TRUST EQUAL REACTIONS MAY CANCEL EACH OTHER TO THE LONG SOUGHT SOLUTION" (SIGNED) MARSHALL

~~TOP~~

~~SECRET~~

B3File

ARUMAN LIBRARY

ent's Secretary

WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL DETACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WTE V WHW
WHITE 152
011935Z

~~SECRET~~

FROM: BILL BOYLE
TO : MR CONNELLY

AS I HAVE ADVISED MURPHY AND DANIELS JEWISH SITUATION IN
NEW YORK AND LARGE CITIES TURNED AGAINST US TERRIFICALLY
BY MARSHALL AND BEVIN BERNADOTTE PLAN. IF ANY ACTION
CONTEMPLATED IT SHOULD BE IMMEDIATE AND FIRM. MINIMUM
SHOULD BE AT LEAST STAND TAKEN IN DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM.
ABOVE AGREED UPON BY ALL OUR OWN LEADERS AND MYSELF.
NEW YORK TIMES CARRIES BULLETIN FROM SALT LAKE CITY
THAT DEWEY IS PREPARING SPECIAL STATEMENT ON SUBJECT TO
ISSUE AT ROSH HOSHANAH MESSAGE ON SUNDAY OR MONDAY.



DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, Aug 3, 1973
By NLT-HC, NARS Date 12-1-75

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WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL DETACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (E)
4-12-79
OSD letter, April 22, 1994

By NLT-HC, NARS Date 12-1-7

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, 2-25-79
By NLT-HC, NARS Date 12-1-7

WTE V WHW

BLACK NUMBER ONE FIVE ZERO

DTG : 011635Z

FROM: UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, LOVETT

FOR : PRESIDENT THROUGH MR. CLIFFORD

BT



FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM FROM JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DATED SEPTEMBER 22TH TRANSMITTED TO STATE BY SECRETARY
DEFENSE:

QUOTE:

"THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE ON FREQUENT OCCASIONS
POINTED OUT THE CRITICAL STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE NEAR EAST
AREA AND THE NECESSITY, FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT, OF
MAINTAINING THE ARAB WORLD ORIENTED TOWARD THE UNITED STATES
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.

THE PRESENT DISTRESS OF SOME THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
ARAB REFUGEES FROM PALESTINE AND THE INABILITY OF THE ARAB
NATIONS TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR URGENT NEEDS PRESENT AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO STRENGTHEN THE FRIEND-
SHIP OF THE ARAB PEOPLE FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES
AND TO ENHANCE THE PRESTIGE OF THE UNITED STATES, BOTH OF
WHICH HAVE SUFFERED AS THE RESULT OF RECENT EVENTS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE PALESTINE SITUATION. THEREFORE THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF BELIEVE, AS A MEASURE TO STRENGTHEN

File
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WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL DETACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



OUR MILITARY POSITION, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD EMULATE THE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM BY THE EARLY PROVISION OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE TO THE ARAB REFUGEES FROM PALESTINE. SIGNED WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

FORRESTAL IN THE TRANSMITTING LETTER FORWARDING THE JCS VIEWS STATED THAT QUOTE, "ONLY PURPOSE OF THIS LETTER IS TO ADVISE YOU (THE SECRETARY) OF THE CONSIDERED VIEWS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THE URGENCY OF TAKING DEFINITE ACTION AND OF MY CONCURRENCE THEREIN", UNQUOTE.

END OF MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY FORRESTAL TO SECRETARY MARSHALL.

A MESSAGE FROM GRIFFIS, CARIO, DEALING WITH ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM REPORTS THAT ON ARRIVAL SENATOR GURNEY IN CARIO HE STATED THAT AFTER SEVERAL HOURS CONFERENCE WITH IEN SAUD LATTEH, ALTHOUGH FRIENDLY, QUOTE "BERATED HIM AT LENGTH ON FAILURE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT TO ASSIST REFUGEES" UNQUOTE. GURNEY TOLD GRIFFIS THAT HE QUOTE "BELIEVED THAT FROM FIFTY TO ONE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE UPON HIS REQUEST TO SENATOR BRIDGES AND REPRESENTATIVE TABOR TO PERMIT SOME ARMY APPROPRIATION TO BE USED UNDER AN AGREEMENT THAT IT WOULD BE RETURNED TO THE APPROPRIATION AFTER THE OPENING OF CONGRESS IN JANUARY" UNQUOTE.

GRIFFIS REQUESTS AUTHORITY TO SEND PERSONAL TELEGRAMS TO PRESIDENTS OF OIL AND OTHER AMERICAN COMPANIES HAVING

File
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WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL DETACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



IMPORTANT PROPERTIES IN NEAR EAST. FOLLOWING QUOTATIONS
INDICATE GENERAL PLAN OF HIS PROPOSED WIRE, WHICH START:

QUOTE "DESPITE EVERY EFFORT BY STATE DEPARTMENT IT
HAS BEEN FOUND IMPOSSIBLE TO DISCOVER OR ALLOCATE ANY
AVAILABLE GOVERNMENT FUNDS FOR THE RELIEF OF TRAGIC REFUGEE
SITUATION IN NEAR EAST. THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY FOUR
HUNDRED THOUSAND DESTITUTE ARAB REFUGEES, INCLUDING LARGE
PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN, CHILDREN AND OLD MEN. CONTRIBUTIONS
WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD IN RESPONSE TO
BERHADOTTE'S PLEA HAVE SO FAR BEEN A DROP IN THE BUCKET
TO EVEN FEED LET ALONE GIVE SHELTER, BLANKET AND MUCH
NEEDED MEDICAL SUPPLY TO THESE PEOPLE" UNQUOTE MESSAGE ENDS.

QUOTE "WHILE I AM CONSCIOUS OF AND GRATEFUL FOR
CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY ARAMCO COMPANY, THE BECHTEL CORP.,
THE RED CROSS AND OTHERS, I APPEAL TO YOU FOR SUBSTANTIAL
DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS THROUGH ME. I WILL GUARANTEE THAT
EVERY PENNY AND EVERY OUNCE OF GOODS WILL REACH ITS PITIFUL
DESTINATION AND WILL BE HIGHLY PUBLICIZED THROUGHOUT THE
ARAB WORLD FOR AMERICAN AND COMPANY GOOD WILL PROPAGANDA.

I MOST EARNESTLY BESEECH YOUR PROMPT AND GENEROUS
SUPPORT IN THIS MATTER. STANTON GRIFFIS, AMERICAN
AMBASSADOR TO EGYPT. UNQUOTE.

WHILE FUNDS ARE MOST URGENTLY NEEDED AND WHILE GRIFFIS'
SUGGESTION APPEARS TO HAVE MERIT IF HANDLED BY TELEPHONE
AND NOT BY WIRE, DEPARTMENT HAS NOT YET AUTHORIZED THIS
PROCEDURE BECAUSE THERE MAY BE DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

File

B

WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL DETACHMENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

OF WHICH WE ARE NOT AWARE ARISING OUT OF THESE DIRECT
APPEALS AT THIS TIME TO LARGE CORPORATIONS FROM YOUR
AMBASSADOR.

WILL YOU PLEASE GIVE ME BENEFIT YOUR GUIDANCE?

SIGNED LOVETT

BT

DTG: 011635Z

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 2(D) or (E)

Dept. of State letter, Aug. 7, 1973

By MLT-LC, NARS Date 2-1-75

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Clark Clifford, The White House.
FROM : Mr. Robert McClintock, UNA- State Dept.
SUBJECT:

DATE: May 4, 1948.

At the suggestion of the Secretary's Office I attach a copy of a memorandum to the Secretary regarding Dr. Judah Magnes, who has an appointment to see the President off-the-record at 10:45 a.m. tomorrow. I likewise attach a copy of a preliminary draft of a memorandum of the Secretary's conversation with Dr. Magnes this afternoon.

Copy to S- General Carter.

UNA:RMcClintock:em

B. File

B

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE—DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

so return
Mr. McClintock
AS - Room 2211
TELEGRAPH BR

Placed to:
Mr. N. McClintock
AS - Room 2211

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Palmer

Control 10973

Rec'd April 30, 1948
12:36 p.m.

Action: UNA

Info :

SS

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FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 534, April 30, 12:21 p.m.

Substance of views expressed by Dr. Judah L. Magnes
in telephone conversation with me this morning:

The whole situation can be met if a Governor is appointed
for Jerusalem who will take the local people into his
service.

If a police force is needed, it can be got on the spot:
Three hundred each of Arab and Jew police each to be
under separate command but who would meet. That would
be the nucleus. The population of Jerusalem will help
in all possible ways. No politician can stop them.

Jerusalem must be approached with imagination, and with
faith. But let the Governor be appointed and fly out.
I would fly with him. He would be received with open
hearts and arms. Jerusalem people want such help. If
a token force, so much the better; but the Governor
anyway. The people would put themselves at his service.

Faith is a condition for Jerusalem. Dr. Magnes wants
to tell this to the President and to the Secretary of
State. He maintains that we do not need a truce between
the politicians. The people of Jerusalem will take care
of it. No politician can stop the people of Jerusalem.
They will care for it.

The symbol of the religions of the world is Jerusalem.
If the US will put away red tape and get to the people
of Jerusalem the assurance of help from the UN, no truce
between politicians will be needed.

LMS:ML

B File
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUSTIN

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 3(D)

Dept. of State letter, 2-28

By NLT, NARS Date

INFORMATION COPY

May 3, 1948.

WIA- Mr. McClintock

Dr. Judah Magnes

~~SECRET~~

Confirmation has been received from New York that Dr. Judah Magnes, the American-born President of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, will call upon the Secretary at 2:30 p.m., Tuesday, May 4. Dr. Magnes, who has flown from Palestine to New York as a private citizen and at risk of his frail health, is a distinguished educator and a leader of the more moderate Palestinian Jews, who is opposed to the efforts of the Jewish Agency and the Zionists to establish a Jewish state in Palestine.

Although it would appear from the attached telegrams from New York #s 534, April 30, and 551, May 2, that Dr. Magnes is principally concerned with the security of Jerusalem as distinct from arrangements for all of Palestine, Mr. Loy Henderson, Director of WIA, feels that Dr. Magnes will wish to discuss the broader issues of the Palestine problem and not to confine his remarks only to the question of Jerusalem.

It is recommended that the Secretary indicate to Dr. Magnes that his detailed observations on any special regime for Jerusalem should be discussed with officers within the Department and that the conversation be confined to general discussion of the Palestine problem.

Concurrence: WIA (Cleared with Mr. Henderson)

WIA:RMcClintock:am

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)

Dept. of State letter, Aug 2-15-73

By NLT/4, NARS Date 26-7

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : S- General Carter
 FROM : UNA- Mr. McClintock
 SUBJECT: Dr. Judah Magnes

DATE: May 3, 1948.

~~SECRET~~

Confirmation has been received from New York that Dr. Judah Magnes, the American-born President of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, will call upon the Secretary at 2:30 p.m., Tuesday, May 4. Dr. Magnes, who has flown from Palestine to New York as a private citizen and at risk of his frail health, is a distinguished educator and a leader of the more moderate Palestinian Jews, who is opposed to the efforts of the Jewish Agency and the Zionists to establish a Jewish state in Palestine.

Although it would appear from the attached telegrams from New York #1s 534, April 30, and 551, May 2, that Dr. Magnes is principally concerned with the security of Jerusalem as distinct from arrangements for all of Palestine, Mr. Loy Henderson, Director of NEA, feels that Dr. Magnes will wish to discuss the broader issues of the Palestine problem and not to confine his remarks only to the question of Jerusalem.

It is recommended that the Secretary indicate to Dr. Magnes that his detailed observations on any special regime for Jerusalem should be discussed with officers within the Department and that the conversation be confined to general discussion of the Palestine problem.

Concurrence: NEA (Cleared with Mr. Henderson)

UNA:RMcClintock:em

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (E)

Dept. of State letter, 7-15-75

By NLT, NARS Date 2-26-75

~~SECRET~~

B. File

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE—DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

TELEGRAPH B

18 B

~~SECRET~~

Action: UNA

Info :

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Control 295

Rec'd May 2, 1948

9:17 p.m.

FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State.

NO: 551, May 2, 8:23 p.m.

URGENT

Referring Magnes' appointment with ~~President~~ ^{Secretary} Tuesday afternoon, he sent me in this connection his views as follows re Jerusalem:

"The Trusteeship Council

The preamble remains the same.

1. Paragraph 1, together with annex A, remains the same.
2. The introduction to paragraph 2 -- the first four lines -- remain the same.

(A) To read as follows:

That a temporary administration be set up at once for the area of the municipality of Jerusalem.

(B) To read as follows:

That a special United Nations representative for Jerusalem be appointed by the Trusteeship Council at once. He should proceed to Jerusalem without any delay. His terms of reference are to be:

- (1) To observe the cease-fire in the Walled City.
- (2) To extend the truce to the whole of the municipal area of Jerusalem.

(3) To take

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) of (B)
Dept. of State letter, Aug 6, 1975
By NLT/HC, NARS Date 8-26-75

~~SECRET~~

B. File

INFORMATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- #551, May 2, 8:23 p.m., from New York

(3) To take over from the mandatory authority the administrative functions necessary to maintain peace and order when these functions are laid down by the present authority, and to take custody of such assets as may be arranged with the mandatory authority, and

(4) To organize a police force in Jerusalem for the maintenance of law and order.

NOTES:

1. Whereas a temporary trusteeship arrangement is just the thing for Jerusalem, I have written 'temporary administration' so as to obviate any debate as to trusteeship. Moreover, it would take time to work it out and have it approved by the Assembly. There is no time. The clock is ticking in Jerusalem.

2. I have designated the appointee special representative of the United Nations for Jerusalem in order to give him an authoritative title. This is important.

I have said he should be appointed by the Trusteeship Council, because this in itself indicates that trusteeship is in mind, even if the term be avoided for reasons given above.

I have substituted the words 'at once' for 'promptly', because 'at once' is more urgent.

He must really be delegated from here on this special mission and no attempt should be made to find a man already in Jerusalem. The search would probably prove futile.

3. I have left out the words in B (2) 'to cooperate under conditions to be determined by the Security Council', because they may start another debate and take time. There is no time.

4. I have left out the words in B (3), 'under the terms of the trusteeship agreement', for reasons indicated above.

5. I have

B File

-3- #551, May 2, 8:23 p.m., from New York

5. I have left out in B (3) the word 'administrative' where it appears the second time, because it may be interpreted restrictively.

6. I have left out the last five lines of B (4) for two reasons: First, because it would seem to be almost impossible to have the necessary forces supplied by members of the United Nations, and second (and this is of primary importance) because the people of Jerusalem themselves are, in my opinion, ready and anxious to bear this responsibility themselves.

For this reason also I have inserted the words 'in Jerusalem', as the place where the police force was to be organized."

AUSTIN

DM:RMc

Note: Mr. McClintock notified 10 p.m., 5/2/48 (CWO/FMH).

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (U)
 Dept. of State letter, 27-8-73

By NLT-66, NARS Date 26-75
 174

~~SECRET~~

B File

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

Preliminary Draft

DATE: May 4, 1948.

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Palestine

PARTICIPANTS: S- The Secretary
 Dr. Judah Magnes
 UNA- Mr. Robert McClintock

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12958, Sec. 1(E) and 5(D) re (E)

Dep. of State, 7-15-78

Ex NLT, 11, NARS Date 2-26-75

COPIES TO: U- Mr. Lovett
 UNA- Mr. Rusk
 NEA- Mr. Henderson
 USUN- Ambassador Austin

I received Dr. Magnes, the President of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, at his request at 2:30 this afternoon. We exchanged complimentary remarks on Sir John Dill, who at one period of his career had been High Commissioner in Palestine and for whose character, charm and integrity we both had the highest regard.

I told Dr. Magnes that the essence of the problem in Palestine was the absence of trust between the parties at issue. Neither side would believe the other and this, coupled with the fact that the problem was overlaid by side issues and affected by politics, made the matter one of immense difficulty. I said that on the military side I could clearly foresee what was going to happen. The Jews had won the first round and were encouraged by their successes. At this point Dr. Magnes said that time was on the side of the Arabs. The Jews were short on time. They sought to strike quickly, without realizing that the Arabs could afford to wait and would eventually overwhelm them.

Dr. Magnes said that the first of the points he desired to make was that great pressure could be brought to bear on both Arabs and Jews if the United States would impose even partial financial sanctions. He pointed out that the Jewish community in Palestine is an artificial development and that, although the work of the Jews had resulted in many beautiful accomplishments such as farms, universities, and hospitals, which resulted from contributions from

the United States

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 1.1(b) and 1.1(d) of (1)
Dpt. of State, 2-15-77
By NLT, 11-1-88, NARS Date 2-16-88

the United States, the money now contributed to the Jewish community was being used solely for war "which eats up everything". Dr. Magnes said that the Hagannah costs \$4 million a month to run. He was certain that, if contributions from the United States were cut off, the Jewish war machine in Palestine would come to a halt for lack of financial fuel.

On the Arab side Dr. Magnes said that Syria was in very shaky financial straits, and that the situation in Iraq was also precarious. I asked him if his proposed embargo would apply to all financial relations with Palestine and the Arab States, or only to contributions. He said that at this juncture he thought it should refer to the latter and not to ordinary commercial transactions.

Speaking of the truce, Dr. Magnes greatly doubted that a truce could be worked out by the United Nations, operating some six or seven thousand miles distant from the scene. He thought a real truce could only be developed on the spot in Palestine. As for the nature of a truce, there were two possible alternatives. There could be a voluntary truce, which Dr. Magnes thought was now almost out of the question, or an imposed truce, which would call for the use of force. It seemed from the debates at Lake Success that no country was willing to take up the American offer to send troops to implement a trusteeship provided other governments did likewise. Accordingly, the prospects for an imposed truce - unless this could be accomplished by financial sanctions - did not seem bright.

Dr. Magnes then turned to the problem of Jerusalem. He said he had lived in Jerusalem for 25 years. He knew its people, both Arabs and Jews, perhaps as well as any living man. He assured me with great conviction and intensity that the populace of Jerusalem - Arab and Jew alike - is heartily sick of the situation in which they find themselves and that their burning desire is peace.

Dr. Magnes said that if the United Nations could send some man of integrity and character to Jerusalem, preferably a man from a religious call of life, he thought that the populace of Jerusalem would gather behind such a leader to provide a regime of peace for the Holy City. He said that there were both Arab and Jewish municipal councils and that there were separate Arab and Jewish police forces, each numbering 300 men. It would be necessary for the United Nations Commissioner to do something immediately to enable the populace to restore certain public services, particularly the water supply. However, Dr. Magnes was certain of success if such a United Nations Representative of the proper qualifications were sent. In response to a question he said that there was always the danger of physical violence,

since the

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B. File

MAGNES, JUDAH LEON

* * * * *

Rabbi, community leader, and president of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. b. San Francisco, 1877. He received his B.A. degree from the University of Cincinnati in 1898 and his rabbinical degree from the Hebrew Union College two years later. From 1900 to 1902 Magnes was in Europe, for the most part in Germany, where he did post-graduate work at both the University of Berlin and the University of Heidelberg. He received his Ph.D. degree from Heidelberg in 1902.

Returning to the United States in 1903, Magnes did not at once enter the active rabbinate but instead became librarian and instructor at the Hebrew Union College. In 1904 he was called to Brooklyn to occupy the pulpit of Temple Israel.

The first years of the 20th century were a period of great germination in American Jewish life. Although the impetus, both hopeful and tragic, came from Europe, the more sensitive spirits in American Jewish life responded quickly, and among them was Magnes. He became secretary of the Federation of American Zionists (1905-8), and in so doing he helped to bridge the schism in language and in ideology between the groups he represented and the growing masses of East European Jewry who spoke and read Yiddish. He was among the first to insist that in America Zionism must be interpreted in conformity with the American environment rather than with the theories of national life prevailing in the European countries of origin.

Through his Zionist work, the Jewish masses came to know Magnes and he them. He identified himself still further with their needs and aspirations when he organized the protest meetings and made the relief appeals called forth by the Kishinev pogroms, and himself headed the protest parade.

His forthrightness and forensic abilities resulted ~~abilities resulted~~ in his being offered the influential pulpit of Temple Emanu-El in New York in 1908, at the suggestion of Louis Marshall. But his advocacy of the resumption of more traditional aspects of worship and custom brought about his resignation from that pulpit in 1910.

It was during his two years' incumbency at Emanu-El that Magnes succeeded in laying the ground for what might have become a unified Jewish community in New York City, the Kehillah. Magnes was its chairman during the entire period of its existence (1909-22). The comprehensive program of that short-lived Kehillah proved to be premature. But its Bureau of Jewish Education, which Magnes called into being in 1910, continued until 1941, and profoundly influenced the community organizations for Jewish education throughout the United States.

In the meantime, having left Temple Emanu-El, Magnes sought to carry out his personal adoption of more conservative Judaism by becoming rabbi of Congregation B'nai Jeshurun. A year later he organized the Society for the Advancement of Judaism, and was its leader until 1920. He helped found the Yiddish daily DER TOG, sponsored the Inter-collegiate Menorah Society and promoted many other Jewish cultural institutions.

During the first World War (1914-18) Magnes was one of the prime movers in establishing the Joint Distribution Committee, and in 1916 headed the first commission that went to Europe to arrange for the distribution of American Jewish relief funds. But during the entire four years of the War, Magnes was subjected to a great deal of opposition and criticism because of his espousal of the pacifist cause. Despite the attacks made on him, he did not alter his position; not until twenty years later, when in 1939 Britain went to war against Nazi Germany, did Magnes relinquish the unflinchingly pacifist credo to which he had adhered his whole life.

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-4-

E. O. 11652, Sec. 1(e) and 1(d) or (f)
Dept. of State Index 23-4635

By NLT: H, NARS Date 2-26-75

be without prejudice to the eventual settlement, should be amended to read "without prejudice to that settlement which will be worked out by the Arabs and Jews". He said he was absolutely certain that there could be no settlement of the Palestine problem unless the Arabs and Jews sat down to work out their own solution.

As for the government of the trusteeship, Dr. Magnes felt that the British had made a mistake in their government of the Palestine mandate. In none of the important offices of government were there any Arabs or Jews in posts of responsibility. The British had implanted a foreign regime on the people of Palestine. If the United Nations should implant a regime which was made up of the populace, drawing equally on Arabs and Jews, the trusteeship might develop into a more lasting settlement.

I told Dr. Magnes that this was the most straightforward account on Palestine I had heard, and asked him if he had an appointment to see the President. He replied that he had not but very much hoped it would be possible to call at the White House. I asked McClintock to make arrangements for Dr. Magnes to see the President.

As Dr. Magnes was leaving, he asked permission to direct a very blunt question: "Do you think there is any chance to impose a solution on Palestine?". I replied that imposition of a regime implied the use of force. It was clear as daylight that other governments were eager to sidestep and leave Uncle Sam in the middle. I did not think it was wise for the United States alone to take the responsibility for military commitments in Palestine but I would be glad to give this matter further thought.

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B File

DKA:RMcClintock:em

5/4/48

since the young Jewish zealots believed fanatically in their cause and were truly idealistic in the thought that they had a mission to restore the land of the Jews to its people. However, a small bodyguard -- and Dr. Magnes said it was beyond his province to estimate its number -- would suffice to ensure the physical safety of the United Nations Representative.

When asked if Dr. Magnes had any names in mind for the Jerusalem post, he said that he thought either Dr. Bromley Oxnam, a prominent Methodist divine who was formerly President of the Federal Council of Churches, or the present President of that organization, Mr. Charles Taft, of Cincinnati, would be ideally qualified for the task.

On the broader question of sending a United Nations Representative to establish a truce for all of Palestine, Dr. Magnes thought that this man should have perhaps other qualifications. He should be a man of action and capable of rapid decisions. He thought someone like Lord Louis Mountbatten would be the type of man for this task. I remarked that I thought Lord Mountbatten would probably not be available, as he had about reached the limit of his endurance after a variety of difficult tasks, and we agreed that his British nationality would probably militate against him for such a post. After discussion of several other possibilities, McClintock mentioned the name of Lt. General Mark Clark, with the comment that he now had little to do after having accomplished some very impressive jobs, and that the fact that he was half Jewish might in this particular situation be useful. Dr. Magnes said that he had not known that General Clark was half Jewish and this fact alone indicated that General Clark could not be regarded as pro-Zionist. I said that the suggestion had considerable interest.

Dr. Magnes stressed his belief that, even if fighting had broken out in Palestine between Arabs and Jews, the United Nations should still send representatives to Jerusalem and all of Palestine. He cited the example of Indonesia where, although hostilities were in progress, the United Nations Consular Commission, succeeded by the Good Offices Committee, had succeeded in securing observance of a cease-fire order and principles of agreement.

Dr. Magnes said he would be frank in remarking that he thought American spokesmen at Lake Success had been too apologetic in putting forward our trusteeship proposals. He said there was no solution for the Palestine problem outside of trusteeship at the present time. Trusteeship could take a variety of forms. It could be made up of states, as in the federal union, or it could consist of cantons or provinces inhabited by Jews and Arabs separately. He said that our phrase that the temporary trusteeship should

be without

With the end of the first World War and the development of Jewish activities in Palestine, Magnes was asked to undertake the organization of the Hebrew University. He secured the initial funds for its maintenance and laid the basis for its academic structure. When it was opened in 1925, Magnes became chancellor, and in 1935 he was made president of the university.

Living in Palestine, Magnes has continued to follow a path of political belief which has frequently clashed with majority opinion. He was from the very beginning outspoken in favor of cooperative activity with the Arab population rather than dependence on British protection. He disagreed with the official Zionist leadership by expressing doubts about the possibility of establishing a Jewish commonwealth that would be accepted peaceably by the Palestinian Arabs. His counter-suggestion was that "bi-national" parity be established in Palestine between Jews and Arabs, that agreement with them be reached on the rate of Jewish immigration, and that the country be made part of an Arab Federation in the Near East. He made several unsuccessful efforts to implement his plan of bringing together the moderate Arab spokesmen with the Zionist leadership in Palestine.

On the other hand, Magnes remained his old challenging self in other aspects of Jewish life, urging, for instance, that Jews the world over adopt the insignia of the yellow Magen David imposed on the Jews of Nazi-controlled countries, and thus turn it into a mark of honor. As head of the Hadassah Emergency Committee in Palestine, he was instrumental in maintaining the morale and well-being of the population and in putting the resources of the Hadassah Medical Organization and of the Hebrew University at the service of the British war effort.

~~Archives of the President~~

B...File

The following Members have signed the letter to the President:

Congressman John Blatnik	Minn.	Congressman Thomas Lane	Mass.
" Sol Bloch	N.Y.	" Walter Lynch	N.Y.
" Joseph Bryson	S.C.	" Ray Madden	Ind.
" Frank Buchanan	Pa.	" John McCormack	Mass.
" Charles Buckley	N.Y.	" Hugh Meade	Md.
" William Byrne	N.Y.	" Benjamin Muter	N.Y.
" John Carroll	Colo.	" Donald O'Toole	N.Y.
" Emmanuel Celler	N.Y.	" Philip Philbin	Mass.
" John Delaney	N.Y.	" Melvin Price	Illinois
" John Dingell	Mich.	" John Rooney	N.Y.
" Harold Donohue	Mass.	" Adolph Sabath	Ill.
" Helen G. Douglas	Calif.	" George Sadowski	Mich.
" H. Eberharter	Pa.	" Andrew Somers	Ill.
" Aime Forand	R.I.		
" Thomas Gordon	Ill.		
" Edward Hart	N.J.		
" Frank Havenner	Calif.		
" James J. Hefferman	N.Y.		
" Chet Holifield	Calif.		
" Walter Huber	Ohio.		
" Frank Karsten	Mo.		
" Estes Kefauver	Tenn.		
" Augustine Kelley	Pa.		
" John Kennedy	Mass.		
" Eugene Keogh	N.Y.		
" Arthur Klein	N.Y.		

B. File

2. Any officer or employee of an Executive department, agency or independent establishment of the Government possessing personal information or knowledge relating to the subjects referred to the Committee for examination and study under its several terms of reference, may, upon the request of the American Chairman of the Committee and with the approval of the head of the department, agency, or independent establishment concerned, furnish such information or knowledge to the Committee either orally or in writing as shall in each case appear to be desirable.

3. The Secretary of State may assign or detail officers and employees of the Department of State, including officers and employees of the Foreign Service of the United States, for service with the American members of the Committee.

4. The head of any department, agency, or independent establishment of the Government may, upon request of the Secretary of State, detail or assign officers and employees of his department, agency, or independent establishment for service with the American members of the Committee.

5. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are authorized to provide appropriate assistance including the furnishing of available Government-owned motor transportation and other Government-owned and operated facilities which can be spared to enable the Committee properly to perform the tasks entrusted to it.

6. The Secretary of State may, in order to effect the purposes of this order, and in conformity with existing law, delegate to one or more responsible officers of the Department of State the authority vested in him by this order.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,

January 18, 1946

Admiral Leahy

TOP SECRET

SM-6049
21 June 1948

COPY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: British Proposals in Connection with the
Report of the Anglo-American Committee of
Inquiry on Palestine.

With regard to the request of 7 June 1948 by the Acting State member, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (J.C.S. 1634), following are comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on certain topics proposed by the British for joint consideration in connection with the recommendations of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. It will be noted that no definitive recommendations are offered on many of the difficult political aspects of this problem, on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not feel they should advise.

We urge that no U.S. armed forces be involved in carrying out the Committee's recommendations. We recommend that in implementing the report, the guiding principle be that no action should be taken which will cause repercussions in Palestine which are beyond the capabilities of British troops to control.

Should the question of using any U.S. forces arise, we would point out that, under present War and Navy Department commitments to the Congress, only very limited forces could be spared from tasks in which we are already engaged. Such contingents might in theory be of a size to contribute to pacifying the situation in Palestine, but we believe that the political shock attending the reappearance of U.S. armed forces in the Middle East would unnecessarily risk such serious disturbances throughout the area as to dwarf any local Palestine difficulties. Such a condition would, among other effects, invalidate entirely any current estimates of required strengths of the Army and Navy. Further, the Middle East could well fall into anarchy and become a breeding ground for world war.

It is believed that implementation of the report by force would prejudice British and U.S. interests in much of

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E), and 3(D) or (F)

OED Memo, April 12, 1974

By NLT: HC, NARS Date 7-16-75

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COPY

the Middle East and that British and U.S. influence would consequently be curtailed except as it might be maintained by military force. The USSR might replace the United States and Britain in influence and power through the Middle East.

As to the importance of a stable Middle East, friendly to the Western Powers, it is obvious that this area is the buffer between Russia and the British Mediterranean life line. If the peoples of the Middle East turn to Russia, this would have the same impact in many respects as would military conquest on this area by the Soviets. Under these conditions, even if Turkey maintains her internal and political integrity, it is highly questionable that she could continue her stand on the Dardanelles and maintain her position as other than a satellite Russian state. Also, for very serious consideration from a military point of view is control of the oil of the Middle East. This is probably the one large undeveloped reserve in a world which may come to the limits of its oil resources within this generation without having developed any substitute. A great part of our military strength, as well as our standard of living, is based on oil.

As to U.S. participation in a Palestine trusteeship, we consider that military advice must rest on our supposition that such participation would lead to military involvement, on which subject our views are stated above.

In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that in implementing the report of the Anglo-American Committee, no action be taken which would:

- a. Commit U.S. armed forces, or
- b. Orient the peoples of the Middle East away from the Western Powers, as the U.S. has a vital security interest in that area.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

A. J. McFARLAND,
Colonel, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

1684/1 - approved as amended 21 June 1946)

Copy to:

Chief, P&F Group, P&C Div.
Admin. Aide to CNO

~~TOP SECRET~~

B. File

TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE—DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

TELEGRAPH B

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control 6186

Rec'd May 19, 1948
2:54 p.m.

Action: UNA

Info :

SS

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EUR

NSA

DCR

LOG

FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 674, May 19, 2:15 p.m.

FOR MARSHALL FROM AUSTIN.

For your personal information and that of the Department, the following appraisal of the present position of the US in the UN is transmitted with a view to its utility in framing further instructions for the guidance of the Mission in regard to the Palestine case and other political issues in the SC, the IC, and in the next session of the GA.

It is our best estimate recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel last Friday evening has deeply undermined the confidence of other delegations in our integrity and that this is a factor which the Department will want to keep in mind in the immediate future and for some time to come.

The following is our estimate of the way in which a large number of delegations view the sequence of events in the special session of the GA culminating in the announcement of our recognition of the Provisional Government:

1. Recognition constituted reversal of US policy for truce plus trusteeship as urged in special session of GA and, in later stages, US compromise resolution laying stress on truce plus mediation;
2. Concerning efforts to secure truce, both in SC and in informal truce negotiations, we had heavily emphasized that there should be no action of a political character which would alter the status quo or prejudice the rights, claims or positions of either Arabs or Jews. This was generally understood to apply primarily to the establishment of the

Jewish state.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 1(a) and 2(D) or (E)

Dept. of State Letter, Aug. 9, 1973

By NLT- , NARS Date 12-74~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION COPY

B.F.I.

-2- #674, May 19, 2:15 p.m., from New York.

Jewish state. SC truce resolution which had our strong backing included appeal to all governments to take all possible steps to assist in implementation of truce;

3. In carrying through this truce program under instructions which we understood had highest clearance, we persuaded other delegations of correctness of our position and induced them to come forward and carry a large share of the burden. They thus became publicly identified with our position;

4. The feeling is that although the Jews had not accepted the truce they disregarded the admonitions of the SC, violated spirit of truce effort, and prevented conclusion of formal truce. US immediately not only condoned but endorsed these violations, thus striking heavy blow at prospect of concluding any truce and equally heavy blow at prestige and effectiveness of SC and UN generally;

5. US by its immediate act of recognition of the Provisional Government, violated the terms of the SC truce resolution;

6. The consequence of foregoing is a lack of confidence in the integrity of US intentions and disbelief of further statements of future US intentions and policies;

7. This attitude in turn leads to strong desire to avoid being committed to any US position which might be reversed without notice;

8. As a further consequence, other governments feel the necessity of recapturing their own freedom of action to make spot decisions instead of supporting us or relying on UN, since this appears to them to be current US attitude;

9. An important contribution to foregoing attitude was failure of US to inform or consult before announcement of final step. We had developed here closest and most friendly relations large number other delegations which desire to support our foreign policies not only in UN but generally. We had kept each other informed, working out mutually acceptable points of substance, strategy, and tactics. Method by which US recognition action was taken without prior notice or consultation deeply offended many of those who had collaborated closely with us;

10. With two or three exceptions our closest and most consistent supporters among other delegations, while expressing friendly personal feeling are manifestly mistrustful of continuing cooperation on basic questions of policy or strategy.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- #674, May 15, 2:15 p.m., from New York.

or strategy, or even of tactics.

It, of course, was to be anticipated that the delegations of the Arab states would be particularly bitter, but the reaction of other delegations such as those of Canada, China and a number of the Latin American states is not based on the merits but is due to a feeling, frankly expressed by them, that they have been double-crossed.

With particular reference to our immediate policy on Palestine and specifically the resolution which we have introduced in the SC calling for action under Chapter VII, the situation in our estimation is that if we press this to a vote it will not receive more than three or four affirmative votes. Delegations of governments which are generally well-disposed and friendly feel that a finding of breach of peace under Article 39 is unrealistic unless sanctions, if necessary, will be assured. In this connection delegations are completely mistrustful of our readiness to participate in sanctions. Current newspaper comment concerning possible US action on the existing arms embargo is an element mentioned by other delegations as contributing to their mistrust.

In the long run, of course, identity of interest between the US and various other governments will tend to outweigh current reactions, but it will take time to diminish current attitude of distrust. This means that positions taken by the US on a variety of topics may continue to be viewed with suspicion, and that other delegations will not be inclined to support us for fear that a change in our position will leave them vulnerable. We must, I feel, exercise particular care not to advance major proposals on political issues, particularly in the SC, without careful previous canvassing of delegations here. In many cases our objectives might best be obtained through support of proposals introduced by other delegations. In general, I believe we should be responsive to indications of fear of Russian expansion on the part of many delegations, and their underlying conviction of identity of interest with us.

AUSTIN

LMS:EDW

~~TOP SECRET~~

REF ID: A66000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Following the receipt of information from various sources regarding the distressing situation of the Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution in Europe, I wrote to Mr. Attlee on August 31 bringing to his attention the suggestion in a report of Mr. Earl G. Harrison that the granting of an additional 100,000 certificates for the immigration of Jews into Palestine would alleviate the situation. A copy of my letter to Mr. Attlee is being made available to the press. I continue to adhere to the views expressed in that letter.

I was advised by the British Government that because of conditions in Palestine it was not in a position to adopt the policy recommended, but that it was deeply concerned with the situation of the Jews in Europe. During the course of subsequent discussions between the two Governments, it suggested the establishment of a Joint Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, under a rotating chairmanship, to examine the whole question and to make a further review of the Palestine problem in the light of that examination and other relevant considerations.

In view of our intense interest in this matter and of our belief that such a committee will be of aid in finding a solution which will be both humane and just, we have acceded to the British suggestion.

The terms of reference of this committee as agreed upon between the two Governments are as follows:

1. To examine political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living therein.
2. To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression and to make estimates of those who wish or will be impelled by their conditions to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.
3. To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine as such problems are affected by conditions subject to examination under paragraphs 1 and 2 above and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States for an interim handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution.
4. To make such other recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph 2 above, by remedial action in the European countries in question or by the provision of facilities for emigration to and settlement in countries outside Europe.

It will be observed that among the important duties of this committee will be the task of examining conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration. The establishment of this committee will make possible a prompt review of the unfortunate plight of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been subjected to persecution, and a prompt examination of questions related to the rate of current immigration into Palestine and the absorptive capacity of the country.

The situation faced by displaced Jews in Europe during the coming winter allows no delay in this matter. I hope the Committee will be able to accomplish its important task with the greatest speed.

B. Fil

The text of the letter addressed to the Prime Minister of Great Britain by the President, under date of August 31, 1945, follows:

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Because of the natural interest of this Government in the present condition and future fate of those displaced persons in Germany who may prove to be stateless or non-repatriable, we recently sent Mr. Earl C. Harrison to inquire into the situation.

Mr. Harrison was formerly the United States Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, and is now the Representative of this Government on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. The United Kingdom and the United States, as you know, have taken an active interest in the work of this Committee.

Instructions were given to Mr. Harrison to inquire particularly into the problems and needs of the Jewish refugees among the displaced persons.

Mr. Harrison visited not only the American zone in Germany, but spent some time also in the British zone where he was extended every courtesy by the 21st Army Headquarters.

I have now received his report. In view of our conversations at Potsdam I am sure that you will find certain portions of the report interesting. I am, therefore, sending you a copy.

I should like to call your attention to the conclusions and recommendations appearing on page 8 and the following pages - especially the references to Palestine. It appears that the available certificates for immigration to Palestine will be exhausted in the near future. It is suggested that the granting of an additional one hundred thousand of such certificates would contribute greatly to a sound solution for the future of Jews still in Germany and Austria, and for other Jewish refugees who do not wish to remain where they are or who for understandable reasons do not desire to return to their countries of origin.

On the basis of this and other information which has come to me I concur in the belief that no other single matter is so important for those who have known the horrors of concentration camps for over a decade as is the future of immigration possibilities into Palestine. The number of such persons who wish immigration to Palestine or who would qualify for admission there is, unfortunately, no longer as large as it was before the Nazis began their extermination program. As I said to you in Potsdam, the American people, as a whole, firmly believe that immigration into Palestine should not be closed and that a reasonable number of Europe's persecuted Jews should, in accordance with their wishes, be permitted to resettle there.

I know you are in agreement on the proposition that future peace in Europe depends in large measure upon our finding sound solutions of problems confronting the displaced and formerly persecuted groups of people. No claim is more meritorious than that of the groups who for so many years have known persecution and enslavement.

The main solution appears to lie in the quick evacuation of as many as possible of the non-repatriable Jews, who wish it, to Palestine. If it is to be effective, such action should not be long delayed.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

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2. To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression and to make estimates of those who wish or will be impelled by their conditions to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.
- 3.- To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine as such problems are affected by conditions subject to examination under paragraphs 1 and 2 above and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States for an interim handling of those problems as well as for their permanent solution.
4. To make such other recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph 2 above, by remedial action in the European countries in question or by the provision of facilities for emigration to and settlement in countries outside Europe.

It will be observed that among the important duties of this committee will be the task of examining conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration. The establishment of this Committee will make possible a prompt review of the unfortunate plight of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been subjected to persecution, and a prompt examination of questions related to the rate of current immigration into Palestine and the absorptive capacity of the country.

The situation faced by displaced Jews in Europe during the coming winter allows no delay in this matter. I hope the Committee will be able to accomplish its important task with the greatest speed.

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The text of the letter addressed to the Prime Minister of Great Britain by the President, under date of August 31, 1945, follows:

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Because of the natural interest of this Government in the present condition and future fate of those displaced persons in Germany who may prove to be stateless or non-repatriable, we recently sent Mr. Earl G. Harrison to inquire into the situation.

Mr. Harrison was formerly the United States Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, and is now the Representative of this Government on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. The United Kingdom and the United States, as you know, have taken an active interest in the work of this Committee.

Instructions were given to Mr. Harrison to inquire particularly into the problems and needs of the Jewish refugees among the displaced persons.

Mr. Harrison visited not only the American zone in Germany, but spent some time also in the British Zone where he was extended every courtesy by the 21st Army Headquarters.

I have now received his report. In view of our conversations at Potsdam I am sure that you will find certain portions of the report interesting. I am, therefore, sending you a copy.

I should like to call your attention to the conclusions and recommendations appearing on page 8 and the following pages - especially the references to Palestine. It appears that the available certificates for immigration to Palestine will be exhausted in the near future. It is suggested that the granting of an additional one hundred thousand of such certificates would contribute greatly to a sound solution for the future of Jews still in Germany and Austria, and for other Jewish refugees who do not wish to remain where they are or who for understandable reasons do not desire to return to their countries of origin.

On the basis of this and other information which has come to me I concur in the belief that no other single matter is so important for those who have known the horrors of concentration camps for over a decade as is the future of immigration possibilities into Palestine. The number of such persons who wish immigration to Palestine or who would qualify for admission there is, unfortunately, no longer as large as it was before the Nazis began their extermination program. As I said to you in Potsdam, the American people, as a whole, firmly believe that immigration into Palestine should not be closed and that a reasonable number of Europe's persecuted Jews should, in accordance with their wishes, be permitted to resettle there.

I know you are in agreement on the proposition that future peace in Europe depends in large measure upon our finding sound solutions of problems confronting the displaced and formerly persecuted groups of people. No claim is more meritorious than that of the groups who for so many years have known persecution and enslavement.

The main solution appears to lie in the quick evacuation of as many as possible of the non-repatriable Jews, who wish it, to Palestine. If it is to be effective, such action should not be long delayed.

WRITTEN ORAL STATEMENT

The American Government, for domestic and other reasons, would find it easier to support in the United Nations and elsewhere the solution of the Palestine problem calling for partition and the setting up of a viable Jewish state than any other solution at present under consideration.

In case the British Government after careful study and further discussion should come to the conclusion that the partition solution would be unworkable and if it should be successful in working out in consultation with Arabs and Jews a solution, which in its opinion could successfully be put into effect, lying somewhere between the partition plan and the Morrison-Grady cantonization plan, the American Government would be disposed to give such a solution its support.

It would be somewhat difficult in view of the attitude of the American public for the American Government to give support to the cantonization plan as proposed by Morrison-Grady. It would be much more difficult for it to support any solution which does not provide for the entry in the near future into Palestine of at least 100,000 displaced European Jews and for Jewish immigration at a reasonable rate thereafter. It is assumed that the

British Government understands that the American Government could not participate in the carrying out of any solution by armed force. The President is planning in the near future to recommend to Congress the enactment of legislation which would permit immigration into the United States of a substantial number of displaced persons in Europe. Such legislation, if enacted, should make it clear to both Arabs and Jews that the United States is prepared on its part to accept an appropriate share of Jewish displaced persons.

Since the British Government has special knowledge derived from its many years' administration of Palestine and since it is engaging in direct conversations with Arabs and Jews, it should be in a better position than any other Government to sense the kind of solution of the Palestine problem which has the best possibility of success. Furthermore, it will bear the primary responsibility for putting into actual operation any plan for Palestine which might be adopted. It would seem, therefore, that the decision as to the solution of the Palestine problem must rest with the British Government.

The American Government, while realizing that the British Government alone can decide the course which it

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should follow, would regret any decision of the British Government to turn the mandate over to the General Assembly without recommendations. Such a course might well lead to much confusion and violence in Palestine and elsewhere in the Near East.

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Palestine

PROPOSAL MADE BY LESSING J. ROSENWALD, PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR JUDAISM, TO PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN AT THEIR MEETING IN THE WHITE HOUSE, TUESDAY, DECEMBER FOURTH

The future of the displaced Jews in Europe continues in uncertainty. Their plight - with the rigors of winter ahead - remains desperately tragic. Meanwhile, conditions in Palestine have reached a stage alarming to the peace of the world. We have had sabre rattling, boycott, recriminations, rioting, bloodshed, and threats of still more bloodshed.

This situation is not eased by the issuance of belligerent notes by sovereign states of the Near East, or by demonstrations and nationalist propaganda on the part of Zionists in and out of Palestine.

It is high time to call a halt to this dangerous course.

So-called promises made or implied decades ago, ambiguous and mutually contradictory, and variously interpreted by various parties, must no longer be determinant in the face of a new and grave situation. There is no reason why realistic conditions today should not lead to a complete reconsideration of the Palestine problem as there has been of other world problems.

The necessity of reaching a workable and peaceful solution outweighs all other considerations. The peace of the world demands it. A solution of the Palestine problem can become a token of our earnest resolve to deal with broad world problems before they reach the crisis stage.

We urge the following as a basis for a fair and peaceful settlement:

- 1) There shall be a United Nations declaration that Palestine shall not be a Moslem, Christian or a Jewish state but shall be a country in which people of all faiths can play their full and equal part, sharing fully the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.

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- 2) All official declarations on Palestine in any way discriminating for or against a segment of the population shall be formally repudiated; in their place there shall be a renewed pledge of full freedom of religious expression and equality for all in Palestine.
- 3) Palestine, as a ward of the civilized world, shall receive financial help for the expansion of its economy, and the enlargement of its immigration opportunities.
- 4) Immigration into Palestine shall be maintained on the basis of absorptive capacity and without privilege or discrimination.
- 5) Immigration procedures shall be controlled by representative bodies of all the inhabitants of Palestine, in association with properly instituted international commissions.
- 6) Institutions of home rule for Palestine shall be progressively and rapidly instituted under the aegis of an international commission.
- 7) The problem of the displaced Jews in Europe shall be treated separately, in the following way:
- a. The above policy on Palestine shall be made known to them.
 - b. On the basis of such knowledge, a poll shall be taken in which the displaced persons would list, in order of preference, the lands of their choice for their individual resettlement.
 - c. Based upon these findings, an International Displaced Persons Committee shall, with the co-operation of the United Nations, bring about the resettlement of the displaced on a basis corresponding as nearly as possible to their preferences, with countries of the United Nations co-operating to take in a fair number of the displaced. Action by the United States Government to make available unused and current

B File

immigrant quotas, and the necessary consular and visa machinery for the immigration of displaced persons of all faiths, would set a high moral example to the rest of the world of our determination to contribute to the solution of world problems and would, in fact, bring about the rapid solution of the refugee problem.

THE AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR JUDAISM IS PLEDGED TO ADVANCE THIS PROGRAM AS A CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE IN PALISTINE, HUMANITARIAN AID FOR THOSE IN DISTRESS AND FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THOSE OF JEWISH FAITH AS FREE AND EQUAL CITIZENS EVERYWHERE.

Issing Rosenwald

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Palistine File

General Marshall, representing the Executive branch of

the Government in this matter, has two heavy burdens: the finding of some solution for a highly complicated problem, and the persuading of important groups of American and other opinion to cooperate with a proper solution. General Marshall has been using for these two purposes the regular staff of his Department. The question is whether it would be useful for him, in addition, to select and make use of special assistance.

It is in the great and long-standing American tradition for the American government ^{to} make use of two practical principles of government in a matter of this sort:

(1) To bring in additional and resourceful brains, whenever useful, for the purpose of possibly finding new ideas for straightening out kinks that seem to be difficult or impossible.

Sometimes the Government calls in a man already in the Government, and sometimes it calls in some satisfactory person who happens at the moment not to be in the Government.

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For example, when considerable sections of American public opinion were critical of the course of our Government in China,

and even of the kind of understanding and factual reports our Government in Washington was getting from the Government's representatives in China, General Marshall was sent out on a special mission to China. This resulted in unifying American opinion in support of the Government.

Another example: in order similarly to satisfy public opinion at home, and even to meet the complaints of the Russian government at the time that the American government's representatives in the Balkans were doing an unfair job, our Government sent Mark Etheridge to the Balkans to ascertain the facts, to report, and to straighten out kinks that were proving so difficult for the regular men on the spot in the Balkans.

(2) A second well-established principle of the American government, in every one of its branches, is that when it becomes desirable to obtain the cooperation of any group, it may become useful to employ for that purpose a person who is trusted by the group that has to be persuaded to give its full cooperation.

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For example, even within Congress, when it is necessary

to straighten out differences of opinion, the usual practice is to seek that Senator or that Member of the House who has the most influence with the opposing or contending group of Senators or Representatives.

So deeply ingrained is this principle in American government practice that when quite recently a District Judge in the District of Columbia decided to preside over a case, despite the objection that he would necessarily be biased, the Appellate Court over-ruled him and said that even though a District Judge were not biased, he should refuse to try a case once his bias was brought into question, even though incorrectly and unjustly charged.

The present Palestine problem presents an example: No matter how the problem is solved, no matter how the present proposal may be modified, Secretary Marshall's representative dealing with the Jews will have to say to them on important points - NO. Wherever their

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cooperation may be asked, whether on the subject of agreeing to a truce or anything else, that cooperation will have to be requested in spite of the fact that the answer to them on at least some important points will unquestionably have to be, NO. Who is more likely to succeed in getting them to accept a rejection of their position on any point? An aide of General Marshall whom they deem (whether rightly or incorrectly) biased against themselves? Or an aide of General Marshall whom they respect and trust?

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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

May 7 1948

The President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:



Believing as we do that this is an hour of grave crisis for the United Nations and also for the United States, we respectfully address you concerning the Palestine situation.

We believe that the Resolution favoring partition as adopted by the General Assembly on November 29th provides a solution which is more practicable, equitable and capable of administration than the trusteeship proposal now sponsored by our government. This recommendation seeks under a new guise and with far less hopes of success to perpetuate a mandate over two unwilling peoples in Palestine, which the British government is now abandoning as utterly unworkable. The logic of the General Assembly Resolution in favor of partition is now proving itself in practice as the only right and hopeful solution for Palestine.

The action of our government carries the implication of an abandonment of the democratic process in settling international issues. Physical force by member nations in the United Nations in any effort to upset the decisions of the majority appears to have been an important factor in our government's change in position. The situation requires understanding, firmness and statesmanship.

We suggest the following program and urge that it be given your full support:

1. Our government should cease its fruitless efforts to impose a trusteeship which will involve the use of forces greater than any that might have been required to enforce partition, it should place its authority and prestige unequivocally behind the resolution for the establishment of Jewish and Arab States in Palestine.
2. Immediate action should be taken to protect Jerusalem which is part of the spiritual heritage of mankind from the large-scale destruction of battle which threatens following the termination of the Mandate. Our government should take the initiative to secure the immediate confirmation of the Jerusalem Trusteeship Statute. The United States should support the formation of a voluntary force contributed by willing member states of the United Nations to maintain the truce and restore order in Jerusalem.

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3. The United States should immediately lift the arms embargo and facilitate the flow of arms to Palestine to be used for defense purposes. To assure that these arms are not used for aggression, they may be distributed through the United Nations Palestine Commission.

4. The United States should not allow the authority of the United Nations and its own prestige to be impaired, as they are now being impaired, by aggression of the Arab States in clear violation of the Charter and in defiance of the United Nations. The United States should take leadership in the United Nations in directing these nations to withdraw their armed nationals from Palestine and to desist from further invasion. It should be made clear that unless this is done, economic and diplomatic sanctions and even expulsion from the United Nations as provided in the Charter of the United Nations, will be instituted against them and will be supported by the United States. A Border Commission of the United Nations, comparable with that sent to Greece, should be sent to Palestine at once.

5. Our concern over the failure of the British Government to cooperate in carrying out the partition resolution of the General Assembly and especially its failure to maintain law and order, which responsibility it reserved exclusively unto itself until the termination of the Mandate, should be transmitted by our government to the British Government. We draw particular attention to the responsibility which rests on the government of Great Britain to restrain the Arab Legion of King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan from any military intervention in the affairs of Palestine. This Legion exists only by virtue of a British subsidy and is under the command of a British commanding officer.

Mr. President: It is our conviction that this is an hour no less critical for the history of the world than when fascist Italy marched with impunity into Ethiopia and set in train consequences which led inevitably to World War II. Considerations of justice, of law and of our national safety alike require that affirmative action along the lines above indicated be taken by our government. Courageous assertion of American leadership is called for and we hope that we shall not appeal to you in vain.

Respectfully yours,

Chas. H. Haysfield

Abraham J. D. Fulton - Abraham D. Fulton
Adolph J. Sabath - Adolph J. Sabath
X

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Emanuel Keller - 15th New York
Thomas J. Kane - 7th Mass

Eugene Keogh - 9th New York
Hughes - 2nd - Ind.

Ray Smadden 1st Indiana

Amos J. Haring - 1st R.I.

John A. Carroll - 1st Colorado

As a minimum Amos J. Haring

John A. Carroll - 10th Mass.

Frank Buchanan - 23rd Pennsylvania

John Dingell - 15th Dist of Michigan

Frederick W. Lantieri - 4th Mass. Light.

John W. Lantieri - 32nd Ill. Infantry

John W. Lantieri - 32nd Ill. Infantry

John W. Lantieri - 32nd Ill. Infantry

John W. Lantieri - 32nd Ill. Infantry

John W. Lantieri - 32nd Ill. Infantry

John W. Lantieri - 32nd Ill. Infantry

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Donald L. Toole

N.Y.

James J. Heffernan N.Y.C.
John J. O'Reilly N.Y.C.

Herman P. Eberharter Penna.

Sam J. Rasmey New York

Francis R. Havens - Calif.

George V. Sadowski - Michigan

Thomas S. Gordon - Illinois

John A. Blatnik - Minnesota

Philip M. Mullin Mass.

Eine, Dawson Tenn.

Arthur Miller 19 - N.Y.

John J. Warr 11 - N.Y.

John B. G. Mundy 11 - Mass.

Walter B. Miller 14 - Ohio

Frank Kaasten 13 - Mo

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John B. Warr 20 - New York

John B. Warr 20 - New York

Charles A. Buckley 25th C. District.

PROVIDING FOR THE FURNISHING OF INFORMATION AND
ASSISTANCE TO THE JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE
OF INQUIRY ON JEWISH PROBLEMS IN PALESTINE AND
EUROPE

WHEREAS by an exchange of notes on December 10, 1945, between the Secretary of State of the United States and the British Ambassador there has been created a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (hereinafter referred to as the Committee), whose terms of reference are as follows:

1. To examine political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living therein.
2. To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression, and to make estimates of those who wish, or will be impelled by their conditions, to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.
3. To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine as such problems are affected by conditions subject to examination under paragraphs 1 and 2 above and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom for an interim handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution.
4. To make such other recommendations to the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph 2 above, by remedial action in the European countries in question or by the provision of facilities for emigration to and settlement in countries outside Europe;

AND WHEREAS the Government of the United States is desirous of rendering all possible aid to the Committee to enable it properly to perform the task entrusted to it:

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. All departments, agencies, and independent establishments of the Executive branch of the Federal Government shall furnish to the Committee, upon the request of the American Chairman of the Committee, such of their records and documents as relate to the subjects referred to the Committee for examination and study under its several terms of reference: Provided, however, that a department, agency, or independent establishment shall not be required to disclose confidential records and documents the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States: Provided further, that in all such cases, the head of the department, agency, or independent establishment concerned shall furnish the American Chairman of the Committee with a statement justifying the withholding of the records and documents requested by him.

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"(b) The Security Council consider if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution:

"(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution:

"(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this Plan;"

The General Assembly's resolution in addition called upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect; and appealed to all governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations.

The General Assembly's resolution also contained authorization to the Secretary General with regard to expenses of the Commission provided for in the plan and for withdrawals from the working capital fund.

On December 1, 1947 the Trusteeship Council received Part 3 of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 and commenced work on a draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem.

On December 9, 1947 the Security Council recorded that it had received the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 and, having been seized of this matter, had agreed to postpone further consideration.

On February 1, 1948 the Palestine Commission provided for in the plan, which had commenced its activities on January 9, 1948, submitted its first monthly progress report to the Security Council.

On February 16, 1948 the Palestine Commission presented its first special report on the problem of security in Palestine to the Security Council.

On February 24,

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United Kingdom, however, had asked for recommendations of the General Assembly on the future government of Palestine. It did not withdraw that request nor did it propose any other type of United Nations action. It was up to the Assembly to recommend, specifically to the United Kingdom, what it considered to be a fair and equitable solution which could rightfully claim the cooperation of the people of Palestine and of the Mandatory Power as a final settlement for that troublesome question.

We and many other Members of this Assembly hoped that the expression of general world opinion would influence the Arabs to give the recommendation of the Assembly a chance to work, that the United Kingdom would cooperate fully in carrying out those parts of the plan which it alone could carry out since it was in Palestine as the Mandatory Power, and that the Jews would make every possible effort to compose their differences with the Arabs in an effort to reduce the violence which prevailed in Palestine. Events have not fulfilled these hopes.

Following the passage of the resolution of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947, the United States attempted by diplomatic means to urge a moderate attitude upon the interested parties in order that a peaceful implementation of the Plan for Partition with Economic Union might be possible. We do not know what efforts have been made by other members of the United Nations to exert their influence along similar lines in support of the recommendation of the General Assembly. In any event, such efforts were not successful.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 1.5(i) and 1.5(D) or (E)

Dept. of State Exec. Aug. 9, 1973

By NLT/HCL, NARS Date 7-16-75 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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bringing about its peaceful implementation and of making it acceptable to the peoples of Palestine would have the support of the United States Government in the United Nations.

In the case of (B), it may develop that the General Assembly will approve by a two-thirds vote a new resolution providing for a temporary trusteeship agreement for Palestine without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties and without prejudice to the eventual political settlement relating to the government of Palestine. In this event, the question arises as to whether the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 should be suspended or withdrawn. If the trusteeship is for a temporary period; if it is without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties; and if it is without prejudice to the eventual political settlement relating to the government of that country, it follows that suspension rather than withdrawal of the resolution of November 29 would be equitable. Withdrawal of the General Assembly's resolution under such conditions would undoubtedly be considered as prejudicial to the rights, claims and position of one of the parties and would also undoubtedly be considered as prejudicial to the eventual political settlement. It would, accordingly, appear to be preferable to suspend the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 by a statement to this effect in the new resolution providing for a temporary trusteeship agreement.

In the case of (C), it may develop that a new resolution providing for a political settlement will be approved by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. In this event, it might be presumed that the new resolution would automatically supersede the resolution of November 29. It would be preferable, however, for the General Assembly to withdraw its previous resolution. Such action might be accomplished (a) by the introduction of a separate resolution before the passage of the new resolution; (b) by the introduction of a separate resolution after the passage of the new resolution; or (c) by a statement in the new resolution itself. From a parliamentary point of view no objection would appear to any of these three courses. From a political point of view, however, it would appear that the preferable course would be by a statement in the new resolution. Such action would definitely link the new resolution with the previous resolution and might avoid the necessity for a separate vote on the withdrawal of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29.

DRAFT PROPOSED REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR AUSTIN TO PLEARY
SESSION, SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE, MONDAY,
APRIL 19, 1948

Since the United States introduced the resolution in the Security Council which led to the calling of this Special Session of the General Assembly, we believe it appropriate to outline at this early stage of our proceedings the nature of the problem which now confronts us.

The Palestine question first came before the United Nations at a Special Session of the General Assembly which convened in New York on April 28, 1947 in response to a request made by the United Kingdom on April 2, 1947. In that Special Session the United States supported the idea that a Special Committee, made up of neutral and disinterested Members, should review the situation in Palestine and report to the Regular Session of the General Assembly which was to meet in September of last year. We supported such a Committee because we were aware that earlier efforts to find a solution for Palestine had been unavailing and because we were anxious to see the question dealt with by the United Nations on its merits, free from special interests and other factors which did not bear directly upon Palestine itself.

While UNSCOP was at work, from May 26, 1947 until the submission of its Report to the General Assembly on September 3, 1947, the United States Government scrupulously refrained from statements of policy or from acts which might in any way prejudice the work of that Committee.

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We were eager for it to have, insofar as we were concerned, every possible opportunity to make an impartial study of the question and to recommend what seemed to it to be a fair solution.

Inherent in our attitude was a desire on our part to give every great weight to the work of such a Committee.

The majority of UNSCOP proposed a Plan of Partition with Economic Union. In the Regular Session of the General Assembly which convened in September of last year, the United States supported this majority proposal. In doing so, we sought certain changes in it which we thought would make the plan more workable. We proposed territorial revisions which reduced the size of the Arab minority in the proposed Jewish State and endeavored to strengthen that part of the plan providing for economic union. UNSCOP itself had unanimously concluded that "the preservation of the economic unity of Palestine as a whole is indispensable to the life and development of the country and its peoples".

In favoring the Plan for Partition with Economic Union we were aware that the Arabs of Palestine were unwilling to agree to it in advance, that the plan was not acceptable in every respect to the Jews of Palestine, and that the United Kingdom had stated its unwillingness to take an active part in its implementation in the absence of agreement between the Jews and Arabs. The General Assembly made every possible effort to meet objections from these three sources. Had the Assembly taken all such objections at full value, no recommendation at all would have been possible. No plan could have met the views expressed to the Assembly by the United Kingdom and by the Jews and Arabs. The

On February 24, 1948 the Security Council resumed its consideration of the Palestine question.

On February 25, 1948 the United States representative on the Security Council introduced a resolution providing for the acceptance, subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter, of the request addressed by the General Assembly to it in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947.

On March 1, 1948 the Palestine Commission submitted its second monthly progress report to the Security Council.

On March 5, 1948 the Security Council by a vote of five in favor with none against and six abstentions, declined to accept the requests of the General Assembly.

On March 12, 1948 the Trusteeship Council, having continued its work on a draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem, decided that it was in a satisfactory form and agreed that the question of its formal approval together with the appointment of a Governor of the City should be taken up at a subsequent meeting to be held not later than one week before April 29, 1948.

On April 1, 1948 the Security Council adopted by nine affirmative votes with two abstentions the United States resolution requesting the Secretary General of the United Nations to convoke a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine.

The action of the Security Council on March 5 in declining to accept the requests of the General Assembly under its resolution of November 29 in conjunction with the action on April 1 in requesting the convocation of a Special Session clearly indicates that the Security Council was not prepared to accept or implement the General Assembly's resolution of November 29.

II - The United Nations might adopt one of the following courses of action with regard to the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947:

- A. The General Assembly might amend its resolution of November 29.
- B. The General Assembly might suspend its resolution of November 29.
- C. The General Assembly might withdraw its resolution of November 29.

In the case of (A), amendments to the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 which would have the effect of

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E. O. 12958, Sec. 1.7, and 1.5 of (C)
EX-100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000

By M.T. / [signature] JAMES EARL RAY

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The Palestine Commission, established by the resolution of November 29, began in early January its task of carrying out the Plan of Partition with Economic Union. My government wishes to express its great appreciation for the devoted work which this Commission has applied to its task and the efforts which it has made, in the most difficult possible circumstances, to carry out the responsibilities imposed upon it by this Assembly. If the plan for partition with economic union is not being implemented today, it is in no way due to any lack of effort or attention to duty on the part of the Palestine Commission.

The resolution of the General Assembly on Palestine was considered by the Security Council in February and March. The Security Council rejected that part of an American resolution which would have placed the Security Council behind the Plan of Partition with Economic Union. During a period of intensive consultation among the permanent members, the Mandatory Power, the Palestine Commission, and the representatives of the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, it was impossible to find the necessary agreement, either among the peoples of Palestine or among the members of the Security Council, to permit the peaceful implementation of the Assembly resolution.

It became apparent that peaceful implementation of the plan for partition with economic union could not be expected, that the UK was intent upon terminating the mandate on May 15 regardless of action by the United Nations, and that there would be no government in Palestine after that date capable of maintaining law and order. Violence and open civil war have

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increased daily

daily in Palestine and the peace of the Middle East is seriously threatened.

We note that the Report of the United Nations Palestine Commission directed to this Special Session states that "Arab elements, both inside and outside of Palestine, have exerted organized, intensive effort toward defeating the purposes of the resolution of the General Assembly. To this end, threats, acts of violence, and infiltration of organized, armed, uniformed Arab bands into the Palestinian territory have been employed". Our own information confirms this part of the Palestine Report. The primary reason why the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 could not be carried out by peaceful means was Arab resistance. Some of this resistance, arising from outside Palestine, is in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and must be halted.

The Jewish Agency for Palestine has demonstrated that it is prepared to accept the resolution of the General Assembly of last November 29, despite the fact that this resolution did not represent the full measure of their claims. We must recall, however, that irresponsible elements in the Jewish community have resorted to widespread terrorism and wilful murder since November 29, 1947. Such activities have shocked the entire world, have served to inflate still further the Palestine question and have made it more difficult for the United Nations to find a peaceful solution to the Palestine problem.

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It seems to us clear that the primary responsibility for reaching a peaceful settlement of this problem rests upon the people of Palestine. Instead of serious and responsible efforts to resolve their differences, we see bitter retaliatory fighting and an apparent determination to seek a solution by force of arms rather than by force of reason, adjustment and persuasion. We do not believe that the peoples of Palestine are entitled to appear before the United Nations to assert demands which must be accepted by the other party and the world community as the only alternative to war.

The United States has repeatedly stated that we shall act in regard to Palestine only as a Member of the United Nations. It is not our intention to accept unilateral responsibility or to take unilateral action. We have sought in every way possible to counsel moderation upon the parties in this situation to seek a peaceful settlement.

By the middle of March, however, we recognized that time was fast running out. The only certainty was that grave disorders were occurring daily in Palestine and that even greater bloodshed could be expected after May 15. That prospect presented a hard choice to the United States as a Member of the United Nations. We could remain completely inactive and let the situation move on to inevitable chaos. The alternative was to suggest some emergency action to preserve the peace, running the risk of the misunderstanding

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and will present suggestions in the First Committee to that effect. The First Committee may wish to ask the Fourth Committee of the Assembly to undertake the major role in such exploration.

If a temporary trusteeship, which we see as an orderly extension of a truce, commends itself to the Assembly as a practical way of meeting this present crisis, again we emphasize the importance of a truce in Palestine as an essential preliminary to a trusteeship or to any other solution. We urge, therefore, all members of the United Nations to support as strongly as possible the efforts of the Security Council to bring about that truce.

The United States has raised with certain other governments the question of joint responsibility for the security of a temporary trusteeship. These discussions have thus far produced no tangible result. The United States is willing to undertake its share of responsibility for the provision of police forces which are required during a truce and a temporary trusteeship, along with other members who may be selected by the General Assembly and who are willing to carry out such a task in accordance with the will of the Assembly and with the provisions of the Charter.

While the United States is prepared to carry its fair share of the United Nations burden involved in such a temporary trusteeship, it is not prepared to act alone in this matter. Our participation will be conditioned upon a readiness of other governments to provide similar assistance.

The time which is left to us by the apparent determination of the

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Mandatory

would be able to establish United Nations governmental authority in Palestine. In the trusteeship field, the General Assembly has authority to accept responsibility which goes far beyond its powers of recommendation. The United Nations itself can become the Administering Authority.

We have not suggested a temporary trusteeship as a substitute for the plan of partition with economic union or for any other solution of the Palestine problem which may be agreed upon by the Jews and Arabs of that country. We consider it an emergency measure to ensure public order and the maintenance of public services. The truce and trusteeship together envisage a military and political stand-still to save human life and to make possible further negotiations on a final political settlement. As we see it, the truce and trusteeship would be entirely without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties or to the character of the eventual political settlement.

The United States does not wish to confront the General Assembly with a draft trusteeship agreement which has been worked out in every detail. We have, however, prepared some suggestions which are based upon a draft statute which the Trusteeship Council developed for the Territory of Jerusalem, as well as upon suggestions which have been made informally by several members of the Security Council. We hope that the Assembly will agree to a full exploration of trusteeship possibilities

and will

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which would accompany any such effort on our part. We considered that the only decent course lay in an effort to save lives and we found that our colleagues in the Security Council were ready to move in the same direction. There is no need for a Member of the United Nations to apologize for an effort to keep the peace. It is clearly required by the Charter. The primary function of the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is to strive by every possible means to keep the peace and to seek a peaceful settlement of disputes.

The United States, therefore, along with other members of the Security Council, turned to an attempt to effect a truce in order to bring to an end the serious fighting which is now occurring daily in Palestine and to forestall the even greater bloodshed which can be expected after May 15. The Security Council has now taken action to establish such a truce in Palestine. This effort of the Council needs and deserves the full support of all the Members of the United Nations.

Since the truce itself would not ensure the continuance of governmental authority in Palestine, the United States believes that consideration should be given by the General Assembly to the establishment of a temporary trusteeship which might provide a government and essential public services in that country pending further negotiations. If the Mandatory Power actively cooperates, the General Assembly would

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Mandatory Power to terminate its mandate on May 15 is perilously brief. However, joint effort by all parties involved in this situation, acting in the spirit of the Charter, can meet this emergency and meet it promptly. My Government believes that the General Assembly must expect the Jews and Arabs now to show a more moderate attitude in order to prevent a slaughter on both sides which they can avoid in no other way.

We have suggested a temporary trusteeship as a way of meeting under the Charter the crisis which confronts us. It is easy, particularly in regard to Palestine, to point out difficulties and objections to any course of action. It is not easy to come forward with practical and responsible suggestions to meet the situation. We are ready to give most careful consideration to other solutions which may be proposed to the Assembly. We are confronted here with a problem of unusual complexity and one which presents a most serious challenge to the United Nations. It can be met only if the Mandatory Power, the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine, and all of the Members of the United Nations take an active part in seeking a settlement in the spirit of the Charter.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Problem:

To determine the position which the United States Delegation to the Special Session of the General Assembly should adopt with respect to action by that body on the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947 on the Palestinian Question.

Recommendations:

A. If the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 is amended at the Special Session, the United States should support changes which would have the effect of bringing about its peaceful implementation and of making it acceptable to the peoples of Palestine.

B. If a new resolution providing for a temporary trusteeship agreement is approved by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly the United States should initiate or support the suspension of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, preferably by statement to this effect in the new resolution.

C. If a new resolution providing for a political settlement is approved by two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, the United States should initiate or support the withdrawal of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, preferably by a statement to this effect in the new resolution.

Discussion:

1 - On November 29, 1947 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the Palestinian question. This resolution provided for a plan of partition with economic union for Palestine. It included provisions for a future constitution and government of Palestine, boundaries, a special regime for the City of Jerusalem and an invitation with regard to capitulations in Palestine.

The General Assembly's resolution recommended to the United Kingdom, as the Mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the plan of partition with Economic union as provided for in that resolution.

The General Assembly's resolution also requested that:

"(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the Plan for its implementation;

"(b) The Security

WESTPORT

MENSWEAR

MAIN AT 39TH STREET
KANSAS CITY 2, MISSOURI
PHONE VA. 3506

October 3rd, 1947

ING NATIONALLY ADVERTISED MEN'S

The Hon. Harry S. Truman,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Again I am appealing to you in behalf of my
People.

The future of one and one-half million Jews
in Europe depends on what happens at the present
meeting of the United Nations. With Winter com-
ing on with its attendant hardships, time is short
for action by this meeting to alleviate further suf-
fering by these helpless people.

How they will be able to survive another winter
in concentration camps and the Hell holes in which
they live, is beyond my imagination. In all this
World, there is only one place where they can go -
and that is Palestine. You and I know only too well
this is the only answer.

I have read Secretary Marshall's recent state-
ment that the U.S. would give great weight to UNSOP's
recommendation; that was a great deal to be thank-
ful for. Now, if it were possible for you, as leader
and spokesman for our country, to express your sup-
port of this action, I think we can accomplish our
aims before the United Nations Assembly.

October 8, 1947

Dear Eddie:


I appreciated very much your letter of the third in regard to the Jewish situation.

The matter is now pending before the General Assembly of the United Nations and I don't think it would be right or proper for me to interfere at this stage, particularly as it requires a two-third vote to accomplish the purpose sought.

General Marshall is handling the thing, I think, as it should be and I hope it will work out all right.

I don't want to be quoted on the subject at all. When I see you I'll tell you just what the difficulties are.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Harry", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the left.

Mr. Edward Jacobson
Main at 39th Street
Kansas City 2, Missouri

WESTPORT

MENSWEAR

MAIN AT 39TH STREET
KANSAS CITY 2, MISSOURI
PHONE VA. 3506

ING NATIONALLY ADVERTISED MEN'S

#2 The Hon. Harry S. Truman.

The lives of one and one-half million souls depend on what happens at the United Nations Meeting within the next few weeks. I trust to God that he give you strength and guidance to act immediately.

I think I am one of few who actually knows and realizes what terrible heavy burdens you are carrying on your shoulders during these hectic days. I should, therefore, be the last man to add to them; but I feel you will forgive me for doing so, because tens of thousands of lives depend on words from your mouth and heart. Harry, my people need help and I am appealing to you to help them.

Everyone at home is well and my business is keeping up fine. Just enlarged the store and am very proud of it.

Wishing you and your family the best of everything, I am

Sincerely,

Your Friend

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1. As you well know, since becoming President I have consistently favored the establishment of an independent state for Jews in the Middle East. This country has taken a position of leadership in the establishment of such an independent state, and I think it should continue to take such leadership.

2. It is my belief that strong American support of the new state of Israel will hasten the ultimate settlement of the problem of the Middle East, and will contribute toward the attainment of world peace.

3. We are engaged now in extending economic aid and moral support to the nations of western Europe, in order to stem the spread of Communism. I consider it necessary, at this time, to lend our same support and extend economic aid to Israel for the same reason.

4. There is ample precedent in international law for the extension of de jure recognition to Israel. This is illustrated by the fact that fourteen nations have extended de jure recognition to Israel since it became an independent state on May 15, 1948. It is my opinion that de jure recognition by the United States will hasten the recognition of Israel by other nations, and this will have a stabilizing effect in the Middle East.

5. In view of the above, it is my wish that the following course of action be taken:

1. Extend de jure recognition to Israel at once.
2. Make loan to Israel just as soon as details can be completed.
3. Take active steps to assist Israel in gaining admission to the United Nations.

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I am preparing now a release announcing the de jure recognition of Israel. I shall submit it to you for suggestions. Kindly keep me advised of progress made in granting the loan, and in the admission of Israel to the United Nations.



B. File

July 30, 1973


Dear Dan:

I am enclosing the original of an anonymous paper dated September 11, 1948, which came from the Clark Clifford Papers. This is to be returned by safe hand to Ben Zobrist at the Harry S. Truman Library.

I discussed the origin of this odd piece of paper with George Elsey, who later made an appointment for us both to see Clark Clifford about it. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum which I prepared on this conversation. Unless you see some objection, I would recommend that this memcon be attached to the anonymous paper so that any scholars who see the paper will have the benefit of the information that we got from Mr. Clifford.

We will not include this unofficial paper in "Foreign Relations" for 1948, and as far as we are concerned we have no further official interest in it. I suspect, however, that the Truman Library will get repeated queries about this odd paper, and that further information about its origin may be found in the papers mentioned in the last paragraph of my memcon. I hope that the archivists will keep an eye cocked for information on this subject and will be good enough to let me know whatever turns up.

Sincerely,


William M. Franklin
Director, Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs

Enclosures:

1. Original of Memorandum of Sept. 11, 1948 from Clark Clifford Papers.
2. Memorandum of Conversation, July 25, 1973.

Dr. Daniel J. Reed,
Assistant Archivist for Presidential Libraries,
National Archives and Records Service,
Washington, D.C. 20408.

B_File

July 25, 1973

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Clark Clifford (Special Counsel
to President Truman, 1946-1950)

Mr. George M. Elsey (Assistant to
Mr. Clifford, 1947-1949)

Mr. William M. Franklin (Director,
Historical Office, Department of State)

SUBJECT: Identification of anonymous paper of Sept. 11,
1948, found among the Clark Clifford Papers
in the Harry S. Truman Library.

Mr. Elsey and I called on Mr. Clifford in his office at 11:30 a.m. today. I showed him the anonymous paper of September 11, 1948 ("Memorandum to Secretary Marshall") and asked for his recollection of who had drafted it and why it showed no evidence of having been acted upon. I mentioned that there was no copy of this paper in the files of the Department of State or in the George Marshall Library. In order to refresh his memory I also showed him a copy of Marshall's memorandum to Truman (August 30, 1948) dealing with "De jure recognition of Governments of Israel and Trans-Jordan". (I had previously shown the anonymous memo to Elsey who had no recollection of it whatever.)

Mr. Clifford said that he could not recall the anonymous paper with perfect clarity, but he could say that he had not drafted it himself and neither had Mr. Truman. His recollection was that it had been given to him (Clifford) by Sam Rosenman. Warming to the subject, Mr. Clifford recalled that this was the beginning of the Presidential campaign of 1948, and that it would have been very advantageous timing from

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Rosenman's point of view. Probably Rosenman had passed it to him as one who had been sympathetic to the Israeli cause; but he had no recollection of having discussed it with Mr. Truman or anyone else.

Mr. Elsey pointed out, however, that the memorandum had been typed on paper bearing the U.S. Government watermark and that the blue ribbon used in typing the memorandum looked like the "White House blue" that had been in vogue at that time. In order to verify the matter of the type, Mr. Clifford called in his long-time secretary, Miss Mary Weiler. Miss Weiler consulted her files and brought back some examples from 1948 which showed that Clifford's office had regularly used a blue ribbon but elite type, whereas the anonymous memorandum was typed in pica-size type.

Mr. Elsey suggested that the memorandum might have been typed or retyped in the White House office of David Niles, who was close to Rosenman and equally interested in helping the Israelis. In that case the memo in question might have been given to the President, who in turn might have sent it in to Clifford for his information. This would explain why Clifford had no recollection of having discussed it with the President; no discussion would have been necessary, since the proposal for immediate de jure recognition of Israel was contrary to the position approved by Truman on August 30, as shown by the President's endorsement on the Marshall memo of that date. The anonymous writer had obviously not been aware of this fact, although he must have known that de jure recognition was under consideration.

Mr. Clifford agreed that this was a logical hypothesis, but he repeated that the paper was associated in his memory only with Mr. Rosenman, and that was really all that he could recall about it.

I raised the question as to how we should handle this paper, pointing out that we could not properly include it in "Foreign Relations" nor could we ignore it, since it was now available to unofficial scholars. Mr. Elsey offered the suggestion, approved by Mr. Clifford,

that

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that I should attach a memorandum of this conversation to the anonymous paper in the Truman Library, so that the scholars would have the benefit of Mr. Clifford's recollections on the subject. I said that I would do so, and would also seek to stimulate further research on the subject in the Rosenman Papers, the Truman Papers when they become available, and in the papers of David Niles, if they can be located and opened.

B File

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

June 20, 1974

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Clark Clifford (Special Counsel to President Truman, 1946-1950)

Mr. William M. Franklin (Director, Historical Office, Department of State)

SUBJECT: Clark Clifford and the Palestine Problem in 1948

I saw Mr. Clifford in his office at 11 a.m. on June 20, 1974, in order to discuss further with him the unsigned draft memorandum of September 11 from President Truman to Secretary Marshall, which I had discussed with him on July 25, 1973. In the meantime I had sent him a copy of the handwritten notes that had been discovered in the Truman Library and which appeared to indicate that Mr. Clifford was the author of the unsigned draft memorandum of September 11.

Mr. Clifford said that the handwritten notes had been of great help in reviving his recollection of the whole incident. He remembered that he had jotted down these notes aboard the yacht Williamsburg on the weekend trip (September 11 and 12, 1948), and had dictated the memorandum to the President's traveling secretary, Jack Romagna. (This would explain why the type was different from that used in Mr. Clifford's office.)

In answer to my question Mr. Clifford said that as far as he knew the memorandum could have been signed and sent by the President. I pointed out that there was no copy in State Department files or in the Marshall Papers. Furthermore, the sequence of events would clearly indicate that Marshall had received no such instruction from the President. - Mr. Clifford did not know why the memorandum had not been sent; he


could not remember that the President had ever spoken with him about it. "Apparently", said Mr. Clifford, "somebody talked him out of it", and he added that Mr. Truman had more respect than he for the views of Secretary Marshall.

I showed Mr. Clifford the following unsigned papers from the Clark Clifford Papers, which he acknowledged to be his own drafts:

1. March 6, 1948 - "Proposed Program on the Palestine Problem".
2. March 8, 1948 - [No title; addressed to the President]
3. May 8, 1948 - [No title; memo of conversation with Rusk]
4. May [14?], 1948 - "Dear Mr. Rusk"; [unsigned but for President's signature]
5. June 17, 1948 - "Palestine" [Recognition and Loy Henderson]
6. Sept. 29, 1948 - "To Secretary Marshall, Paris, from the President" [draft telegram in Truman's handwriting]
7. [October 23?] [Draft statement to the press on de jure recognition of Israel]

With regard to the following paper Mr. Clifford said he had "no recollection":

1. [May ? 1948] [Draft announcement of message from President Truman to the Arab states]


William M. Franklin
Director, Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs

United States Senate WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

JUN 21 10 58 AM '46 1:58 P.M.

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June 20, 1946

Dear Mr. President:

The case for the immediate admission into Palestine of 100,000 Jews who have been the victims of Nazi persecution is written in blood and suffering:

1. From 1933 on, the Jews of Europe were the first signal and final depths of Nazi persecution and barbarism.
2. In Hitler's concentration and extermination camps, 6,000,000 Jews were tortured, gassed or burned to death. The rest suffered horrors not much better than death.
3. The 1,500,000 Jews still left alive in Europe are largely destitute, unwanted or homeless with a well-grounded need and want to migrate to Palestine and to leave the scene of the horrors inflicted on them.
4. The Jews still left in Europe had hoped that when victory was achieved over the Nazis more than a year ago, they would then have a reasonable opportunity to go to Palestine soon.
5. On August 31, 1945, you wrote to Prime Minister Attlee asking that 100,000 of the displaced European Jews be allowed to migrate to Palestine.
6. The British Government turned down this request and suggested instead an investigation. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, made up of distinguished British as well as American representatives, was appointed to make this investigation.
7. The Anglo-American Committee started its work on January 4, 1946. It completed and published its report on April 30, 1946. It unanimously endorsed your proposal of August 31, 1945 that 100,000 European Jews be admitted to Palestine--and it recommended that this be done immediately.

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8. The British Government then began to propose conditions of military and economic assistance which, it is understood, had been considered and previously rejected by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry.

9. Now new committees have been set up, presumably to give technical advice, but it is not clear whether these committees are instructed to speed up the actual admission of the 100,000 Jews, or whether they are again to investigate and examine various alternatives. Already spokesmen for the British Government have explained that the current negotiations regarding the technical problems involved in the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine are merely advisory, and that the decision on this point will have to await decisions on the entire Report of the Anglo-American Committee.

10. On the basis of past experience, it is likely that an attempt will be made to utilize the proceedings of these new committees to bring up new conditions and hurdles. Instead of speeding up the carrying out of your request to admit immediately 100,000 Jews into Palestine, these committees may serve in effect to undo this objective.

11. The situation has become further aggravated by the events of last week: Foreign Secretary Bevin's statement of June 12, in which a clearly hostile attitude toward the idea of admitting the 100,000 Jews was bolstered by manifestly biased and untenable arguments; and the flight, under highly suspicious circumstances, of the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, whom the British Government had consistently refused to indict as a war criminal despite a wealth of evidence against him--an event calculated to foster those very Arab disorders which the British Government pretends to fear.

12. Neither the gallant people of Britain nor the other peoples of the world, and certainly not the American people, can be in favor of such delaying toying with the souls and hearts and bodies of persecuted and destitute human beings.

13. You will be acting in accordance with world opinion, and in the sense of true humanity and statesmanship if you use your influence to put an end to slow death and torture by committees, investigations, and other delaying devices. Action, not more committees, is what is required today.

14. We urgently request you, through direct communications with Prime Minister Attlee, to press again and without let-up, for the admission at once of 100,000 European Jews into Palestine. That would be only right and just.

B. File

15. The Government of Great Britain cannot be permitted to repudiate its commitments. To that end, it is high time that British leaders gave heed to the urgent promptings of the President of the Nation that helped to keep the British people themselves from being exterminated.

Very truly yours,

Robert F. Wagner

Robert F. Wagner

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Horner Ferguson

James E. Thompson

Robert L. Taylor

James H. Doolittle

Robert La Follette

Ed. Johnson

Samuel F. Hughes

James M. Keck

B. File

MAY 9

Statement

Events during the past several days underline the importance of an early statement by the President of his intention to recognize the new Jewish State in Palestine as soon as it comes into existence.

1. We asked for a special session of the General Assembly because at that time our experts said it was impossible to achieve partition. We continued to maintain that partition was our ultimate objective. But while the UN debated and discussed, the Jews in Palestine, by showing unexpected strength in relation to the Arabs, succeeded in achieving that objective.

2. Now it is clear that partition is an accomplished fact. ~~Everyone realizes this except the State Department.~~ The British realize it; British commercial interests are investing heavily in Jewish Palestine. The top British Military Commanders in Palestine and Egypt have officially reported that the Jews are in complete control of the partition area. Diplomatically, Creech Jones assumed a Jewish state after May 15th in his statement on Friday at Lake Success. (See attached N.Y. Times clipping of May 8 - clipping A). The UN realizes it; as recently as Friday, May 7, the head of the UN commission's advance party to Palestine urged recognition of the de facto situation -- that there are now two completely independent areas in Palestine. (See same N.Y. Times clipping). The Arabs now realize it, and admit it; a widely printed UP dispatch from Jerusalem, May 7, quotes a member of the Syrian Parliament as having said: "The battle is all over. The Jewish state has arisen." The same dispatch quotes another influential Arab as saying: "We have saved the Arab half of Palestine." (N.Y. Times, May 8 -- clipping B).

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3. The practical reality of partition involves more than military superiority of the Jews. The Jews have successfully organized and maintained essential governmental services within the areas which they control. Moreover, they have announced their intention of confining the Jewish State to the areas designated in the UN partition plan, although it is now patent that they have the strength to extend their authority over wider areas.

4. The fact of partition now means it is no longer realistic to think in terms of whether partition can be implemented or whether it can be prevented. It is now only a question whether it can be reversed. To reverse the reality of partition would require military force, threats, sanctions or persuasion. None would be effective. If we could not muster military support to implement the UN resolution, or our trusteeship proposal, surely we could not muster it to dislodge the Jews from the areas assigned to them by the UN. Nor would we want to, for such a course would only precipitate a war against the strongest military force in the Middle East. Threats and sanctions would be equally ineffective, mainly because they would run counter to the letter and spirit of the UN resolution. Finally, it is unrealistic to believe that the Jews of Palestine could be persuaded to relinquish the State which they achieved largely through their own efforts pursuant to the highest international moral authority -- the UN resolution.

5. Since we cannot, and would not want to, reverse the reality of partition, we should derive the maximum advantage for the President and for the U.S. government from the existing situation.

This can best be done by an immediate statement by the President that he intends to recognize the Jewish State when it is proclaimed.

6. Such a statement would retrieve the prestige which has been lost on this issue during the past few months by the President, the U.S. Government and the U.N. The President has consistently maintained that he is in favor of partition and that he desires peace in the Holy Land. However, there has been a widespread feeling that the recent espousal of a truce and temporary trusteeship has been ineffective because so remote from reality. He would be widely acclaimed if he, in frank recognition of the facts of the situation and without rancor toward any element in the Palestine picture, proclaimed that full support should be given to the nascent Jewish state. Moreover, such an action would lift the prestige of the U.S. Government, which has fallen to a new low in the U.N. Our delegation to the U.N. has been ridiculed on all sides in the U.N. during the past few weeks for proposing a variety of unrealistic "solutions" -- none of which has worked, -- or even had a chance of working, in the view of seasoned observers. The President's statement would be welcomed in most UN circles as a sign that at last the U.S. has come "down to earth" again. And it would enable the special session to terminate promptly -- to the great relief of most of the delegates -- as soon as some general resolution is passed urging the members of the UN to support the Jewish (and future Arab) State. At the same time, this action would enhance the influence of the U.S. upon the Arabs who respect reality rather than sentimentality (as was shown during the war by their affinity for the Nazis when the Allies were having

hard going). It is most likely that they would accept the inevitable -- and it would be easier for them to do so -- if we made it clear that we considered partition to be inevitable. In the process, we would have rescued the UN from the terrible morass in which it is now floundering. The UN delegates are dispirited and pessimistic about the possibility of getting anywhere on any of the innumerable proposals. (See attached Associated Press dispatch in the Washington Star, May 8 -- Clipping E). While the delegates of other countries have had their noses kept to the grindstone by the State Department, they have come to realize that the State Department's proposals are grandiose as well as futile. The British delegation finally, on May 7, pointedly proposed that the large talk and large proposals be dropped, and that UN content itself with playing a small role, in a small way, in the partitioned Palestine of today. (See same clipping E).

✓ 7. The chief advantage resulting from American recognition of the Jewish State will be lost if prompt action is not taken by the President. The Soviet Union and its satellites are expected to recognize the state promptly. (See N.Y. Herald Tribune, May 6 -- clipping C). They might even announce their intention to do so in advance -- i.e. in the beginning of week, May 9. Once they have already recognized the Jewish state, any similar action on our part will seem begrudging -- no matter how well-intentioned. In fact, it would be a diplomatic defeat. On the other hand, if we take this action before the Russians, we can rest assured that they will not take issue with us, because their firm insistence upon partition will require them to follow suit.

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Also, as soon as the Jewish State is proclaimed, there will be tremendous pressure domestically for its recognition. The Republicans will certainly push hard on this issue, before, during and after their convention. (This is clearly implied in the document prepared by 36 House Republicans, as indicated in the attached clipping from the May 8 Washington Post -- clipping D). There will be no such issue if the President has already said, in advance of May 16, that he intends to recognize the Jewish State.

8. Nothing will be accomplished by waiting for everybody to climb on the bandwagon, while we insist on getting some sort of agreement between Jews and Arabs. The Arabs have come to see that the U.N.'s partition plan has been implemented already, so far as the Jewish State is concerned. (See N.Y. Times, May 8, clipping A). The Arabs now want the Jews not to take any territory assigned to the Arabs. (See N.Y. Times, May 8, quoting the Lebanese adviser, evidently pleased that the Arab League had "saved the Arab half of Palestine"). What is really at play is a contest between various Arab States and rulers, to attach to themselves Arab Palestine, or a part of it. If there be any Arab troops in Palestine, this is a staking out of a claim by their ruler. Abdullah has begun to do this, and the British are believed to be behind him. There is fair reason to believe that any remaining contest for territory will be, not between Jews and Arabs, but between Arabs and Arabs; not for Jewish territory, but for the part of Palestine assigned to the Arab State.

Besides the Arabs, there is Britain, staking out increased financial relations with Jewish Palestine. There may be Soviet

satellites and the Soviets, recognizing the Jewish State France, still resentful of the British coup in driving the French out of Syria at the end of World War II and suspicious of the British moves, has been especially conciliatory toward the Jewish Agency in the U.N. proceedings.

At home, the Republicans are making their bid too — Taft, Stassen, the House Republicans including such influential key leaders as Everett Dirksen of Illinois.

What is accomplished for the United States of America in building up powerful friendships in the Near East — if the one military power there is flouted by us.

What interest of the United States is served? Is peace served? Is the avoidance of bloodshed served by a United States policy which enables the politicians (like the Mufti) who have lost out in the intra-Arab race, to cry for dissension, armed effort, that all is not lost, let the Arabs keep fighting, the United States is still holding out against partition. Those Arab politicians who have lost to Abdullah are completely out, unless they can keep the strife alive. The only issue they have is, Down with partition. The only hope they can offer to Arabs militarily defeated in the fight against partition is, The United States may yet come to the rescue against partition and against the Jews, with troops or with sanctions, embargoes, and penalties.

If, like the other major nations in UN, we accept the realities, we will not be used by Arab or Republican politicians, we will help to retrieve the prestige of U.N. and U.S., and we will cease to subject President Truman to unjust and unjustified

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losses and sacrifices.

But the opportunity to retrieve for the U.S. and for the President is fast vanishing. If we continue instead to seek to retrieve the reputations, or to satisfy the amour propre of a few State Department officials, the opportunity to undo the damage to the President may fade out.

We cannot afford to live in a bygone day -- even four weeks can make a complete change. The Palestine Jews do not now need the United States. But our Government can in the future use their good will, and in the present needs to adjust its policy to changed conditions. To be sure, the Jewish State may ~~not-attack~~ need negative help from the U.S. -- that it should not attack them or stir up strife against them.

This is not the first occasion on which a great power has had to adjust or reverse its policy in dealing with a small power, or on which the experts of a great power have judged incorrectly. Britain is especially good at making such changes. Driven out of Palestine by the Jews, losing soldiers and officers to the Jews, Britain is now increasing its investments in Jewish Palestine and courting the new Jewish State. Why let experienced Britain outstrip the U.S. in this area?

ADDENDUM

The Accumulation of News on May 9, 1948

The press associations and the special correspondents of the leading American newspapers may, of course, all be wrong in the news they report. But there is such a large accumulation of news confirming the facts stated in the preceding pages of this memorandum that it may be useful to have a few of the clippings, principally of Sunday, May 9, and also of a few of the preceding days, establishing the probable correctness, and the wide spread recognition, of the facts.

The supplementary clippings are grouped as follows:

Clippings

1. The actuality of partition
 - (1) Partition is an accomplished fact F, G, H
 - (2) The majority of UN delegates frankly acknowledge that partition is an accomplished fact and that nothing could prevent proclamation of a Jewish State I, J
2. The actuality is an intra-Arab struggle not an Arab-Jewish struggle K, L, M, N, O
3. The Arab governments are probably unable to use their regular armies against the Jewish State P
4. Even if the Arab armies were all combined for an attack on Jewish Palestine, there is a reasonable likelihood that they would be defeated Q
5. The United Nations
 - (1) The UN is regarded as having been reduced, on the Palestine issue, to the status of an aimless debating society R
 - (2) The use of the special meeting of the UN assembly on the call by the U.S. has seriously damaged its prestige and therefore the influence of the U.S. on foreign policy S
 - (3) UN delegates now prefer to follow the British plan of dropping the grandiose proposals made in recent weeks and resorting to a modest plan, with a small role for UN in Palestine affairs T

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May 11, 1948

Memorandum for the President

The Department of State recommends that the President approve the following position on Palestine for the United States during the remainder of the Special Session of the General Assembly, and authorize the United States Delegation to introduce necessary resolutions, if that appears desirable in the light of the negotiating situation at Lake Success.

1. The General Assembly should strongly support by resolution the present efforts of the Security Council to obtain a truce in Palestine.
2. The General Assembly should appoint a United Nations Commissioner for Palestine, who shall have the following functions:
 - a. The United Nations Commissioner shall use his good offices as a mediator with the local and community authorities in Palestine to
 - (1) Arrange for the operation of common services necessary to the maintenance of law and order in Palestine and the health and well-being of its population.
 - (2) Assure the protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine.
 - (3) Assist in reaching agreement between the local and community authorities on the future government of Palestine.
 - b. The United Nations Commissioner shall cooperate with the Truce Commission for Palestine appointed by the Security Council in its resolution of April 23, 1948.
 - c. The United Nations Commissioner may, with a view to the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine, invite the assistance and cooperation of appropriate specialized agencies of the United Nations such as the World Health Organization, of the International Red Cross and of other governmental or non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character.

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- d. The United Nations Commissioner shall render monthly progress reports, or more frequently as he deems necessary, to the Security Council and to the Secretary General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations.
 - e. The United Nations Commissioner shall be guided in his activities by the provisions of this resolution and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.
 - f. Measures taken by the United Nations Commissioner under the terms of the present resolution shall become immediately effective unless the United Nations Commissioner has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.
3. The General Assembly should establish a Temporary United Nations Trusteeship for the City of Jerusalem under the direction of the Trusteeship Council or some other form of special regime under the United Nations auspices for that city.
4. The November 29, 1947, resolution should stand, except that the General Assembly should relieve the Palestine Commission of any responsibilities thereunder and should take note of any directive given by the General Assembly to the Trusteeship Council regarding an alternative course with respect to the City of Jerusalem.

~~SECRET~~

D. E. 10 7

March 6, 1948

Dear Frank:

I appreciated your letter of March fourth very much.

I think it would be advisable for you to come in and see me off the record and I'll talk with you very frankly about the situation referred to in your letter.

I naturally am not happy over the implication that I might be ducking any issues - that is not my manner of meeting a situation, as you are well familiar with by this time. However, you come in and we'll discuss the matter from the beginning of the alphabet to the end.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Honorable Francis J. Myers
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

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EDWARD S. JARRETT, CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE

March 4, 1948

Honorable Harry S. Truman
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

As one who has fought with you and behind you on all of those things which are important to us both as Democrats, but primarily as Americans, I must get this off my chest, and this seems the best way to do it -- in a personal letter which is not designed for public circulation as an indication to my constituents of my efforts at statesmanship, but is purely a heartfelt attempt to help our party and our country.

As you no doubt know, there has been a veritable uproar in this country over the American position in the United Nations on Palestine. The protest is vocal among Jewish citizens, of course; but it is also genuine among all non-Jews, I believe, who sincerely believe this United Nations must be made to work.

The news stories on Senator Austin's speech at the UN when the Palestine debate opened gave the impression, still current, that our country is "selling out" the Jewish people and undercutting the UN structure. A few Democratic party leaders in my state, in the lower political levels, have resigned in protest and have stated categorically they can no longer support our party because of what it has "done" in the Palestine case. Many Pennsylvanians of Jewish extraction seem to be as bitter against you and the party over this incident as some of our brethren from the South profess to be.

I have obtained a copy of Senator Austin's text at the opening session of the Security Council on Palestine and I have read it. It strikes me that the main trouble here is sloppy draftsmanship, perhaps purposely so. I could find nothing in the Austin text to bear out the charges that the United States has sold out. However, I found vague, weasel-worded passages so involved and so legalistic and confusing that it is hard to tell just exactly where we stand. Yet, a careful reading shows, I think, that fundamentally the United States has not retreated and is not "selling out."

Honorable Harry S. Truman

March 4, 1948

Why can't we come right out and say what we mean instead of hedging the thing around with such phraseology that even the trained newsmen and commentators can't seem to penetrate the fog?

If I'm wrong and if we are in truth ducking on this issue, then the American people should be told in simple and direct language what we are doing and why. The facts should be put on the table.


Those of us who support you and have supported you and who want to continue fighting in behalf of your program, are at a terrible disadvantage in this Palestine incident because we just can't put our finger on the facts. It isn't fair to you and it isn't fair to us for us to be in such a position of complete bafflement that we hesitate to open our mouths.

Foreign affairs and the United Nations are things which are now real and personal to nearly all Americans. We want them to stay that way. The quickest way to dissipate this interest and revive isolationism and unconcern is, I think, to feed the public vague generalities and legalistic double-talk which the public can't understand.

I don't think you could lend yourself to any "sell-out" such as has been charged in regard to Palestine. And yet, Mr. President, it is so terribly difficult to find solid facts and plain, understandable information on just where we do stand that I am most disturbed.

I do not ask that you answer my letter. I just thought I owed it to you to pass my thoughts along.

Sincerely and most respectfully yours,



FRANCIS J. MYERS

FJM:rz

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President
FERIA KIRCHWITZ

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LILLIAN KIRCHWITZ
Director

May 10, 1948

Honorable Harry S. Truman
White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Tomorrow morning the Washington Post will carry, in the form of a full-page advertisement, the text of an open letter to you requesting the implementation of the November 29 resolution on Palestine.

I have been requested to send you the enclosed text of this open letter by the signatories to it who are, apart from myself, Henry A. Atkinson, who is Secretary of the Church Peace Union; Bartley C. Crum, publisher of PM and your appointee to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry; Leon Henderson, who is the National Chairman of Americans for Democratic Action; Philip Murray, President of the C.I.O.; James G. Patton, President of the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union; and T. O. Thackrey, editor and publisher of the New York Post and Home News.

It is our hope that in the week which remains before the end of the British Mandate, action will be taken by you to insure the recognition of the Jewish state as a means of maintaining the prestige of this country, the authority of the United Nations, and peace in the Middle East.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph Kirchwitz
President

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President

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PAGE H. TONG

WALTER WHITE

STEPHEN S. WINE

DAVID BROWDER

LEWIS BRIDGES

Director

May 10, 1948



MR. PRESIDENT:

On November 29, 1947, your leadership defeated the delaying tactics of the Middle Eastern section of the State Department and brought about the decisive vote of the United Nations in favor of partition with economic union in Palestine.

On the day following that vote, however, the State Department resumed its active collaboration with the British Foreign Office to prevent the implementation of that resolution. This was reflected in the embargo on arms shipments to Palestine by the United States on December 6; in the failure of the State Department to let the Arab states know we would not tolerate their revolt; active propaganda by the Defense Department to prove the necessity of Middle Eastern oil for war purposes, and the danger that the Arabs would cancel oil leases; and in the charge of lack of patriotism against those who favor partition.

Secretary of Defense Forrestal has justified the new American appeasement policy as essential to preventing the cancellation of oil concessions by the Arab states. But the facts are that no Arab rulers have threatened to cancel oil leases; American military experts concede that Middle Eastern oil installations could be destroyed almost overnight in the event of war; and there are ample undeveloped oil reserves in the United States, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Columbia, Brazil, and Argentina, apart from the enormous potential of synthetic oil.

Actually, except for the determined sabotage of the partition resolution by the British and our own State Department, there is nothing in the present Palestine situation which was not anticipated last fall when you directed the American delegation to support partition.

On October 31, your representative, Herschel Johnson, told correspondents at the United Nations that if the Arabs resisted partition, there was no reason why the Jewish state could not be set up and the Arab area turned over to the Trusteeship Council. On November 22, he told the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine of the United Nations: "We do not say we anticipate no trouble." On November 25 he voted for the inclusion in the preamble of the resolution of a specification that "the Security Council should deter-

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mine as a threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution." On November 29 he told the final session of the General Assembly: "If we are to effect through the United Nations a solution of this problem, it cannot be done without the use of the knife."

Britain is Behind Acts of Arab League

The military and political developments in the Arab world are controlled by the Arab League composed of the governments of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Transjordan, and Yemen. Representatives of the British government were present at the meetings of the Arab League where the revolt was planned, and are in continuous connection with it.

Within a month after the November 29 resolution the Arabs were encouraged by Foreign Minister Bevin of Great Britain to believe that partition would be supplanted by a federal state. Armed shipments have been continued by Britain to the Arab states despite their known use for Palestine warfare.

The Arab world is incapable of a sustained revolt without the active support of the Western nations including moral encouragement, military supplies, and training of troops. That the present revolt has taken place is due to the direct encouragement of the British government which is in active alliance with the Arab League.

Since 1945 the British government, under the direction of Foreign Minister Bevin, has resisted every American proposal for a decent settlement of the Palestine question. This was true in 1946 when he refused to accept the proposal of the Anglo-American Committee, and your own, for the admission into Palestine of 100,000 Jews. It was true again in 1947 when he refused to accept the UNSCOP report in favor of partition.

British Deliberately Create Chaos

In 1948, the British government has deliberately created chaos in Palestine under the pressure of which it is trying to force the United States government to discard partition, to appease the Arabs, and to secure its own continuing control in the Middle East. For the British government, by arrangement with the Arab League, is to receive base rights in Haifa, the Negev, and the Galilee, if partition is shelved through one of several schemes to assure Arab dominance in the whole of Palestine.

British Intelligence Reveals British Plot Against the United Nations and Partition

The British plot against the United Nations decision on Palestine is revealed in the secret documents of British Military Intelligence in Palestine and the Middle East. These have been incorporated in a Memorandum submitted to the United Nations and to you on April 30 by The Nation Associates.

This Memorandum proves that:

1) Representatives of the British government attended the meeting of the Arab League where the Arab revolt was first planned and that the British

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representative in Egypt, Brigadier P. A. Clayton, regularly attends the meetings of the Arab League.

2) The British first suggested the use of "volunteers" in the Arab invasion of Palestine, instead of the official armies of the Arab states, as a direct means of avoiding U. N. action to curb them.

3) British Intelligence is aware of every move of the invading forces in Palestine, but the British representatives have not informed the U. N.

4) The British in Palestine have sent messages to Arab leaders requesting them to ask the invaders to be as "unobtrusive" as possible.

5) In the opinion of British Military Intelligence the Arab invaders have served as a "pacifying and stabilizing" influence.

6) The Arabs have instructions not to attack the British.

7) The British, in allowing 10,000 foreign invaders to enter Palestine, have condoned aggression.

8) Units of the Arab Legion have been deliberately retained in Palestine in order to coerce the Jews.

9) As far back as February 13 the British knew of the plan of King Abdullah of Transjordan to march into Palestine; and that under past and current treaties, Abdullah's Arab Legion, trained, armed, commanded, and financed by the British, could not move without British knowledge and consent.

10) The British have admitted into Palestine Arabs of known Nazi allegiance and training and Nazi prisoners of war in command of attacking units.

British Deliberately Destroy Assets



Further, The Nation Associates' Memorandum reveals that:

1) The Palestine administration of the British government is involved in an organized dissipation of the assets of the country in the determination that there should be a vacuum and chaos at the end of the Mandate.

2) An artificial deficit has been created.

3) The Jews have been landlocked by the turning over of two railroads connecting with the outside world to Egypt and Transjordan.

4) A deliberate breakdown of central authority has been undertaken as part of the British move to create chaos.

British Military Rights in Palestine

Laws have been drafted which would guarantee British rights in perpetuity to military bases and control of land, rail, and sea connections to the Middle East.

Partition is a Fact

Despite British sabotage, the Arab revolt, and Jewish reprisals, parti-

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tion is a fact. Dr. Pablo Azcarate, head of the advance party of the U. N. Palestine Commission, on his return from Jerusalem a fortnight ago, reported that partition was in effect and could not be overthrown. The truce commission of the U. N. has reported that the Jewish Agency has taken over suspended governmental activities as the British withdraw and is functioning effectively in spite of constant warfare.

Resisting with remarkable courage the war of nerves being waged against them, and Arab assault, the Haganah has occupied the key points in almost the whole area awarded the Jewish state by the United Nations. Jewish authorities have taken over most of the services. More impressive still, they have set up an agency to safeguard the properties of Arabs fleeing from towns and villages taken over by the Jews. Arab businesses are managed wherever possible, vineyards and farms are being attended and produce used, but the assets are conserved for the legal Arab owners.

Not the United Nations, but the Jews themselves, have implemented the United Nations decision.

A Minimal U.S. Program for Palestine

Is British sabotage, Mr. President, to be permitted to serve as the basis of U.S. policy on Palestine?

The press of the United States and leading American spokesmen for the democratic way of life are unanimous in declaring the present reversal of our policy is without justification, an attack on the prestige of the United States, a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a peril to peace and security in the Middle East and in the world at large.

You, Mr. President, have continued to endorse partition. The resolution of November 29 still stands. Justice, honor, practically all demand a new directive by you to insure its implementation.

A minimal program should be:

- 1) Recognition of the Jewish state on May 15 at the Mandate's end.
- 2) A loan to that state.
- 3) Trusteeship for the Arab areas of Palestine pending the creation of an Arab government.
- 4) A general embargo on the shipments of arms to the states comprising the Arab League.
- 5) A recommendation to the Security Council to recognize that the aggression of the Arab states is a threat to peace.
- 6) Recognition of Haganah and supplying of arms to it.

The will to carry through partition thus demonstrated by the United States can put an end to Arab gangsterism, British sabotage. It will also safeguard the authority of the United Nations and lay the foundations for a more lasting peace. To do less, to yield to Arab blackmail, is to destroy the moral foundations on which our country is built.

(Signed) Henry A. Atkinson
Bartley C. Crum
Leon Henderson
T. O. Thackrey

Freda Kirchway
Philip Murray
James G. Patton

B. File

מדינת ישראל

STATE OF ISRAEL

MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL AND UNCLASSIFIED~~

No. 1313

August 2, 1949

Dear Mr. Clifford:

You may be interested to read the attached opinion on de facto recognition of the State of Israel by the United States Government, which has been prepared by an outstanding authority on International Law.

Sincerely yours,



Elisha Epstein
Special Representative

Mr. Clark Clifford
Special Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

B F

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Whether a recognition is a de facto recognition of a de jure government, or the other way around is indeed a matter for legalistic quibble. But there is a test on which the real attitude of one government to another (of the recognizing government to the recognized government) can easily be made, namely, the type of diplomatic and consular relations it is maintaining with the government which asks for recognition.

The real nature of the American recognition of the State of Israel is not expressed in the statement of the President but in the way the State Department deals with Israeli representative in Washington and with Israeli Consul-General in New-York. There has been a clear-cut tendency to try to reduce the level of this relationship to something very provisional and very temporary and very unsatisfactory from Israeli viewpoint. The thing to do is not so much the use of one or another magic formula, but the practical kind of status granted to Israeli representatives. If Israeli diplomatic representative is carried in the diplomatic list, if he is given a proper title, if he enjoying by right and not by sufferance his diplomatic immunities and privileges— well, that will do. But if in all these respects he is treated as an inferior while some representatives of states extinguished long ago are still given full diplomatic recognition, this certainly is an appropriate interpretation of what the real meaning of the so-called de facto recognition was, at least in the eyes of a diplomat and in international law.

The provisional character of the government of Israel has nothing to do with the kind of recognition to be granted to Israel. This designation was used exclusively out of deference to the Resolution of the General Assembly. It is no reflection at all on the representative character of the government or on the very idea of this government as a democratic government enjoying popular consent. In fact, it emanated from the National Council elections in 1944 as corrected by the election of the Zionist Congress in 1946. Indeed, the American theory of recognition does not require a formal popular vote but only the assumption that the government is indeed a government by consent. This was the idea that prompted the U.S.A. to recognize a few days after the March Revolution the provisional government of Russia, Prince Lubov. What is more interesting is that this government remained so, that is remained de jure for 16 years from 1917 to 1933, with the representative of this government Mr. Bakametyeff, enjoying all the privileges and immunities of an ambassador of a fully recognized government. During these 16 years the government was in power only six months, and was overthrown by the Bolsheviks. Practically all of those in the government were dead much earlier than 1933. Still the recognition stood. This is certainly the best proof that neither the word "provisional" nor the fact that the government did not emanate directly from a parliament is in any way relevant in American practice for full recognition.

B. File

September 1, 1948

Dear Mr. Epstein:

I have read with interest the memorandum on the question of recognition which you enclosed in your letter of August 9th. This is a helpful approach to this complex subject.

Very sincerely yours,

CLARK M. CLIFFORD
Special Counsel to the President

Mr. Eliahu Epstein
Special Representative
State of Israel
Mission to the United States
2210 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

2210 Massachusetts Ave, N.W.
Washington 8, D. C.

COPY

May 14, 1948

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to notify you that the state of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic within frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution of November 29, 1947, and that a provisional government has been charged to assume the rights and duties of government for preserving law and order within the boundaries of Israel, for defending the state against external aggression, and for discharging the obligations of Israel to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law. The Act of Independence will become effective at one minute after six o'clock on the evening of 14 May 1948, Washington time.

With full knowledge of the deep bond of sympathy which has existed and has been strengthened over the past thirty years between the Government of the United States and the Jewish people of Palestine, I have been authorized by the provisional government of the new state to tender this message and to express the hope that your government will recognize and will welcome Israel into the community of nations.

Very respectfully yours,

/s/ ELIAHU EPSTEIN X
Agent

Provisional Government of Israel

Copy

B. File

Sanctus

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The General Assembly of the United Nations in special session on May 15, 1947, unanimously adopted the following resolution:

"The General Assembly calls upon all governments and peoples, and particularly on the inhabitants of Palestine, to refrain, pending action by the General Assembly on the report of the Special Committee on Palestine, from the threat or use of force or any other action which might create an atmosphere prejudicial to an early settlement of the question of Palestine."

The search for a fair and workable solution of the Palestine problem is one of the most difficult and important tasks confronting the United Nations. It is in the interest of the United States as well as of the United Nations that the efforts of the United Nations to solve this problem meet with success. Activities calculated further to inflame the passions of the inhabitants of Palestine, to undermine law and order in Palestine, or to promote violence in that country are certain to create an atmosphere prejudicial to an early settlement of the Palestine problem and to render still more difficult the tasks which the United Nations has before it.

I therefore urge every citizen and resident of the United States, in the interests of this country, of world peace, and of humanity, meticulously to refrain, while the United Nations is considering the problem of Palestine, from engaging in, or facilitating, any activities which tend further to inflame the passions of the inhabitants of Palestine, to undermine law and order in Palestine, or to promote violence in that country.

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B.B.F.

(ISRAEL RECOGNITION)

PRESIDENT TRUMAN ANNOUNCED THAT THE U.S. RECOGNIZED THE NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN PALESTINE.

5/14--JM623P..

ADD 1 RECOGNITION (623P)

A FEW MINUTES AFTER THE PROCLAMATION OF A JEWISH STATE IN PALESTINE BECAME EFFECTIVE AT 6:01 P.M. EDT, MR. TRUMAN ISSUED THIS STATEMENT:

"THIS GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT A JEWISH STATE HAS BEEN PROCLAIMED IN PALESTINE, AND RECOGNITION HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT THEREOF.

"THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AS THE DEFACTO AUTHORITY OF THE NEW STATE OF ISRAEL."

5/14--JM625P

ADD 2 RECOGNITION

WHITE HOUSE SECRETARY CHARLES C. ROSS SAID CREATION OF THE NEW JEWISH STATE AND U. S. RECOGNITION WILL IN NO WAY LESSEN THIS GOVERNMENT'S EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT A TRUCE BETWEEN WARRING ARABS AND JEWS.

5/14--JM626P..

ADD 3 RECOGNITION

ROSS TOLD REPORTERS:

"THE DESIRE OF THE UNITED STATES TO OBTAIN A TRUCE IN PALESTINE WILL IN NO WAY BE LESSENED BY THE PROCLAMATION OF A JEWISH STATE.

"WE HOPE THAT THE NEW JEWISH STATE WILL JOIN WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL TRUCE COMMISSION IN REDOUBLED EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN, THROUGHOUT THE UNITED NATIONS CONSIDERATION OF PALESTINE, A PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF THIS GOVERNMENT."

5/14--JM631P..

CAIRO--ORDERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN FOR EGYPTIAN TROOPS TO ENTER PALESTINE. A GOVERNMENT COMMUNIQUE SAID.

5/14--JM633P..

B File

HWADD TROOPS, CAIRO (633P)

IT WAS PRESUMED HERE THAT SOME OF THE ESTIMATED 10,000 EGYPTIAN TROOPS MASSSED ON THE BORDERS OF PALESTINE ENTERED THE HOLY LAND A FEW MINUTES AFTER MIDNIGHT, WHEN THE BRITISH MANDATE OFFICIALLY ENDED.

5/14--JM639P..

3 File

MAY 14, 1948

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the provisional government thereof.

The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel.



B Fi
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SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
165 BROADWAY
NEW YORK 6

July 30, 1948.


Mr. Clark Clifford,
White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Clark:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a memorandum which I have asked be prepared for me on the question of the recognition of Israel.

Maybe the State Department would be willing to change the designation of MacDonald and of Epstein.

Very sincerely yours,



Samuel I. Rosenman

SIR/sg
Enclosure



July 29, 1948

WHAT KIND OF RECOGNITION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL
AND ITS PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT BY THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES?

1. This is the text of the President's pronouncement of May 14:

"This Government has been informed that a Jewish State has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the Provisional Government thereof. The United States recognizes the Provisional Government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel.

Harry S. Truman
President"

2. The nature of this recognition has given rise to some controversy. It has been maintained that this is de jure recognition of the State of Israel and a de facto recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel. It has also been maintained that this latter recognition can not at this time be other than de facto in view of the provisional character of the Government. On the other hand, it has been argued that since the recognition of the Government is only a de facto one, the same would also apply to the recognition of the State.

3. It would help very little to go into the intricacies of the problems concerning the difference between de jure and de facto recognition. There is one test which unfailingly gives an answer to the proper nature of recognition; and this is whether or not under this recognition there is full diplomatic intercourse between the recognizing and recognized State, and whether or not full diplomatic immunities are conferred upon the representatives of the authority recognized de facto. (Out of the mass of literature on the subject, see the authoritative volume of Prof. Lauterpacht, "Recognition in International Law" 1947, pp. 345-346)

4. If it is held that the recognition of Israel is a de jure one and "a full one", it is certainly inconsistent to give the representatives of the two States (U.S.A. in Israel, and Israel in U.S.A.) the unusual title of "Special Representative", completely unknown in international law, instead of the generally accepted title of "Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary". If the title "Special Representative" was not meant to imply a status inferior to that of the Minister, the question arises: why was it chosen? It must have had some meaning.

5. We arrive, therefore, at the conclusion that on this test it can hardly be said that the recognition of May 14 can be properly defined as "full" or "de jure".

B. File

B. File

WZ035 PED-NEW YORK NY 1:10 PM

SENATOR HOWARD J. MCGRATH
SENATE OFFICE BUILDING

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL HAVE JUST LEARNED TEXT OF STATEMENT PRESIDENT ABOUT TO ISSUE RE PALESTINE. REGARD IT AS VERY UNSATISFACTORY WITH RESPECT TO HIS OWN DIRECT INTERESTS AS WELL AS TO SITUATION. NO STATEMENT FAILING TO OPPOSE THE BERNADOTTE PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF JEWISH STATE BY TWO-THIRDS WILL BE RECEIVED WITH ANYTHING EXCEPT DISDAIN. PUBLIC OPINION IS SO OPPOSED TO BERNADOTTE PROPOSAL BECAUSE IT IS A REWARD TO BRITISH FOR WAR AGAINST U.N. RESOLUTION WHICH THEY INSPIRED, AND TO ARABS FOR WAR THEY CONDUCTED. MOREOVER, TRANSJORDAN, WHICH ALREADY HAS SOME 34,000 SQUARE MILES OF AREA FOR A POPULATION OF 300,000 DOESNT NEED 3,000 MORE MILES OF DESERT. IF NEGEV AND DEAD SEA AREA ARE TAKEN OUT OF JEWISH STATE IT MEANS JEWS CANNOT RESETTLE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS STILL IN D.P. CAMPS OF EUROPE. THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION IN WORLD SITUATION FOR ACCEPTANCE OF BERNADOTTE PROPOSAL WHICH IS NOTHING MORE THAN A SHOPWORN BRITISH PLAN WHICH THEY HAVE TRIED TO PUT OVER THREE TIMES WITH THE CONNIVANCE OF OUR STATE DEPARTMENT, AND WHICH EACH TIME THE PRESIDENT STOPPED. NEWYORK TIMES, IN DISPATCH FROM PARIS, SAYS MARSHALL'S ACTION WAS TAKEN ON HIS OWN WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH DULLES OR ANY OTHER MEMBER OF U.S. DELEGATION. AUTHORITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF OUR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN IN HANDS OF PRESIDENT. IF PRESIDENT WANTS TO DEMONSTRATE TO COUNTRY THAT HE IS A MAN OF STRENGTH, CHARACTER AND EFFICIENCY, HE CAN DO SO BY POSITIVE ACTION IN REPUDIATING BERNADOTTE PLAN. NOTHING ELSE WILL SERVE HIS FAILURE TO DO SO WILL CERTAINLY ADD TO HIS OWN DIFFICULTIES AND COULD ALMOST CERTAINLY DEFEAT DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF SENATE. AS FAR AS SUCH ACTION JEOPARDIZING OTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH RESPECT TO WORLD

Clark *Diff-A* *(m)*

B-File

SITUATION, CANNOT BELIEVE THAT U S ON WHOM BRITAIN IS DEPENDENT,
NEEDS TO STRIKE A BARGAIN WITH BRITAIN WHICH IS CONTRARY TO SENSE,
JUSTICE AND PRACTICALITY.



FREDA KIRCHMEY PRESIDENT THE NATION ASSOCIATES
20 VESEY STREET, NEW YORK

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When we went into the President's office for our staff meeting this morning there was a sculptor, Stanley Martineau, there working on two small, clay busts of the President. They were remarkably good, one a particularly fine likeness.

The President had a fairly full list of appointments during the day and was scheduled to go to Constitution Hall tonight to attend a concert by Sigmund Romberg.

Mary and I drove to Providence Hospital where she went to see Mable Ostrander, who has been there for a couple of weeks as a result of injuries in an automobile accident and also a nasal operation. Afterward we drove to Hall's Restaurant, Seventh street near the waterfront, for dinner. So after, to stop at the office and thence home.

May 12th, Wednesday.

[1948]

Reaction ~~hahaha~~ as reported in the newspapers this morning, to the Bedell Smith-Molotov exchange, was varied and it brought about some discussion at our morning staff meeting. There was some comment on the manner in which the State Department handled the release of the exchange after it gave the communications out following the Russian broadcast, disclosing what had been done. The President pointed out that the Department made the letters public without any background or explanation and even without the opening paragraph of the instructions to Ambassador Smith in Moscow, showing that he acted at the direction of the President and the Secretary of State. While the President was thus given no credit, as Ross remarked the Department will come running back to the President in the end.

The Palestine situation also came in for some discussion after Bill Hassett told of a talk he had last night with David Cushman Coyle who told him of a plan Kermit Roosevelt proposed for dealing with the problem. Roosevelt proposed steps to halt trade to Palestine which, as Clifford pointed out, would in effect mean the imposition of sanctions.

Clifford had a memorandum on the situation and commented that the State Department's position on Palestine was incredible. He said they had now gone completely back to the idea of partition after having put over the trusteeship proposal that practically scuttled the American position for partition. He had talked with Rusk of the Department and he said he asked him what had been accomplished by all of it. In effect, of course, nothing has been accomplished -- except, as the President agreed, to embarrass the President.

Clifford said the State Department has been considering the idea of something along the line of sanctions but and this would have to be taken up in the Security Council of the United Nations. Someone said this would be subject to the veto but, as Clifford said, that could apply only to the individual nation. If the United Nations turned down sanctions the United States and Britain still could impose sanctions and if Britain declined to, the United States still could

and this would be almost as effective as most of the supplies come from the United States anyhow. Such sanctions still would not shut off the flow of arms to Palestine as the President commented that arms now are being shipped in from Czechoslovakia and Russia anyhow, by airplane. Clifford said the purpose of sanctions would not be to shut off arms but rather other supplies and the President commented that would shut off also oil royalties to Arabia.

The President had several appointments, as usual during the day and in the late afternoon a session with Secretary Marshall, Undersecretary Lovett and others of the staff, largely on Palestine.

In the afternoon I went to Silver Spring, at the invitation of Aubrey Thomas, to visit the Applied Physics Laboratory where a great deal of secret work is being done, chiefly at this time, on guided missiles, such rockets. The laboratory is supported by the Navy ordnance department, with Johns Hopkins University and various industrial concerns about the country who are contributing both in research and manufacturing. I went through the place with Thomas and officials of the laboratory who showed me what is being done in the development of the rockets.

I was there practically all afternoon and it was about 5 p.m. when I left for home. In the meantime Mary had come to the White House at 4 p.m. and accompanied Mrs. Truman and Reathel Odum to Dr. Wallace Graham's home, at Walter Reed hospital, to a tea given by Mrs. Graham. Afterward Mary came home and was there when I arrived. We had dinner at home and were home in the evening except for a drive to the White House to get the papers.

May 12th, Friday.

General Vaughan, who has been in Missouri, was back this morning. At our staff conference he asked the President what Governor Tuck said to the President when the two met at the time the President visited Williamsburg, Va., to receive a degree at ~~Marx~~ William & Mary College. He asked if, as he said was reported in the Kansas City Star, Tuck said: "How are you Mr. Pendergast."

The President scoffed at it and said of course, he did not; Tuck greeted him like a long-lost brother and said, "How are you, Mr. President?"

Clifford said Lilienthal, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, wanted to bring all of the members of the commission in on May 17th to give the President a report on the Eniwetok atom bomb tests, recently made. The President agreed but said to make the appointment for more than 15 minutes as he wanted to talk to the commission. He said he wanted to tell them either to back him up in his fight for the terms for which he has nominated them or to get out.

Clifford also spoke of a conference he had held on the question of racial segregation in the National Guard. He thought a pretty fair agreement

pers of:
Ben A. Ayers

BBFile 99

on a program had been worked out, comprising some three points. The first was that with the National Guard the state's could enact and should enact their own legislation. Another point related to land grant colleges for negroes.

The President held a press and radio conference which was not marked by much news. ~~xxxxxx~~ The reporters based their stories chiefly on an answer to a question as to whether the President's hopes for peace had been improved through the Molotov-Smith exchanges, over the view he expressed some time ago when he ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ said his confidence had been somewhat shaken. He said ~~xxxxxx~~ today that his hopes had not been strengthened.

This was a religious day on the President's appointment schedule. At 11:00 o'clock more than 300 priests, members of the Alumni Association of the North American College in Rome were received. They went through to the Rose Garden where the President spoke very briefly to them. At 11:15 he received three Presbyterian clergymen representing the church who came in to present their stand on foreign policy and at noon he received a delegation from the American Council of Christian Churches which has been meeting in Atlanta.

At 3:30 p.m., the President held a conference with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff Bradley, Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Denfield, chief of naval operations; secretary of the air force and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg and Director Webb of the Budget Bureau. This was to go over a recommendation which was sent up to the Speaker of the House immediately afterward for revisions in the budget for the armed serviced.

Later I walked to the Press Club and there met Mary and had dinner there with her. We walked back to the White House and drove home from there.

May 14th, Friday.

There was little at our staff meeting this morning and the President had no appointments for the forenoon except the regular cabinet meeting at 10 o'clock. At noon he received Monnett B. Davis, the new ambassador to Panama and at 12:15 he had an off-the-record appointment with Ernie Cuneo, attorney for Walter Nichell. What the purpose of this was, was not disclosed but Senator Howard McGrath, Democratic chairman, came with him.

We did have a minor flurry during the day, however, as a result of a story which appeared in the New York Times this morning and possibly in other papers. The President was scheduled to present awards this afternoon to Honor Medal Winners of the Schoolboy Patrol. This is an enterprise of the American Automobile Association which brought winners from various parts of the country. Among the children from New York who were scheduled to come were four negroes. They found, in New York, when arrangements were being made, that the negroes would not be admitted to some hotels or to eat with ~~xxxxxx~~ white children in some restaurants and as a result they cancelled the trip.

We expected somethings of a flareback as a result although the

papers of:
Ben A. Ayers

B File

White House had nothing to do with the selection of the winners or the make-up of the list of those coming to the White House. However, it passed off without much embarrassment. ~~and~~ One of the boys who received medals from the President was a negro, which helped.

~~straightforward~~ The outstanding event here was the announcement about 6:15 tonight by Charlie Ross of recognition by the President of the new Jewish state of Israel, set up in Palestine by the Jews. The British mandate in Palestine expired tonight and the Jews proclaimed the new state to be effective at 6:01 p.m.

The sudden and unexpected recognition by the United States was brought about through planning that has been under way several days. Clark Clifford took a considerable part in it. It was carried out very secretly, however. Late in the day a statement was completed and before 6 o'clock Ross and I were in his office and Clifford brought in the statement. It had been agreed to by Secretary of State Marshall and Undersecretary Lovett. The U.S. delegation at the United Nations had not been informed and we waited while Lovett at State Department reached Warren Austin, head of the delegation in New York, and ~~asked~~ told him. This was around 6 p.m. or a few minutes thereafter. ~~End~~

About 6:12 newspapermen on duty here at the White House were called in to Ross's office and he read them the "Statement by the President" which follows:

"This government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the Provisional government thereof.

"The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel."

Ross followed this by a statement on his own which was "The desire of the United States to obtain a truce in Palestine will in no way be lessened by the proclamation of a Jewish state. We hope that the new Jewish state will join with the Security Council Truce Commission in redoubled efforts to bring about an end to the fighting which has been throughout the United Nations consideration of Palestine a principal objective of this government."

Actually the only request for recognition was in the form of a letter that came in this afternoon from Eliahu Epstein, Washington representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. He acted without having received authority from the Jewish organization in Palestine, we understand, but there is no question about that coming.

Afterward Ross and I were discussing the whole situation, particularly State Department handling of the Palestine issue and he expressed the belief, with which I agree, that the Department has been influenced by certain of the people in it who are Anglophiles, following the British line without consideration for U.S. interests. As I told him, they seem to operate completely in a vacuum so far as the United States and its domestic affairs and politics are concerned. One who has exercised - but probably does so no longer -- particularly strong influence, especially in the switch from partition to trusteeship, is Loy Henderson.

B. File ¹⁰¹

The President tonight spoke at a dinner of the Young Democrats at the Mayflower Hotel. This speech followed the plan of the last two or three under which the President used no manuscript. A draft of an address had been made and had been gone over with him by some of the staff and he had worked on it also and had some notes. His talk, however, appeared as an extemporaneous address and he made a good impression. It was carried by only one radio network, Mutual, and Mary and I listened to it at home. I thought the President did well although he did not stick accurately to all that had been planned.

He made his strongest hit when he told his audience that there would be a Democrat in the White House the next four years "and you're looking at him."

In the final paragraph of his speech, however, he made a reference to the need now for an Isaiah and a Martin Luther and the reference to Luther was not, perhaps, too fortunate, especially in its effect upon Catholics.

May 15th, Saturday.

Bill Hassett, who is a Catholic, brought up the President's reference to Martin Luther in his speech last night, at the opening of our staff meeting this morning. My wife had said last night when she heard it that she wished he had not made it and Bill took a similar slant. The President told Bill that Luther actually had done more for the Catholic church than any other person through his part in the Reformation. He told Bill he had a book he'd let him read on Luther and Bill laughingly replied that he had a book on Luther.

I told the President about hearing Governor Thomas E. Dewey on the "Meet the Press", radio program last night and that Dewey said he inaugurated the present bi-partisan foreign policy of the United States.

"The fact is," the President said, "that was started by Franklin Roosevelt when he appointed Knox (Frank Knox of Manchester, N.H.) and Stimson (Henry L. Stimson) to his cabinet." Roosevelt named Knox, a Republican, as secretary of the navy and Stimson, a Republican, as secretary of war. Knox served until his death and Stimson until his retirement after President Truman came in.

The President went on to recall that Dewey had been planning a speech (in ~~the~~ the 1944 campaign, as I recall) which would have done great harm and that he was induced not to make it. This ~~man~~ became known at the time. The President commented that it was well often to ~~know~~ know the history behind some of these things.

There was some ~~him~~ talk about the Palestine action of last night and ~~on~~ of what further can be said in view of the questions raised as to probable action on the arms embargo now in effect, diplomatic representation, etc.

The President had no appointments on his list for today and he went to the House for the afternoon. We were kept at the office for some time by a veto we gave out on a bill which the Congress passed providing for investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the loyalty and character of his nominations to the Atomic Energy Commission. The President held that the bill was wholly unnecessary and unwise and an unwarranted encroachment by the legislative branch of the executive authority. He also questioned its constitutionality.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Palestine

On April 18 Secretary Stettinius sent you a personal and confidential letter in which he pointed out that efforts would undoubtedly be made by the Zionists to obtain commitments from you in favor of their program for Palestine, and that while we were making every effort to relieve the suffering of the Jews in Europe we felt that the question of Palestine was a highly complex one which should be handled with the greatest care.

In this connection I thought that you would like to know that although President Roosevelt at times gave expression to views sympathetic to certain Zionist aims, he also gave certain assurances to the Arabs which they regard as definite commitments on our part. On a number of occasions within the past few years, he authorized the Department to assure the heads of the different Near Eastern Governments in his behalf that "in the view of this Government there should be no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews". In his meeting with King Ibn Saud early this year, moreover, Mr. Roosevelt promised the King that as regards Palestine he would make no move hostile to the Arab people and would not assist the Jews as against the Arabs.

I am attaching a copy of a memorandum summarizing the conversation between Ibn Saud and Mr. Roosevelt, of which the original is presumably with Mr. Roosevelt's papers. After the meeting, this memorandum was approved by both the President and the King, so that it may be regarded as completely authentic. On April 8, only a week before his death, the President signed a letter to Ibn Saud in which he repeated the assurances which he had made to the King during the meeting. A copy of this letter is also attached.

The

B.L.H.

The Arabs, not only in Palestine but throughout the whole Near East, have made no secret of their hostility to Zionism and their Governments say that it would be impossible to restrain them from rallying with arms, in defense of what they consider to be an Arab country. We know that President Roosevelt understood this clearly, for as recently as March 3, after his trip to the Near East, he told an officer of the Department that, in his opinion, a Jewish state in Palestine (the ultimate Zionist aim) could be established and maintained only by military force.

I should be glad at any time to furnish you with any additional background material which you may desire bearing upon the entire Palestine problem.



JOSEPH C. GREW

Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

- (1) Copy of memorandum of conversation between King Ibn Saud and President Roosevelt. (2) Copy of letter from President Roosevelt to King Ibn Saud.

B. File

May 8, 1948



In a conversation with Mr. Dean Rusk this morning, May 8, indicated the following:

1. Considerable doubt as to the advantage of the British "Neutral Authority Plan". He more or less characterized the British position as one of doing nothing between now and May 15th when the mandate is surrendered.

2. He believes that sufficient votes are available in the General Assembly to approve a simplified trusteeship for Palestine if a truce is not obtained before the 15th. He sees such a simplified trusteeship plan as amounting to a substitute for the November 29th Resolution, with the advantage of placing the Arabs in the position of being brought before the Security Council in case of invasion after the 15th. (Of course this is true now to the same extent with respect to the November 29th Resolution; and the Jews would be faced with similar Security Council action if they forcibly oppose such a trusteeship).

3. Mr. Rusk indicates that the chief desire of the United States is for a truce agreement before the 15th. It is probably that the so-called simplified trusteeship plan, for which Mr. Rusk believes the necessary votes are available, is being held in reserve pending efforts to obtain a truce.

I urged that the United States take no position between now and the 15th which would tie the hands of the United States after May 15th.. I pointed out the likelihood that the Jew and the Arab States would be proclaimed and the United States should then be in a position to deal with the result and that a truce was just as likely to be feasible then as between now and the 15th; that there was strong indication of actual partition now and we should be in a position to reconcile the two peoples under the actual situation without creating a United Nations' legal substitute for partition; that there was just as much danger of continued conflict under such a substitute as under the existing Resolution and that when each had made proclamations there might be a better chance of conciliation. I said that if the United States were seeking an armed truce without a political truce there would be no difficulty.

Mr. Rusk denied that there was actual partition along the lines of the November Resolution, saying that the Jews were in control of only about one-third of the area of the Jewish State as described in the November Resolution. He meant that Negeb was not under their control and indicated the problem would be simpler if in November the delineation of the Jewish State had been different.

The matter seems to me to sum up as follows:

1. The United States as represented in this conversation with Mr. Rusk prefers and thinks it can obtain a simplified trusteeship plan in preference to the British neutral authority plan, unless the efforts of the United States for a truce succeed;

2. Mr. Rusk prefers such a trusteeship plan to leaving the November 29th Resolution untouched when May 15th arrives. He does not

see the British plan as seriously impairing the November 29th Resolution;

3. The present principal effort of the United States is directed towards a truce, armed and also political in the sense of excluding the proclamation of States.

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402

State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982

May 11, 1943

By JEB NLT, Date 11-18-85Memorandum for the President

The Department of State recommends that the President approve the following position on Palestine for the United States during the remainder of the Special Session of the General Assembly, and authorize the United States Delegation to introduce necessary resolutions, if that appears desirable in the light of the negotiating situation at Lake Success.

1. The General Assembly should strongly support by resolution the present efforts of the Security Council to obtain a truce in Palestine.
2. The General Assembly should appoint a United Nations Commissioner for Palestine, who shall have the following functions:
 - a. The United Nations Commissioner shall use his good offices as a mediator with the local and community authorities in Palestine to
 - (1) Arrange for the operation of common services necessary to the maintenance of law and order in Palestine and the health and well-being of its population.
 - (2) Assure the protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine.
 - (3) Assist in reaching agreement between the local and community authorities on the future government of Palestine.
 - b. The United Nations Commissioner shall cooperate with the Truce Commission for Palestine appointed by the Security Council in its resolution of April 23, 1948.
 - c. The United Nations Commissioner may, with a view to the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine, invite the assistance and cooperation of appropriate specialized agencies of the United Nations such as the World Health Organization, of the International Red Cross and of other governmental or non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character.

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- d. The United Nations Commissioner shall render monthly progress reports, or more frequently as he deems necessary, to the Security Council and to the Secretary General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations.
 - e. The United Nations Commissioner shall be guided in his activities by the provisions of this resolution and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.
 - f. Measures taken by the United Nations Commissioner under the terms of the present resolution shall become immediately effective unless the United Nations Commissioner has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.
3. The General Assembly should establish a Temporary United Nations Trusteeship for the City of Jerusalem under the direction of the Trusteeship Council or some other form of special regime under the United Nations auspices for that city.
4. The November 29, 1947, resolution should stand, except that the General Assembly should relieve the Palestine Commission of any responsibilities thereunder and should take note of any directive given by the General Assembly to the Trusteeship Council regarding an alternative course with respect to the City of Jerusalem.

SECRET

March 24, 1948



Hon. Robert A. Lovett
Under Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Bob:

The recent action of our Government on the Palestine issue at the Security Council is a most disturbing and discouraging one to me. Our new policy strikes me as a tragic mistake which can lead only to more trouble and greater difficulties for all parties concerned, including the United States. In view of these implications, I feel compelled to transmit some views to you for whatever use they might serve.

As was clear from the very beginning, the Palestine security problem divides itself into external and internal influences. It has always been thought that the internal security problem would not be a very serious one. That judgment is still valid. If the surrounding countries had been given to understand from the very beginning that the United Nations solution was an accomplished fact and that no armed interference and violence would be condoned, I believe that Syria and Iraq and the others would have stayed out of the picture. Instead, the imposition of the arms embargo by the United States and the failure of the leading powers to make their position clear and strong and unequivocal gave the Arab States reason for feeling that armed interference in Palestine would not make any difference whatsoever in their standing with us and in the United Nations. The Arab countries were, in effect, encouraged to participate in violence as a means of disrupting and changing United Nations policy. Therefore some blame for the degree of violence is on our doorstep.

I recall distinctly that much of the argument and influence exerted by those in favor of Palestine partition during the United Nations hearings was resented by our Government officials. Yet the recent vacillation and then reversal indicates how important that pressure was. No matter how preponderant the evidence and great the merit, there is no point in assuming that right will somehow prevail and that continued argument for the right solution is unnecessary. Since partition was voted by the United Nations, there has been very little opportunity for those in favor of partition to continue to express their views in high quarters in our country. On the other hand, those who were against partition, including Mr. Henderson and Mr. Wadsworth, continued to have their influence felt day by day. Certainly they have the right to their judgment, and I do not in any way question their motives. Yet it was only fair that the other side should have been heard as well. Sustained critical examination of

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strategic, political and economic factors would have helped avoid making what I'm fearful will prove to be a fateful mistake. The lack of effective liaison and channels of communication were in large measure responsible, in my judgment for the acceptance of an unsound policy.

There is much talk about the fact that the United States was entirely responsible for the United Nations decision on partition. In the first place, had it been so it would be very much to our credit. Partition was and continues to be the only feasible and just solution. However, from my experience at Lake Success, the decision was not arrived at primarily as a result of United States pressure. Uncertainty on the vote did prevail until the United States asked other governments to support the plan, but you know better than I that there was no bludgeoning or great pressure brought on other countries. The United States failure on the Balkan issue and on the vote for membership on the Security Council indicated clearly at the last Assembly meeting that the United States could not have its way on any issue at any time under any circumstances. The partition plan was arrived at democratically and freely, and no one nation was responsible. Every nation in Europe, except Yugoslavia, and every British dominion voted for the plan. It is important to keep all this in mind because the Palestine problem has been and continues to be a world problem rather than one involving only our country.

It seems to me that the moral and political status of the United States is most seriously undermined by our turning away from partition and advancing the proposal for temporary trusteeship. No doubt there were many factors taken into account earnestly in arriving at the latest policy. Yet to the laymen it appears as though we have backed down in the face of armed interference by small nations to upset the will of the United Nations. We as a major power - the strongest power on the face of the earth - must believe in peaceful and democratic solution of international problems or we must abandon the whole concept of right rather than might in the settlement of international issues. All over the world free men are increasingly discouraged.

The prestige and status of the United Nations has been lowered further than ever by our action. Since last Friday, there are rumblings that the whole United Nations secretariat is talking of resigning and going into some other activity with greater promise. If the new proposal of the United States truly had strong prospects of a peaceful solution then this severe blow to the United Nations could be weathered. However, prospects for success under the new policy are not very bright and it looks like greater rather than less trouble ahead.

The Jews in Palestine are clearly against trusteeship. The Palestine Arab Higher Committee has also spoken vigorously against it. It is my conviction that before long all the Arab States will also be openly against trusteeship in any form acceptable to the United States.



A good part of the trouble in Palestine over the years can be traced to vacillation and uncertainty and constant shifting of policies by the Mandatory power. Now we seem to be following the same pattern. This shifting back and forth will increasingly complicate the problem and make a permanent solution more and more remote. As time goes on an international force much larger than that required by the British will be needed to impose peace in Palestine. Even then it will not be true peace. It will be more akin to a reign of terror and violence by armed forces against individuals and groups. I shudder to think of the possible - and even probable - implications of our new policy in Palestine, in the United States and around the world.

Whether anything can be salvaged now is problematic. It is much more difficult to rectify mistakes than to start something *de novo*. The moral authority and persuasiveness of the United States in this question has been seriously impaired. However, the realities of the situation will require that some things be done.

First of all, it seems inevitable that there will be some vacuum or gap after the British departure. I think the United States should immediately lift the arms embargo so that there will be the possibility of defense by those who are being attacked. The embargo never did have any justification and it certainly has less and less as the May 15th date approaches.

The United States and the rest of the major powers should express themselves clearly and strongly that they will not condone, nor further ignore armed interference by Syria and Iraq and other Arab countries in the Palestine conflict. As member nations of the United Nations they are violating the basic principles of international peaceful relations. If necessary, they should be threatened with economic sanctions, which should be imposed if they refuse to withdraw their armed nationals from Palestine.

The United States should express itself in favor of continued Jewish immigration on a scale of 100,000 or more per year even during a period of temporary trusteeship. The IP problem is not being solved, and its solution is a must if a healthy Europe is to be reestablished. This cannot be delayed further.

Finally, the United States should make its position clear that it will support whatever decision the Assembly arrives at, whether it be permanent partition now or a short term temporary trusteeship leading to partition or anything else. Without such an advance commitment any new decision is meaningless. In fact, a new decision is unlikely without such a commitment and in view of past experience the commitment must be clear and specific if it is to carry weight.

This country is now deeply involved in a very complex issue which cannot be solved to the full satisfaction of both parties. We

shouldn't kid ourselves into believing that such a solution by agreement is possible. Therefore we must be realistic, fair and courageous. Without these basic attributes we will be lost on this issue as well as on other issues. We can help lead the world to the democracy, peace and prosperity but only by facing issues fairly and squarely.

I feel better having gotten this off my chest and hope you will receive this in the sincere and constructive spirit in which it is sent. If you ever have a moment I should like to talk with you in person about some of these matters.

Very best wishes.

Cordially,

Robert R. Nathan

RRN:mp

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FRANK J. ADLER

July 31, 1974

Note to the attached two memoranda by an anonymous writer, found in the Papers of Edward ("Eddie") Jacobson:

In her letter of July 30, 1974, to Dr. Zobrist of the Truman Library, Mrs. Eddie Jacobson inadvertently identified as "a carbon copy of a seven-page type-written memorandum by an unidentified writer" what actually constitutes two separate items:

- 1.) A 3-page memorandum which begins: "On Thursday, May 27, I called Carl Sherman" The top 1-1/2" had been cut off the first page, suggesting an effort to obscure the identity of the writer.
- 2.) A memorandum containing a total of 3 pages (one being numbered "1-A"), headed "Memorandum on the De Jure Recognition of Israel." The top one inch had been cut off from the first page.

The two items were separately stapled when received by me from Mrs. Jacobson. It is to be noted that the typefaces of the two memoranda appear to be identical and that the same type of onionskin was used to produce the carbon copies of both.

Nancy Miller
C

Please use this typed copy for making xerox copies.
The blue-type original will not photocopy.

HSTL 6/1/73

Original
for 8-10-73

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result in a threat to world peace and security not consonant with the basic purposes and principles of the United Nations.

12. The security of the United States, the peace of the world, and the preservation of the UN, dictate that all possible courses of action by this government be reexamined to determine the one with most promise of success to each of these objectives.

13. Alternative US courses of action with respect to the Palestine question are:

a. Fully support the partition plan with all the means at our disposal, including the use of armed forces under the United Nations.


Under this course of action, the United States would have to take steps to grant substantial economic assistance to the Jewish authorities and to afford them support through the supply of arms, ammunition and implements of war. In order to enable the Jewish state to survive in the face of wide-scale resistance from the Arabs in Palestine, from the neighboring Arab States, and possibly from other Moslem countries, the United States would be prepared ultimately to utilize its naval units and military forces for this purpose.

In the UN Security Council, the United States would seek to give effect to the UN recommendation that "any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged" by the resolution should be regarded as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter. Thereafter the United States would assist in implementing the recommendation by contributing to an international force, either US armed forces or volunteers. Since it is clear that no other nation except Russia could be expected

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5. In meeting this threat, the United States cannot take steps which disregard the following considerations:

a. Unrestricted access to the oil resources of the Middle East is essential to the complete economy of the United States and to the economic recovery of Europe under the ERP.

b. In the event of war, the oil and certain strategic areas of the Middle East will figure prominently in the successful prosecution of such a war by the United States.

c. A friendly or at least a neutral attitude by the Arab peoples toward the US and its interests is requisite to the procurement of adequate quantities of oil for the purposes as stated and to the utilization of strategic areas without prohibitive cost in the event of war.

6. The United States cannot afford to allow the USSR to gain a lodgment in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have emphasized their view that, of all the possible eventualities in the Palestine situation, the most unfavorable in the security interests of the United States would be the intrusion of Soviet forces and, second only to that the introduction of US troops in opposition to possible Arab resistance.

7. It may be assumed that in supporting partition and in any subsequent action within the UN, the intent of the USSR is to exploit the situation in Palestine to its advantage. The USSR can most easily gain a lodgment in the Palestine area by introduction of Soviet or Soviet-controlled forces under the guise of some UN action, or by infiltration of a considerable number of Communist operatives. Such operatives are already at work within

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the Jewish community and their influence will be enhanced so long as a condition of internal strife continues, and their numbers will be increased if the Jewish State is established. The prevailing bitterness and unrest of the Arab people will be nurtured by such operatives to the advantage of the USSR and to the disadvantage of the US.

8. The affirmative vote of the United States upon the UN Plan for Partition of Palestine, and the pressure applied to other governments by various US groups and individuals, have antagonized the Arab peoples to an unprecedented degree. Competent observers of Arab psychology predict that increasing animosity will attend each further manifestation of US leadership in or support of implementation of the Plan for Partition. Consideration must be given to the fact that the Arab people sincerely believe in the righteousness of their opposition to Palestine partition, which imposes upon them the major initial cost of attempting a solution to the international problem of Zionism. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated that no action should be taken which would orient the people of the Middle East away from the Western Powers as the United States has a vital security interest in that area.

9. The United States holds that the peace and security of the world can be furthered by the proper functioning of the United Nations. The prestige of the UN is of deep concern to the United States and is a factor bearing upon US security. Successful and judicious handling of the Palestine issue will contribute materially to the ascendancy of the UN in world affairs. It is not clear that the prestige of the UN will be better served by intransigent insistence upon the implementation of the Plan for Partition.

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than by the adoption of a plan for the future government of Palestine which might be implemented without the use of armed force.

10. Fundamental to the Plan for Partition of Palestine is economic union between the proposed Jewish and Arab States. The Arabs have announced their implacable opposition to the establishment of the contemplated Arab State in Palestine, and there is no indication that the Jews and Arabs of Palestine have made any conciliatory moves to effect a compromise solution. Severe fighting has broken out between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine. These and other developments, since the General Assembly adoption of the Palestine resolution, raise grave doubts that the proposed solution to the Palestine problem is the one most conducive to the security of the US, the increased prestige of the UN, and to the peace of the world.

11. The other developments referred to above include the following:

a. The hope, which the US and other supporters of partition shared, that the UN recommendation would induce the cooperation of both Arab and Jew has not been realized.

b. The schedule for implementation of partition now appears impossible of attainment.

c. The premise that the Jewish State would be able to maintain internal order now appears increasingly doubtful.

d. The UN Commission on Palestine has reported that implementation of the partition resolution will require the assistance of non-Palestinian military forces. The use of military forces to enforce partition is not only of doubtful legality but might well

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DRAFT

February 17, 1948

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT
TO PALESTINE

THE PROBLEM

1. To assess and appraise the position of the United States with respect to Palestine, taking into consideration the security interests of the United States in the Mediterranean and Middle East Areas.

ANALYSIS

2. The National Security Council has agreed that "...The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States..."

3. The United States Government, on the basis of high motives and in consideration of conditions existing at the time, voted in favor of the General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947, recommending the Plan for Partition of Palestine. In so doing our government assumed a moral obligation, along with the other members of the UN who voted for the resolution, to lend its support honestly and courageously to the implementation of that resolution. Our government cannot without cause fail to fulfill this moral obligation. The most impelling cause for any change in our position on the Palestine problem would be a demonstration of the incompatibility of our present position with the security of our own nation.

4. The greatest threat to the security of the United States and to international peace is the USSR and its aggressive program of Communist expansion.

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to participate in such implementation to any appreciable extent, the United States would supply a substantial portion of the money, troops and arms for this purpose. If Russia participated, the United States at least would have to match the Russian effort in this respect.

(1) Advantages.

(a) Maintains UN and US policy constant in the eyes of the world.

(b) Contributes to the settlement of the displaced Jews of Europe.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) Alienates the Moslem world with the resultant threat of:

1. Suspension or cancellation of US air base rights and commercial concessions including oil, and drastic curtailment of US trade in the area.

2. Loss of access to British air, military and naval facilities in the area, affecting our strategic position in the Middle East and Mediterranean.

3. Closing of our educational, religious and philanthropic institutions in the area.

4. Possible deaths, injuries and damages arising from acts of violence against individual US citizens and interests throughout the Middle East.

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5. A serious impediment to the success of the European Recovery Program, which is dependent on increased production of Middle East oil.

(b) Provides a vehicle for Soviet expansion into an area vital to our security interests.

(c) Deploys US troops in a situation where there is high probability of loss of American lives and which might result in war.

(d) Fails to provide a final peaceful solution to the Palestine problem even if Arab and Jewish states are established.

(e) Increases the probability of anti-Semitic activities in the U.S.

(f) Requires the Security Council to act contrary to the Charter in imposing a settlement by force on the people of Palestine.


b. Continuation of support for the Partition Plan in the United Nations by all measures short of the use of outside armed force to impose the Plan upon the people of Palestine.

In this course of action United States representatives in the UN Security Council, the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council would continue to support the implementation of the General Assembly recommendations on Palestine. Such support should take into account, however, that the Charter does not authorize the imposition of a recommended settlement upon the people directly concerned by armed action of the United Nations or its Members. In this course of action, United States representatives would continue to

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(7) Disadvantages.

- (a) Surrenders US initiative in the solution of the Palestine problem.
- (b) Permits communist encouragement of chaos.
- (c) Possibly results in Russian intervention on a unilateral basis.
- (d) Exposes the United States to possible curtailment of air base rights and commercial concessions including oil, and to a lesser degree to drastic curtailment of US trade in the area.

d. Alter our previous policy of support for partition and seek another solution to the problem.

This course of action would call for a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider the situation. Abandoning US support of partition as impracticable and unworkable in view of the demonstrated inability of the people of Palestine to assume the responsibilities of self-government, and in view of the report of the Palestine Commission that outside military forces would be required, the United States would, under this course of action, attempt to seek a constructive solution of the problem.

As a first step in this direction the United States would seek to have the Security Council explore other avenues of a peaceful settlement when the Palestine case comes up for its consideration. Specifically the United States would endeavor to bring about conciliation of the problem. The United States would propose that

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(2) Disadvantages.

(a) Leads to continued deterioration of Arab relations with the United States with the attendant risks enumerated in paragraph 13 a(2)(a).

(b) Permits further exploitation of the interests of world Zionism by the USSR.

(c) Entails further loss of life while waiting for a conclusive demonstration that outside force will be required to preserve law and order within Palestine.

(d) Encourages the Arabs within Palestine to increase their resistance by all available means.

(e) In the event of implementation of partition, provides a vehicle for Soviet expansion into an area vital to our interests.

(f) Threatens the success of the European Recovery Program, which is dependent on increased production of Middle East oil.

c. Adopt a passive or neutral role, taking no further steps to aid or implement partition.

This course of action would involve maintenance and enforcement of the present United States embargo on arms to Palestine and the neighboring countries. The United States would give no unilateral assistance to either the proposed Jewish or Arab States financially, militarily or otherwise, and insofar as possible, the United States would require an attitude of neutrality to be observed by all persons or organizations under US jurisdiction. The United States would oppose sending armed forces into Palestine by the United Nations or any member thereof for the purpose of implementing partition, and would oppose the recruitment of volunteers for this purpose.

Such a course of action would rest on the assumption that implementation of the General Assembly resolution was a collective responsibility of the United

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Nations and that no leadership in the matter devolved upon the United States. The United States would take the position that the UN machinery created by the partition plan should handle the question of implementation, and that the five-man Palestine Commission should proceed with the task entrusted to it of taking over control from the British. The United States would leave it to the peoples in Palestine to give effect to the General Assembly resolution.

(1) Advantages.

(a) Maintains United Nations and United States policy constant in the eyes of the world.

(b) Avoids employment of US troops in Palestine.

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support the General Assembly recommendations until such time as a new situation is created by:

(1) The inability to obtain a sufficient majority in one or more of the principal organs of the United Nations, or

(2) The development of a situation within Palestine which clearly substantiates the view of the UN Palestine Commission that outside force would be essential to carry the Partition Plan into effect.

The United States representative in the Security Council should not attempt to influence the vote of any other member of the Security Council. If no majority exists in the Security Council in support of partition, the Security Council might then recommend that a special session of the General Assembly be called to reconsider the Partition Plan. It would be essential for the United States to have in readiness for such a special session an alternative plan for Palestine which we would be willing to support,

(1) Advantages.

(a) Maintains the announced policy of the United States with respect to Palestine so long as such policy appears to have any reasonable opportunity for implementation.

(b) Retains the responsibility for consideration of the Palestine question within the framework of the United Nations, distributes the responsibility throughout the UN membership, and prevents it from becoming still further a matter of United States responsibility.

(c) Assures a certain amount of political support from elements in the major political parties within the United States.

(d) Contributes to the settlement of the displaced Jews of Europe.

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while working for such conciliation or arbitration, a special session of the General Assembly be called to consider a new solution in the form of

- (1) An international trusteeship or
- (2) A federal state,

with provision for Jewish immigration in either case, and preferably excluding the use of either US or USSR troops.

A trusteeship could take one of several forms; a three-power trusteeship of the US, UK and France, and joint US-UK trusteeship either with or without some of the smaller states, or a general UN trusteeship with the Trusteeship Council as administering authority. Alternatively, a federal state with cantonization, a plan which the British originally favored as having the greatest chance of success, could be discussed.

(1) Advantages.

(a) Assists in preventing Communist expansion into the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

(b) Improves our strategic position in the Middle East, thereby enhancing our overall national security.

(c) Opens the way for restorations of US friendship and influence in the Arab world.

(d) Opens the way for a solution to the Palestine problem more acceptable to the people of Palestine.


(e) Lessens probability of use of US military forces in combat in Palestine.

(f) Protects our philanthropic and educational interests, investments and oil interests.

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(2) Disadvantages.

- (a) Produces violent Zionist opposition.
- (b) Gives Russia and its Communist satellites a sounding board for further vitriolic vituperations.
- (c) Requires the General Assembly to find another solution for the Palestine question without any present assurance of success.

CONCLUSIONS

14. Any solution of the Palestine problem which invites direct Soviet participation in administration, policing, or military operations in Palestine is a danger to the security of the United States.

15. Any solution of the Palestine problem which results in the continued hostility of the Arab world toward the United States will bring about conditions which endanger the security of the United States.

16. The US should continue support for the Partition Plan in the UN by all measures short of the use of outside armed force to impose the Plan upon the people of Palestine.

(The military members of the Staff do not concur in the above conclusion and offer the following as a substitute)

The United States should alter its previous policy of support for partition and seek another solution to the problem. In so doing, United States should propose that, in view of the changed conditions as set forth in the Analysis, the UN Security Council request that a special session of the General Assembly be convoked to reconsider the Palestine problem.

17. The United States should urge the Government of the United Kingdom to continue to exercise its mandate over Palestine in the event of reconsideration of the Palestine problem by the General Assembly. The United

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D)

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TOP-SECRET

State Dept. Ltr. 1-18-73

Signature

2-20-73
Date

B. E. H.

[TYPED COPY]

States should also support a resolution by the UN Security Council requesting the UK to take this action.

18. In the event of reconsideration of the Palestine problem by the General Assembly, the United States should propose the creation of a trusteeship in Palestine with the UN Trusteeship Council as the administering authority. If necessary, this proposal should include provision for an international force to maintain internal order during a transitional period.


19. The United States should oppose dispatch of armed forces to Palestine for the purpose of enforcing the Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, against the objections of the inhabitants of Palestine.

20. The United States should immediately urge all Arab states to refrain from any act of aggression against Palestine.

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E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E) and 5(D)

State Dept. Ltr. 1-18-73


Signature

2-20-73
Date

B File

B File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 21, 1946.

Memo for Honorable Clark Clifford:

If you do see Bart Crum I
hope you will have read this letter
signed by Bart Crum and Paul O'Dwyer.
O'Dwyer is Mayor O'Dwyers's brother.



DAVID K. NILES
Administrative Assistant
to the President

B. File

November 29th Resolution which are not acceptable to the State of Israel. I am confident that the General Assembly will support us in this basic position.

We have already expressed our willingness to help develop the new State through financial and economic measures. As you know, the Export-Import Bank is actively considering a substantial long-term loan to Israel on a project basis. I understand that your Government is now in process of preparing the details of such projects for submission to the Bank. Personally, I would like to go even further, by expanding such financial and economic assistance on a large scale to the entire Middle East, contingent upon effective mutual cooperation.

Thank you so much for your warm congratulations and good wishes on my re-election. I was pleased to learn that the first Israeli elections have been scheduled for January 25th. That enables us to set a definite target date for extending de jure recognition.

In closing, I want to tell you how happy and impressed I have been at the remarkable progress made by the new State of Israel. What you have received at the hands of the world has been far less than was your due. But you have more than made the most of what you have received, and I admire you for it. I trust that the present uncertainty, with its terribly burdensome consequences, will soon be eliminated. We will do all we can to help by encouraging direct negotiations between the parties looking toward a prompt peace settlement.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable Chaim Weizmann,
President,
State of Israel,
Rehovoth, Israel.

November 29, 1948.

Personal and ~~Confidential~~

Dear Mr. President:

Today — the first anniversary of the Partition Resolution — is a most appropriate time for me to answer your last letter, dated November 5th.

As I read your letter, I was struck by the common experience you and I have recently shared. We had both been abandoned by the so-called realistic experts to our supposedly forlorn lost causes. Yet we both kept pressing for what we were sure was right — and we were both proven to be right. My feeling of elation on the morning of November 3rd must have approximated your own feelings one year ago today, and on May 14th, and on several occasions since then.

However, it does not take long for bitter and resourceful opponents to regroup their forces after they have been shattered. You in Israel have already been confronted with that situation; and I expect to be all too soon. So I understand very well your concern to prevent the undermining of your well-earned victories.

I remember well our conversation about the Negev, to which you referred in your letter. I agree fully with your estimate of the importance of that area to Israel, and I deplore any attempt to take it away from Israel. I had thought that my position would have been clear to all the world, particularly in the light of the specific wording of the Democratic Party Platform. But there were those who did not take this seriously, regarding it as "just another campaign promise" to be forgotten after the election. I believe they have recently realized their error. I have interpreted my re-election as a mandate from the American people to carry out the Democratic Platform — including, of course, the plank on Israel. I intend to do so.

Since your letter was written, we have announced in the General Assembly our firm intention to oppose any territorial changes in the

B. Fi
BIF

Barth

O'DWYER & BERNSTIEN

40 WALL STREET
NEW YORK 5

TELEPHONE BOWLING GREEN 9-3939

June 10th, 1948.

PAUL O'DWYER
OSCAR BERNSTIEN
HYMAN L. GOLDBSTEIN
THOMAS G. MORGAN
ANTHONY E. SACCO

The President of the United States
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

The Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 29, 1947 for partition with economic union for Palestine was supported by the United States because it provided the most equitable solution for Palestine in view of the sharp tension between the Jewish people and the Arab peoples living there, created in no small measure by Britain as Mandatory.

That Resolution is still valid. It is still the only practicable compromise solution bringing a measure of justice to all the inhabitants of Palestine. Its fulfillment insofar as the Jewish people are concerned, was advanced by the establishment on May 15, 1948, of the Jewish state provided for therein. The Arab state, giving Palestinian Arabs equal independence, as well as the international regime for Jerusalem, are yet to be established. They await the withdrawal from Palestine of foreign Arab armies invading the country to divide it amongst themselves.

The actions of Arab states have violated the Resolution and the United Nations Charter itself.

Our Government must shoulder much of the responsibility for the present state of events in Palestine because of its failure in the period between February 18, 1948 and May 15, 1948 to take the necessary steps to implement the Resolution, and especially because of our imposition of an arms embargo on December 7, 1947.

Britain also, by its obstructionist tactics toward and refusal to cooperate with the United Nations Commission, by arming and training Arab troops, by violating its pledges to withdraw the Arab Legion by May 15, 1948, and by opposing the "cease fire" proposal of May 24, 1948, stands condemned as the chief instigator of the breach of peace that has occurred in Palestine. Britain's efforts to justify the invasion by Trans-Jordan are particularly shocking. When United States delegate Herschel Johnson, in August 1947 in connection with Greece, defined a threat to the peace as "giving support to armed bands.....and going into the territory of another state.....", (U.N. Weekly Bulletin - August 5, 1947) Britain gave full approval and support to the definition. Yet, Bevin, when asked if he considered Trans-Jordan's participation in the Palestine fighting an act of aggression, cynically replied "Certainly not. She has been invited to go into the territory by her fellow Arabs." (N.Y. Post - June 2, 1948)

June 10th, 1948.
Page 2.

Even Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations, found it necessary to warn Bevin that Britain's policy toward Palestine "might destroy the United Nations", and that in his opinion, "Britain could do much to end the war in the Holy Land".

The State of Israel, recognized now by ten nations, is a fact. Its continued existence as a sovereign and independent nation must not be interfered with or infringed upon.

Support for Israel strengthens the United Nations and restores the hope of the world that it will continue to be a world force for peace and justice, whose decisions cannot be set aside by aggression.

Arab rejection of the "cease fire" order of May 24, 1948 brought further appeasement of aggression in the form of Britain's truce proposal of May 29, 1948 instead of punitive action by the Security Council. This truce proposal was but one further step by Britain in its support of Arab aggression against Israel and Arab violation of the United Nations Charter. Small wonder then, as reported in the New York Times, that the Arab states were "delighted" by the proposal. (May 29, 1948)

We set forth without comment the following from the New York Times: "Complete silence on Israel's acceptance of the truce proposal was maintained by the United States delegation whose lack of expressed opposition to the British "cease fire" resolution was one of the key factors in the approval of it by the Security Council last Saturday." (June 2, 1948)

The British truce proposal, although adopted by the Council in a modified form on May 29, 1948 and accepted by Israel on June 1, 1948, must be condemned. It treats equally Arab aggressors and Israeli defenders. It permits Arab aggressors to maintain military positions achieved as a direct result of their aggression, yet it limits Israel in its efforts to secure the arms needed to repel these aggressive acts. The truce freezes the initial advantage in military equipment enjoyed by the Arabs, created in great part by our own arms embargo and the constant flow of arms to the Arabs from Britain.

In the very act of acceptance of the truce proposal, the Arab states committed a further threat to the peace by coupling their acceptance with a specific refusal to respect the independence and integrity of Israel. For they openly declared that at the end of the truce period aggression will commence again and that the peace will be ended unless Israel's independence is terminated. "We will never under any circumstances accept a Jewish state", declared Abdullah on June 2, 1948. The King of Egypt made a similar statement, while Jemal El Hussein, cousin of the Mufti and Vice-Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee stated bluntly at Lake Success that the truce would "only delay matters one month" unless Israel agreed to dissolve. "We will fight against the existence of the Jewish state and we will

B File

June 10th, 1948.
Page 3.

not waiver in this fight", he declared. (New York Post - June 2, 1948)

The Security Council must, therefore, take immediate steps to determine the specific non-military sanctions under the Charter it will invoke against the Arabs if they break the truce or resort to warlike measures again at the expiration of the truce. The Council must call upon all member nations to adhere to these measures. The Council will thus be ready to act at once. Failure to do this now opens the door to more delay and more encouragement to aggressors. These non-military sanctions provided for in Article 41 of the Charter, include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of railroad, sea, air, coastal, telegraphic, radio or other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

That Trans-Jordan is not a member of the United Nations organization does not free it from the consequences of its acts, nor exempt it from Security Council action. Article 2, paragraph 6 of the Charter provides that "the organization shall ensure that states which are not member states of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of the peace and security." Ambassador Austin took the same position in June, 1947, in connection with the Balkan report: "The Council must treat alike all states using force against the territorial integrity of another - whether they are members of the United Nations or not."

We must be alert that the truce is not used in an attempt again to weaken or abandon the Partition Resolution, or to substitute for it any trusteeship, federalization or cantonization proposal that would destroy the existence of Israel as an independent state.

The record of the United States on Palestine is good in words but not in deeds.

Arms are still being withheld from Israel.

No effective measures are being taken to prevent passengers from being taken off and cargoes from being confiscated from American ships.

It is time for us to act as well as to speak in support of the United Nations and Israel. Therefore, we call upon our President, our State Department, our Congress and our Delegation to the United Nations immediately to do the following:

- a) Accord de jure recognition of Israel, enter into diplomatic relations with it, and extend economic assistance to it.

B File

June 10th, 1948
Page 4.

- b) Take appropriate action against Lebanon and Egypt in respect to their acts against American ships, cargoes and passengers in violation of international law.
- c) Discipline those officials of the executive departments of the United States Government who have endeavored to frustrate the United Nations Resolution of November 29, 1947.
- d) That Congress immediately investigate the extent to which American funds have facilitated British action in arming and financing Arab aggressors, and take measures to prevent any further economic aid from the United States to Britain from being so used.
- e) That our Delegation to the United Nations move in the Security Council the immediate adoption of non-military sanctions, to be applied at once in the event of further aggression against Israel.

Very truly yours,

LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE IN PALESTINE

Bartley Crum
Bartley Crum
National Chairman




Paul O'Dwyer
Paul O'Dwyer
New York City Chairman

B. File

B. File


PALESTINE SITUATION - 11 JUNE 1948
(On effective date of U.N. cease-fire order)

PALESTINE

-  Jewish held areas
-  Jewish controlled area
-  Jewish area (as accepted by U. N. General Assembly, November 1947)

CONFIDENTIAL

-  Partition Boundary (as accepted by the United Nations General Assembly, Nov. 1947)
-  International Boundary
-  District Boundary
-  Standard Gauge Railroad 1000-1
-  Narrow Gauge Railroad 1000-1
-  First Class Road
-  Second Class Road
-  Oil Pipe Line
-  International Stream
-  Jewish Controlled Area



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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 3(d) or (e)
Date of Review: August 1993
By: NARS Date: 11/1/93

B File

June 15, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: United States Government Representation
in Palestine.

Reference is made to the Department's memorandum of May 27, 1948 in which the following recommendations were made:

"A Mission of the United States should be established in the capital of the new state of Israel for the purpose of performing political and consular functions. It is believed that Tel Aviv or a suburb of that city will be selected as the capital by the Provisional Government of Israel. This Mission should be headed by a Special Representative of the United States.

"Approval should be given to the establishment of a Mission of the Provisional Government of Israel in Washington, headed by a Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel. The United States should agree to the designation, by the Provisional Government of Israel, of Mr. Eliahu Epstein as Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel in the United States."

These recommendations were approved by you on May 27, 1948.

On June 7, 1948 the Department was informed that the Provisional Government of Israel accepts the proposed arrangement ad interim in the confident expectation that an exchange of legations and envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary will follow without undue delay.

Pending the selection and appointment of a special representative to head the Mission of the United States


in Israel

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in Israel the Department proposes to establish its Mission in Tel Aviv or a suburb of Tel Aviv and will provide the necessary personnel. The Department has assigned Mr. Charles Frederick Knox, Jr., an American Foreign Service Officer, to the staff of its Mission and is assigning him as Acting Special Representative pending the selection and appointment of a Special Representative.

There is attached a copy of a press release which the Department of State plans to issue announcing the substance of the foregoing.

It would be appreciated if you will approve this procedure.



DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 1(E) and 1(D) or (G)
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973
By NLT-14 . NARS Date 1-16-76

Attachment:

Proposed Press Release

B File

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R E F

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS RELEASE

Agreement was reached, as of June 7, 1948, between the Government of the United States and the Provisional Government of Israel on the establishment of a Mission of the United States in Israel and a Mission of the Provisional Government of Israel in the United States. Agreement was also reached on the exchange of special representatives.

Mr. Eliahu Epstein has been designated by the Provisional Government of Israel as its Special Representative in the United States heading the Mission of the Provisional Government of Israel in this country. Mr. Charles Frederick Knox, Jr., an American Foreign Service Officer, has been assigned Acting Special Representative of the United States, temporarily heading the Mission of the United States in Israel.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (G)

Dir. of State letter, 7-15-73

By NLT, me, NARS Date 6-26-75

B File

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May 7, 1948



Mr. George C. Marshall
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Marshall:

I apologize for troubling you again in an attempt to clear up what seems to be a persistent misunderstanding. I gather that reports are still circulating both in the State Department and in the White House to the effect that I had agreed to conditions for a military truce and political standstill in Palestine informally proposed by representatives of the United States Delegation. In my letter to you of April 29, I took the opportunity to point out that this was not the case. Indeed, I must emphasize that I had indicated all along that the provision for deferring the proclamation of a sovereign state was a major obstacle, particularly if it were interpreted as precluding the coming into existence of a provisional government for the area of the Jewish State.

It was my sincere desire to explore all avenues for an acceptable truce consonant with the preservation of essential Jewish interests. The fact, however, that with this in view, I continued to take part in the informal conversations, could not be interpreted as implying acceptance of the scheme proposed. There were some provisions to which I did not raise serious objection; but there were others to which I took strong exception; and I repeatedly indicated that the decision on the proposal as a whole would have to be taken in Palestine.

Our contacts with Palestine have unfortunately been very irregular, and in response to an urgent call from the Jewish Agency Executive there I am flying to Palestine for consultation. As things stand, I see no prospect of an agreement which would preclude the setting up of a Provisional Government for the Jewish State or entail the prolongation of British rule.

I know that individual Jews who have been in touch with the State Department or the President recently, have differed from the line taken by the Jewish Agency in this matter. All I can say is that while those concerned are perfectly entitled to their own private views, they do not represent the Jewish people of Palestine, they bear no constitutional responsibility for its future, and they are not in a position to give effect to the policy which they advocate.

At the same time, I must make it clear that it would be utterly wrong to impute to the Jewish Agency a refusal to enter into a truce arrangement. From the moment when, at the instance of the Mufti, the disturbances broke out, we declared repeatedly that we are ready to accept an immediate cease fire throughout Palestine provided the Arabs do likewise. We are likewise ready to negotiate a more comprehensive truce agreement, on the understanding that it would not jeopardize fundamental Jewish rights and place us, in relation to our defense preparedness, at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Arabs.

I regret to have had again to obtrude on your time, but I felt obliged, in the interest of truth and clarity, to write you this letter.

Faithfully yours,

Moshe Shertok

BB1 file

Submarine Base, Key West, Florida
February 27, 1948

Dear Eddie:

Your telegram reached me after I had arrived in Florida. I was very sorry that I did not have a chance to see Dr. Weizmann, but there were just too many things to be finished up in Washington before I left there. My schedule was so very crowded that I simply couldn't get him in. There wasn't anything he could say to me that I didn't already know, anyway. I had also made it a policy not to talk with anyone regarding the Palestine situation until the Security Council of the United Nations has had a chance to act on our suggestion for a police force to enforce partitioning.

The situation has been a headache to me for two and a half years. The Jews are so emotional, and the Arabs are so difficult to talk with that it is almost impossible to get anything done. The British, of course, have been exceedingly noncooperative in arriving at a conclusion. The Zionists, of course, have expected a big stick approach on our part, and naturally have been disappointed when we can't do that.

I hope it will work out all right, but I have about come to the conclusion that the situation is not solvable as presently set up; but I shall continue to try to get the solution outlined in the United Nations resolution.

I hope everything is going well with you.

Sincerely yours,



Mr. Edward Jacobson
39th and Main Streets
Kansas City, Missouri

B File

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (F)
Dep't. of State letter, July 25, 1983
By NET. HCN, NARS Date 26.7.85

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

August 16, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Representations to Provisional Government of Israel
Regarding Maintenance of Peace in Palestine.

Information from a wide number of sources causes the Department increasing concern over the apparent tendency of the Provisional Government of Israel to assume a more aggressive attitude in Palestine.

Following the termination of the British mandate on May 15 and the establishment of a Jewish State, the Israeli authorities were quick to respond to United Nations efforts to stop the fighting in Palestine. After the termination of this four-week truce on July 9, hostilities were resumed and it soon became apparent that Israel had materially improved its military position during the period of the earlier truce. Nevertheless, both the Government of Israel and the Arab States agreed to accept the Security Council's order of July 15 for a cease-fire and truce of indefinite duration in Palestine. The demilitarization of Jerusalem was included in the Security Council's resolution and was accepted by the Government of Israel and the Arab States in principle. In recent weeks, however, a new and aggressive note has become manifest, and the readiness of Israel to maintain the truce has become subject to doubt.

The Department has noted evidence of hostility of Israelis in Palestine toward the military observers serving under Count Bernadotte; the inflammatory speeches of the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr. Shertok, with regard to alleged "rights" of Israel in Jerusalem; the military occupation by Israel of much of the Jerusalem area; and the refusal of the Israeli military governor in Jerusalem to cooperate with Count Bernadotte in discussions regarding the demilitarization of Jerusalem. The Department has likewise noted increasing evidence of systematic violations of the United Nations truce by the forces of Israel, including forward movement of Israeli forces from agreed truce positions, continued sniping and firing against Arab positions; and conclusive evidence of the organized transport of arms shipments to Palestine from France, Italy and Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the Israeli Foreign Minister has officially proclaimed that Israel will not accept, pending

negotiation

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- 2 -

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (G)

Dept. of State letter, 2-15-75

By NLT/LL, NARS Date 2-26-75

negotiation of a final peace settlement, the return of the approximately 300,000 Arab inhabitants of that part of Palestine now comprising the Jewish State who fled from their homes and are now destitute in nearby Arab areas.

The Foreign Minister of Great Britain, in a conversation with our Ambassador on August 6, expressed grave concern over the situation in Palestine. He was fearful not only that the USSR would take advantage of this situation to foment trouble in Iraq and Iran but also that within "the next few days" the Jews, on grounds of some Arab provocation, real or manufactured, would reopen their offensive with the objective of seizing more territory - probably Transjordan. Mr. Bevin thought that the Palestine situation was as serious as Berlin. "If the United States and United Kingdom go slack (in Palestine), we lose."

The Department, in light of these developments, feels that it would be wise to call in Mr. Eliahu Epstein, the Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel, and discuss frankly our concern with him. We would tell Mr. Epstein that, as he undoubtedly knows, the United States is the best friend of Israel. We have recognized that State and desire to see it continue in existence and prosper as a peaceful member of the community of nations. We have now before us the question of de jure recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel, support for Israel's membership in the United Nations, and the application from Israel for a loan from the Export-Import Bank. We should like to see all these matters arranged in a manner satisfactory to both governments but we should find it exceedingly difficult, for example, to advocate a loan to Israel if that country is likely to resume hostilities. Similar difficulties would arise concerning membership in the United Nations.

As a friend of Israel we deem it of paramount importance that this new republic not place itself before the bar of world opinion and the United Nations in the role of an aggressor. We should like to tell Mr. Epstein for the information of his government that we shall be not less zealous in the Security Council to oppose aggression from the Israeli side as we were when the attack was launched by the Arab side.

From the wider political aspect and not for the information of Mr. Epstein, it is obvious that it would be most injurious to the interests of the United States if hostilities should be opened by Israel against Transjordan with the result that the United Kingdom would automatically honor its commitments to Transjordan under its existing treaty with that country. This would bring forth an outcry in the United States for the lifting of our arms embargo in favor of Israel,

with the

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
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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Dept. of State letter, July 15, 1975By NLT 66, NARS Date 8-26-75

with the result that the two great Anglo-Saxon partners would be supplying and aiding two little states on the opposite sides of a serious war, from which only the Soviet Union could profit.

With your concurrence the Under Secretary of State proposes immediately to discuss these matters with Mr. Epstein.



B File

This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the ^{provisional} Government thereof.

The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new ^{State of} ~~country~~ *of*

~~State of~~ *Israel*



Harry Truman

*Approved
May 14, 1948.*



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CLARK CLIFORD



WHITE HOUSE

WE ARE RELIABLY INFORMED FROM PARIS THAT SECRETARY MARSHALL
APPROVED BERNADOTTE PLAN WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT.
NATURALLY WE ARE NOT MAKING ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT THIS EFFECT.
BUT I DO SAY TO YOU THAT MARSHALL IS DOING PRESIDENT MORE HARM
THAN ANYTHING I CAN THINK OF. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU
ON YOUR RETURN TO WASHINGTON. WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS

BART CRUM. (NEW YORK STAR)

B

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LESLIE REYNOLDS

DAVID

COPY

June 19, 1948

The Hon. Harry S. Truman
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Among the most shocking aspects of the developments with respect to the Palestine question have been the repeated indications of the desire of the Near Eastern Division of the State Department to defeat your policy on this question and to make as its own the vicious policy of Foreign Minister Bevin of Great Britain.

Within the last few days there has come into our possession conclusive evidence that the State Department position has been inspired by the oil companies, and that there is active collusion among the oil companies, the State Department, and Great Britain. This collusion has taken the form of an attack upon you to the heads of the Arab states by James Terry Duce, Vice President of Aramco, insistence to them that your Middle Eastern experts oppose partition, and assurances to them that the partition decision will not be allowed to stand; and perhaps most important of all, that American dollars can be used to finance the war on the Jews.

All of this is made clear in a report submitted by Mr. Duce to the head of the Arabian American Oil Company. This report has become the Bible of our State and Defense Departments despite the very clear indication that oil concessions are not in jeopardy.

A copy of the Memorandum is enclosed and I hope that you will think it of sufficient importance to read.

Since receiving this documentary evidence we have further come into possession of the following information which comes from an unchallengeable source. The new British Ambassador to the United States has expressed himself within the last few days as being greatly disturbed by the extent of American resentment of Britain's policy on Palestine.

B. F.

At the same time, however, he has expressed his complete satisfaction with the cooperation of the State Department -- cooperation with respect to demanding and securing a shrinkage of the area of the Jewish state. Ambassador Franks, according to our information, says that while there is no formal agreement with the State Department, there is a general understanding with respect to the necessity of, and the nature of, the boundary revisions. The boundary revisions which the British seek are the detachment of the Negev from the Jewish state, to be ceded to the Arabs; the turning over of Jerusalem, scheduled to be an international enclave, to the Arab state; port rights in Haifa for the Arab state; another outlet to the sea for the Arab state. The intention is to proclaim Abdullah the ruler of such an enlarged Arab state.

The British explain that the ceding of territory is necessary in order to save the face of the Arab states. In other words, aggressors, who have suffered a military defeat, are to be rewarded with a political victory. It is to this plan in its major outlines that Mr. Henderson has given his consent.

It is inconceivable that you are aware of this policy or that it could meet with your approval.

We believe that the time has come to denounce those who are responsible for subverting your policy, and to take such other action as will demonstrate before the world that neither the State Department nor the British Foreign Office are running the affairs of the American government. If I may take the liberty of suggesting it, it would seem to me that such action might take the form:

- 1) Of the immediate de jure recognition of the state of Israel within the boundaries of the November 29 resolution.
- 2) Of the granting of a loan to that state.
- 3) Of assistance in the arming of the military forces of Israel as part of the normal conduct of our relations with a friendly state.

If such action is within your contemplation, Mr. President, may I urge that it be forthcoming now without delay?

Sincerely yours,

Freda Kirchwey
President

B

THE W
DA & ABRAHAM
REMOVED

COPY OF ~~XXXXX~~ CABLE SENT BY ~~XXXXXX~~
ELIAHU EPSTEIN TO MOSHE SHEROK

May 14, 1948 MAY 14, 1948

SHEROK
JEWAGENCY
TELAVIV

ONE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS JUST RECOGNIZED STATE IN FOLLOWING LANGUAGE
QUOTE THIS GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT A JEWISH STATE HAS BEEN PROCLAIMED IN
PALESTINE AND RECOGNITION HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT THEREOF.
THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AS THE DEFACTO AUTHORITY
OF THE NEW STATE OF ISRAEL UNQUOTE

TWO, FORMAL CONVERSATIONS WITH WHITE HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT
RECOGNITION DEFACTO RATHER THAN DEJURE BECAUSE ANNOUNCED GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL
IN NATURE.

THREE, SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES ARE AS FOLLOWS: CLARK CLIFFORD WHITE HOUSE
SPOKESMAN TELEPHONED WASHINGTON FRIENDS ADVISING THAT STATE DEPARTMENT ~~WAS~~
AT NOON FOURTEEN MAY AGREE IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION IN EVENT PROMPT REQUEST THEREFOR
RECEIVED. AFTER CAREFUL CONSULTATION HERE WITH BEN COHEN, GINZBERG, FOLLOWING
LETTER DRAFTED AND SENT TO PRESIDENT AND TO SECRETARY OF STATE

(THE ENTIRE LETTER FROM DR. WEIZMANN WAS THEN QUOTED)

FOUR, WHILE CONSULTATION AND PRIOR NOTIFICATION PRECLUDED BY PLEDGE OF SECRECY
DEMANDED BY CLIFFORD.

FIVE, EARLIER DURING DAY HENDERSON TELEPHONED TO ASCERTAIN BOUNDARIES OF NEW
STATE. ADVISED THAT BOUNDARIES IN ACCORD UN RESOLUTION.

SIX, CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED THAT I TAKE TITLE FOR THIS ACT ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY
FOR SENDING LETTER.

EPSTEIN

B

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

August 3, 1948

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

*Polistiner
File*

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to express to you my deepest gratitude for the support which you have given to the establishment of the State of Israel. Without your support and friendship to the Jewish people, the re-establishment of the independent Jewish State - the dream and hope of countless generations - would not have been realized today.

I have the honor to draw your attention to the following pledges contained in the Israel plank of our Party's platform, adopted at the recent National Convention of the Democratic Party:

"President Truman, by granting immediate recognition to Israel, led the world in extending friendship and welcome to a people who have long sought and justly deserved freedom and independence. We favor full recognition of the State of Israel.

"We affirm our pride, too, that the United States, under the leadership of President Truman, played a leading role in the adoption of the Resolution of November 29, 1947 by the United Nations General Assembly for the creation of a Jewish State.

"We approve the claims of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations Resolution of November 29 and consider that modification thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel.

"We look forward to the admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations and its full participation in the international community of nations.

"We pledge appropriate aid to the State of Israel in developing its economy and resources.

"We favor the revision of the arms embargo to accord to the State of Israel the right of self-defense. We pledge ourselves to work for the modification of any Resolution of the United Nations to the extent that it may prevent any such revision.

B. File

"We continue to support within the framework of the United Nations the internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of the holy places of Palestine."

You will have noted that the objectives of this plank are also supported by the platform of the Republican Party.

The subject of Palestine, falling as it does within the field of foreign relations, is one in which the President is generally free to act on his own, without need for specific action by Congress. In view of the urgent need of the newly created State of Israel for the measures of support pledged in our platform, I hope that you will make a special effort to achieve without delay the objectives pledged by the Democratic Party. Knowing that public sentiment, as formulated in the platforms of both major political parties, would be behind you, and that all constitutional means for action are in your hands, I hope that you will give immediate implementation to the pledges contained in the Democratic platform on Palestine.

Two of the pledges contained in our Party's Palestine plank are particularly significant in that they are capable of immediate fulfillment:

- (1) The pledge of full (de jure) recognition to the State of Israel, and
- (2) The pledge of appropriate aid to the State of Israel in developing its economy and resources.

I am enclosing a legal memorandum entitled "De Facto and De Jure Recognition of Israel" in support of my contention that our Government has the power to accord immediate full (de jure) recognition to "the Provisional Government of the State of Israel."

To date, the following nations have accorded full (de jure) recognition to the Provisional Government of the State of Israel: Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Finland, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Rumania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.

I was very happy with your appointment of Dr. James G. MacDonald to serve as Special Representative of the United States of America to head the mission of the U.S.A. in Israel. It would have been more appropriate, however, if you had appointed Dr. MacDonald as a Minister to the State of Israel, enjoying all the prerogatives and rank which go with that office. The title of Special Representative rather than Minister does not accord to the United States Representative to the State of Israel the rank and status which a United States diplomatic representative should command. Why should Dr. MacDonald not enjoy at least the same rank to which the diplomatic representatives of other countries have been named? If the United States would accord full (de jure) recognition to the Provisional Government of the State of Israel, then Dr. MacDonald could be

B. E. H.

appointed as a Minister, a Legation could be established in Israel, treaties of commerce and trade, etc. could be negotiated between the Governments of the United States and the State of Israel. I hope that our Government will accord full (de jure) recognition to the Provisional Government of the State of Israel without delay.

I am informed that the Provisional Government of the State of Israel, through its Special Representative in the United States, Mr. Eliahu Epstein, has applied to the Export-Import Bank in May 1948 for a loan of 100 million dollars; that there have been several informal conferences between the representatives of the Provisional Government of the State of Israel and the Export-Import Bank; that the Export-Import Bank is willing to approve the loan from an economic point of view; and that action on the application for the loan now awaits the approval of the Department of State and the President. I am also informed that Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the State of Israel, had discussed this loan with you and that your reaction was most favorable. It is my understanding that the monies will be spent in the United States for agricultural machinery, fertilizer, industrial and other necessary materials.

The State of Israel is in need of American support. Israel is utilizing all its resources in order to establish its State on a firm democratic foundation. Its economy must be reorganized, developed, and expanded. Israel is absorbing weekly thousands of Jewish displaced persons from Europe and elsewhere.

The American Army in Germany is now feeding countless displaced persons - tens of thousands of Jewish displaced persons among them. These Jewish displaced persons wish to go to Israel. America has done much for these victims of Hitlerism. By helping to resettle the Jewish displaced persons in Israel, the American Government would be relieved of the burden of maintaining them in displaced persons camps, and would thus actually save the American taxpayer millions of dollars.

It would be very much appreciated and very helpful if our Delegates to the United Nations Conference to be held in Paris this year could be instructed to take the leadership in the Security Council in proposing immediately the admission of the State of Israel to membership in the United Nations and to use our best efforts to secure Israel's admission at the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly.

In view of the fact that both our Party and the Republican Party pledged appropriate aid to the State of Israel in developing its economy and resources, I hope you will do everything within your power to see that the Export-Import Bank loan is granted immediately. Such a loan would not only be a great act of humanitarianism but would also be in line with the best American tradition.

Respectfully yours,

B. File

Loj Bloom

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1. There are several instances in the last few decades in which the United States has recognized a provisional government without waiting upon elections or upon the establishment of a permanent government:

(a) Russia after the Revolution when we recognized the "Provisional Government" established by Kerensky. Full recognition was granted -- despite the fact that the government itself was de facto in character, weak and later overthrown by the Soviet authorities. See I Hackworth 135-136.

(b) Poland after the recent war. The Potsdam Declaration specifically indicates that recognition was granted by Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States to the "Polish Provisional Government of National Unity." The interesting thing here is that recognition was unqualified at a time when future elections were contemplated and Poland's borders remained to be delimited.

(c) France after liberation. We unqualifiedly recognized the "Provisional Government of the French Republic", although it was understood that elections remained to be held and a new constitution framed and adopted.

2. There would seem to be no reason or warrant for making the nature of our recognition -- de facto or de jure -- turn on whether the particular government is provisional or final. What a new sovereignty chooses to call its government -- whether it decides to regard it as provisional or otherwise -- is irrelevant from the viewpoint of another country which must determine whether or not to recognize that government. The Provisional Government of Israel is the legal, de jure government of that country, and what procedure the Israelis choose to follow before drafting a constitution, establishing a permanent government, etc. has no bearing whatever on the issues before the United States.

3. The United States is properly concerned with matters such as these: Whether in fact the Israeli government is in possession of the machinery of the state; whether it governs with the assent of the people; whether it can fulfill its international obligations. But assuming these tests are met -- and so far as I am aware no one has denied that Israel can meet these tests -- to withhold full or so-called de jure recognition because the Israelis happen to have described their own government as provisional is an act of political expediency not law.

4. American history offers illustrations where appropriate use has been made of limited recognition. For example, in the case of various South American republics established by revolution; where power has been transferred from one to another group and where the authority of the government in power is under obvious challenge -- de facto recognition may be appropriate. But certainly no one in the State Department has yet suggested that the "Provisional Government of Israel" does not fairly meet the historical tests of recognition. What appears to have happened is that those who were loath to recognize Israel seized on the word "Provisional" in the title of the government and then developed a legalistic thesis that since the government was "provisional", American recognition would only be "de facto." From the viewpoint of reason and precedent this is an absurd non sequitur.

B3 File 1

November 29, 1946.

Personal and Confidential

Dear Mr. President:

Today -- the first anniversary of the Partition Resolution -- is a most appropriate time for me to answer your last letter, dated November 5th.

As I read your letter, I was struck by the common experience you and I have recently shared. We had both been abandoned by the so-called realistic experts to our supposedly forlorn lost causes. Yet we both kept pressing for what we were sure was right -- and we were both proven to be right. My feeling of elation on the morning of November 3rd must have approximated your own feelings one year ago today, on May 14th, and on several occasions since then.

However, it does not take long for bitter and resourceful opponents to regroup their forces after they have been shattered. You in Israel have already been confronted with that situation; and I expect to be all too soon. So I understand very well your concern to prevent the undermining of your well-earned victories.

I remember well our conversation about the Negev, to which you referred in your letter. I agree fully with your estimate of the importance of that area to Israel, and I deplore any attempt to take it away from Israel. I had thought that my position would have been clear to all the world, particularly in the light of the specific wording of the Democratic Party Platform. But there were those who did not take this seriously, regarding it as "just another campaign promise" to be forgotten after the election. I believe they have recently realized their error. I have interpreted my re-election as a mandate from the American people to carry out the Democratic Platform -- including, of course, the plank on Israel. I intend to do so.

Since your letter was written, we have announced in the General Assembly our firm intention to oppose any territorial changes in the

B. File B File


November 29th Resolution which are not acceptable to the State of Israel. I am confident that the General Assembly will support us in this basic position.

We have already expressed our willingness to help develop the new State through financial and economic measures. As you know, the Export-Import Bank is actively considering a substantial long-term loan to Israel on a project basis. I understand that your Government is now in process of preparing the details of such projects for submission to the Bank. Personally, I would like to go even further, by expanding such financial and economic assistance on a large scale to the entire Middle East, contingent upon effective mutual cooperation.

Thank you so much for your warm congratulations and good wishes on my re-election. I was pleased to learn that the first Israeli elections have been scheduled for January 25th. That enables us to set a definite target date for extending de jure recognition.

In closing, I want to tell you how happy and impressed I have been at the remarkable progress made by the new State of Israel. What you have received at the hands of the world has been far less than was your due. But you have more than made the most of what you have received, and I admire you for it. I trust that the present uncertainty, with its terribly burdensome consequences, will soon be eliminated. We will do all we can to help by encouraging direct negotiations between the parties looking toward a prompt peace settlement.

Very sincerely yours,



The Honorable Chaim Weizmann,
President,
State of Israel,
Rehovoth, Israel.

B File

81

August 6, 1948

Dear Dr. Weizmann:


I had a very lengthy visit with President Truman yesterday and spoke to him about the granting of the loan. He authorized me to tell you that he would give us action in the very near future. In fact, he said he would call in Mr. Marshall and get to work on it right away.

I know you will like to hear this good news, so I am sending it to you with Dr. Cohen. I raised the question of de jure recognition and Dr. Cohen will tell you what transpired.

I hope you are enjoying the very best of health and are able to go to Israel in the very, very best of spirits.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,


Edward Jacobson

P.S. I think it would be wise if you would drop the President a note thanking him in advance for his assistance. You might say in this letter that I advised you of his sanction.

Dr. Chaim Weizmann
Hotel Rigi Vaudois
Glen s/Montreux
Switzerland

B

NOTES TO ATTACHED EDDIE JACOBSON HOLOGRAPH CHRONOLOGY.BY FRANK J. ADLER, 712 E. 69TH STREET, KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

This 13-page chronology was erroneously identified as a "diary" in book form, in an article by Joel Levitch and Laurel Vlock published in the Washington Post, May 6, 1973, p. C3, and reprinted on the editorial page of the Kansas City Times, May 11, 1973.

Xerox copies of pp. 11-13 were furnished to the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio, in 1957. The material contained therein was utilized in Frank J. Adler, Roots in a Moving Stream: The Centennial History of Congregation B'nai Jehudah of Kansas City, 1870-1970 (Kansas City, Mo.: Congregation B'nai Jehudah, 1972), pp. 221-22. Pp. 1-10 were partially utilized in the above-mentioned article by Levitch and Vlock.

Some of the events are slightly misdated (according to the best evidence). It is obvious that much of the material was recorded by Jacobson some time after the events described had occurred.

Notes to Page 1

"Herman Rosenberg" refers to a long-time mutual friend of both Truman and Jacobson, Hermann [sic] P. Rosenberg of Kansas City, a member of Truman's Battery D, 129th Field Artillery, in World War I. Rosenberg is understood to have been of personal assistance to Truman in various private matters during his Presidential years.

The Oval Office interview for Rabbi Arthur Lelyveld and Jacobson, accompanied by Charles Kaplan of New York City (with whom Jacobson had haberdashery-business dealings), took place on June 26, 1946.

Truman apparently was not directly involved in Jacobson's White House visits during October and November of 1947. It may be inferred that Jacobson met with David K. Niles, the President's Special Assistant for Minority Affairs, who is repeatedly mentioned in later pages of the chronology.

Notes to Page 2

The Granoff-Jacobson visit with Truman in the Oval Office actually occurred on December 9, 1947, rather than on December 8. The reference to votes "for Israel" by UN delegations of foreign nations makes it clear that these notations were penned by Jacobson after May 14 of the following year, when the name "Israel" was chosen for the Jewish State in Palestine.

Notes to Page 3

The interview with Truman for Jacobson, accompanied by B'nai B'rith leaders Frank Goldman and Maurice Bisgyer, occurred on January 29, 1948. Jacobson's solitary visit with Truman on January 27 apparently occurred outside the Oval Office; in any event, it was not logged in Matthew Connelly's Presidential Appointment Books.

The "Feb. 20" entry quotes Frank Goldman, not Truman. See Adler, Roots, pp. 209-10.

B File

B File

Nov. 24 - 100th Term, 25 French Delegates asked for program
of vote (at Truman request) was carried by 1 vote majority - vote
on proposal took 73 vote. Wed 26 - received call from White House
everything OK. Nov. 27 Thanksgiving sent 2 page memo to
Truman. Friday received call from his secy. not to worry

Nov. 29th - Mission Accomplished.

Dec 8 - S. J. Granoff and myself went to White House
to thank Truman personally for all he had done.
There we recounted the full story of how he and he
alone was responsible for securing the votes of
several delegations for Israel.

Notes to Page 9

Jacobson's "full report on Israel" was given Truman in the Oval Office on April 21, 1949.

There is no record in the Connelly logs of a Presidential interview for Jacobson on August 20, 1949. They may have conversed by telephone.

"Gloria," whose wedding Ambassador and Mrs. James G. McDonald attended, is Jacobson's younger daughter, now Mrs. Dan Schusterman of Tulsa, Oklahoma.

Notes to Pages 10 and 11

With the exception of the October 6, 1949, entry on page 10, essentially the same course of events is twice reviewed here, portraying a Jacobson petition to Truman that the U.S. not support the internationalization of Jerusalem. (On December 9, 1949, the UN General Assembly voted to place Jerusalem under supreme UN authority. The U.S. Delegation, however, cast a negative vote on the question.)

Notes to Pages 12 and 13

Louis Lipsky was chairman of the American Zionist Council, an umbrella organization for various U.S. Zionist organizations. The rabbi referred to along with Lipsky appears to have been Rabbi Jerome Unger, a Zionist official.

Frank J. Adler
Frank J. Adler
712 E. 69th Street
Kansas City, Missouri 64131

July 28, 1974

B File

June 1943

Reinhold Rosenberg and myself - had conference with Pres.
in Kansas City regarding D.P. in Central Europe -
He promised to admit 15000 yearly - congress refused.
Rabbi Arthur Lelyveld visited Pres. in Washington - Rabbi was
impressed by Pres. knowledge of Palestine situation -
Saw Truman again. He left. was still trying to
get 15000 D.P. into U.S.

1946

Truman having trouble with English - Palestine

1947

English threatens to pull out of Palestine. Anglo American
committee reports on Palestine. English refuses to go ahead
with recommendations.

Partition plan opposed to U.N. is certainly not satisfactory
to Jews - but they will go ahead. Truman promised me
he would go the limit to get through resolution.
Presented to U.N. in Sept. Arabs went wild - English
supporting Arabs. Made trip to Washington Oct. 16 - Truman
meeting entire cabinet and State Department to put over
partition. Nov. 6 - Wash - Pres. still going all out for Palestine
Nov. 17 - again to White House.

Nov. 20 - H.C. Zimmert received information that Truman was going
to sign veto to British. Truman denied this to me - Zimmert
still insists.

"Dr. W." refers to Dr. Chaim Weizmann. The reference to Blair House involves Weizmann's stay there as the President's guest May 24-25, 1948.

Jacobson's White House visit at the White House on "Apr. 12" through the "East Door" did not involve Truman personally. A Jacobson-to-Truman letter of April 29, 1948, in the President's Personal File 1656 of the Truman Papers, states that Jacobson had not seen Truman since St. Patrick's Day, when they had shared in a reception in New York City. There likewise is no reference in Connelly's Presidential Appointment Books to an interview for Jacobson on May 8, 1948.

Notes to Page 4

The "Aug. 9th" entry undoubtedly refers to a Jacobson visit with Truman in the Oval Office on August 5, 1948. The subjects discussed on that occasion are detailed in a letter from Jacobson to Chaim Weizmann, dated August 6, 1948, reproduced in Adler, Roots, p.214.

"Meyer Weisgal" in the entry dated June 14th refers to Meyer W. Weisgal, a Weizmann aide (later president of the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot, Israel). "M. Bis." in the same entry refers to Maurice Bisgyer of B'nai B'rith.

"E. Epstein" refers to Eliahu Epstein, now Eliahu Elath, Special Representative of Israel's Provisional Government in Washington and subsequently Israel's first Ambassador to the U.S.

Mrs. Jacobson has no recollection concerning the identity of the "Mrs. Kimo" mentioned at the bottom of the page.

In context, the notations for September 27 suggest that Jacobson left for Oklahoma City (to confer with Truman there) in response to a Weizmann cable of that date. The Weizmann cable was sent from Geneva, Switzerland, as a night letter on September 27, and Jacobson did not receive it until his return from Oklahoma City. He so indicated in a letter to Matthew Connelly, dated September 30, 1948, in Official File 204-D Misc. of the Truman Papers.

Notes to Pages 5-7

The remarks attributed to Jonathan Daniels on page 6 were confirmed to me as substantially accurate by Daniels in 1973. Daniels, however, seemed to recall that the conference had been held in an Oklahoma City hotel suite, rather than on the campaign train.

Notes to Page 8

For additional documentation on Jacobson's October 28, 1948, intercession with Truman in New York City, see Adler, Roots, pp. 217, 219, and supporting source notes.

"Saks" refers to Maurice R. Saks of Bethesda, Md., formerly of Kansas City, a long-time Jacobson friend.

B. File B File

Jan. - Feb 2 - Wash. - N. Y. K.C.
Mar. 13th to 18th Wash. N. Y. Wash.

May 15-18 N.Y. Wash. N.Y.

June 5-6 1904. Quaker

June 20th Wash.



B File

Jan 24 - Feb 2 -

Frank Goldman - Maurice Bysser & J. had interview
with President. Jan 27 - Visited N.Y.C. alone

Jan 27 - Visited H.S.P. ~~about~~
Feb - Pres. refused to see R.W. - very late against N.Y. leaders

Mar 13th. Arranged meeting with Pres. and Dr. W.

Went on to U.G. to see Dr. W. (Pres. very bitter - Had new argument
his old one ~~but~~ ^{new} - Dr. W.)

See Truman in N.Y. Mar 17 arranged to bring Dr. W.
into White House East door.

to White House East Door. - tickets to White House by Henry Rowley
 Then 13th. Dr. W. had conference. Pres. stayed at last of stay during
 as other prices seemed me to well.

Mar 19th - Sat. Father Day.

Talked to D.G.W. Mar 22-30th Went Kap down to W.H. open.
I have had disappointments all my life - this was just one

Get your left open !!! (Tough going - had to keep my chin.)

[Handwritten notes:]

Lila R - East Bank
Munge - ? East Bank
Flag of French flying beside the flag of my country
I saw the King off - my relative

Left for N.Y. to see Dr. W. ^{minors} Conference in afternoon (Sunday)

Left for Wash. Monday morn. Brought greetings from

and Pres. of France to Pres. of U.S. - returned embryos - Louis-
Philippe and (Gen. Henderson) and British. May 19th

Returned to N.Y. Inferior with D.C. Tech K.C.
 named D.C. Tech to Washington - Also Home

Page 3 of 13 pages

June 14th - Myer Wersel - M. Bis. from - K.C.
June 20th - Wash, conference E. Epstine. then H.S.T.
Arbuzov - Butsch - Boundary Lines - Loan -
Complete Reg. Reorganization - Commence to France - Log Thaire
Epstine very happy.
Aug 9th -
Again discussed boundary lines - Loan - Reg. Reorganization.
Sept 15th -
Frank Hollman and myself had interview with President
Both very happy and confident everything was OK.
Discussed loan - Reorganization.
Sept 17 - Bernadette Slater
Received Length cable from Dr. W. Sept 27th.
Sept 21st - Elsie Epstine very much alarmed that Bernadette Proford
will be put through v. M. Talked to Nat. Com. in Los Angeles
called back assured me it would not happen.
Sept for Osla. City Sept 27th. Blum and
Kimo also.
B File
B File

Okla City Okla. Left 28th - 1948

①

Parlor - Presidents Car - Presidential Train. 9:10 P.M. to 10:20 P.M.

Attended Reception -

Had dinner with Gov. Turner in home of H.S.T.

Took my hat for good luck.

Meeting on train was attended by

Clark Clifford

Jonathan Daniels

Matthew Connolly

Chas. Ross

Edw. Brown

} President Truman

I think this meeting was most important - the entire White House staff convinced me that they were not only our friends but were going all out on Palestine. H.S.T. told us he would not budge from the U.N. decision of Nov. 29th, regardless of what Marshall-Smith or anyone else said. He said the U.S. would not endorse the Bernadotte proposal as written - but wanted very much to bring about peace in Palestine.

B... File

B File

Clark Clifford -

After reading plank in Democratic platform regarding Israel - said the State Dept. was called in and agreed to my word - in fact helped write the section regarding Israel. Now they want to do just the opposite! Also called the President's attention to a speech he made a short time ago saying that Joe Stalin would not keep his word - whether a spoken and he (H.S.T.) was doing the same thing. This was denied by H.S.T. - he had nothing to do with American Delegates at U.N. opposing the Bernadotte plan - Marshall acted without consulting him.

Jonathan Daniels -

If we cannot follow our pledge before election how will the people expect us to follow after election. You have made commitments to Dr. W. pledging your word that boundary line of Israel would stand as set by U.N. Nov. 29th. Now can you ask for Jewish votes when you are blamed (and rightfully) for the conduct of A.S. Delegates at U.N. Had a statement prepared and inserted Pres. sign it. This he refused to do until he talked to Marshall. Again he said he would stand by his word.

B File

Met Connally -

Spoke near along lines outlined above. Told H.S.T. anyone present was loyal as could be and did not have any axe to grind with British Gov. Said England was interested in my affairs and did not care about Israel or Arab.

File to Washington Oct 6, 1899 - discussed future plans of
mission - England agrees to work with Israel. (1899)

Nov. 25th Left N.C. 2:45 A.M. Had 11 A.M. appointment with H.S.E.
P. Lane. Landed 11:10 A.M. Received another appointment for
3 P.M. Came White House 2:45 P.M. ^{was helped by Elizabeth in entire afternoon} conferred with S. S.

50 minutes. Gave me message to give to Sheriff for
Dr. Dequers - tell him I will not let him down.
F. Internationalization will be settled agreeable to all.

Asked to slide ^{resolution} at coming this term - but to discuss
it thoroughly.

Then to Atlantic City - W.D.A. Convention. Addressed
Meeting Sunday Nov. 27th. Pres. Lane was our friend - is
our friend & I pray to God will always be our friend.
In to N.Y. had meeting with F. International Co. being agreed
to discuss my various enterprises in Israel.

B. File

B. File

Oct. 11th - admitted to Memorial Hospital. I think the
Lord the Doctors were wrong. Too much excitement
had to take it easy. Hospital one week - home another.
Oct 25th received word from White House that President would
come out with statement on Palestine in his ~~Washington~~
Madison Square Garden speech.



Blumen and I flew to N.Y. Oct 27th.
New York papers carried screaming head lines - England
and China asking U.S. to join them in asking for action
against Israel. Marshall agreed. Truman arrived N.Y.
Thursday Oct 29th. Promised me and he did come to
Marshall not to act on any matters pertaining to Palestine
until he consulted White House. Marshall withdrew -
and England & China followed. Madison Square Garden speech
word for word on city streets

Blumen went on to Washington to meet Acheson. I stayed in
N.Y. Went to Harlem - Times & Brooklyn with the
President and they returned to N.Y. on Presidential
train. ^{Arrived 1 hr. 45 min} Attended a luncheon in Pent House N.Y. 1st
Nov 3rd in Pent House
was Nov 4th that "Great Day". Flew to Washington Nov. 14th.

Blumen & I visited Pres. everything wonderful. Dec 27th
Truman gave Luncheon for me at Marshall Hotel. Truman
wanted to read more. Came unannounced - made his famous
speech on Russia. Visited with him in Pent House.

B. Fitej

1949

Jan 16-1949

Bleum Blum & Co left for inauguration. Had a complicated
 turn but I got sick. President asked me to stay to see him
 sign recognition. This was officially signed Jan 31 in the presence
 of John Snyder - Frank Holden - Morris Byrd and myself.
 We left at once for Israel. Truman and celebrated with
 Chaim Weizmann and friends. Truman left his word -
 Back to K.C.

Flew to Washington Feb. 22 to attend Jackson Day
 Dinner - thank God no troubles. President very happy.
 Mar 12th Left for N.Y. to fly to Israel.
 Arrived back home Apr 10th.

Flew to Washington (Blum & Co) gave Pres. a full
 report on Israel. (55 minutes) Gave me some information
 Dr. W. ^{called - came to U.N.} Went to N.Y. Had a lengthy visit with Dr. W.
 attended dinner for Dr. W. Then home.
 Wed May 4th - Everyone expected U.S. was not to support
 Israel at U.N. Refused to go to Washington. Truman gave his word
 to me and Dr. W. following week. May 6th - U.N. votes passed.
 in. - Hebrew

Aug. 20th - Breakfast with E. Clarke - had a long talk
 with H. S. regarding refugee - internationalization of Jer.
 to N.Y. spent Saturday with Sam H. H.
 Mr. & Mrs. McDonald came to Home Wedding. Sept 17 -
 Sept 28th President came K.C. - had breakfast with him.
 Told me the whole story. Ben M. also told me how the
 Arabians were fighting Ben M. and his men. Hebrew

3. J.
Mr. President -

Speaking of loyalty - I have 2 of them - and I know
you will not question either one. My loyalty to you and
my loyalty to my people - I'm all the years of our
friendship - I have never asked for anything for myself.
But will admit that I did bother hell out of you about
my people and you know that I was never unreasonable.
I asked for anything that was not ~~right~~ rightly
given to us.

B File

Last Nov. you promised Dr. W. and myself that
you would stand by the decision of U. N. regarding bombing
lines established on that date. Again in June of this
year you reaffirmed this statement to Dr. W. and
myself. I'm here at H.C. you told me your stand
and I feel was just the same. Now as on March 15th
your State Dept. has again acted without authority from
you - but you are the man who's taking all the blame.
I know your true feeling towards my people - but how
is this to know? ~~When~~ actions like these make them
forget about one who has done more to create an
independent Israel than any other living man.

You are out here shaking the bushes for a few
cents - while you are losing millions of them in
N. Y. and Penn. by the actions of a State Dept. who
betrayed body and soul to the British Foreign Office.
I'm sure it didn't make sense.

B File

Nov. 24 - Joseph Cohen called. Terribly worried about government
25 - Cohen called " " " " " "
Left N.C. 2:45 A.M. Friday Nov 25 to U.G.
Plane to Wash. Arrived Wash. 11:00 Had an 11:20 A.M. appointment
Called W.H. That gave me 3 P.M. Appointment. ^{Was brought by} ^{clothes to delay}
Officers terribly crowded - H.S.T. Leaving for Florida
Monday. Foot Ball game Sat.

Was with H.S.T. 40 minutes. Discussed International
of Jerusalem and its effects not only on Israel - but
on entire world. I told him I was going to Sheritt
in Atlantic City - gave him message for Sheritt to
come to the "Old man". Told him I would let him
know will do the best possible to delay vote.
U.N. Our delegates would vote with us.

Very better at Catholics. I wanted me to try West.
Went on to Atlantic City addressed U.N. Sunday Morning
Addressed J.W.C. Sat afternoon. Had long visit with Sheritt.
To N.Y. Sunday Mtn. Lunch Monday with directors of
Industrial Institute of Israel Inc. I said my friends
in this group interested in the future. No delay to come
Sent Weizman cable congratulations for 70 Birthday. Received reply
by cable.

FRIDAY MAY 5th - 1950

Arrived Washington Friday May 5th. Met and the
the gang left for Louisville for Derby.

Had a conference with Elmore E. Riffe (144th)
Lunch with Warner B. Spent 25 minutes with
with President. Discussed arms - Weygand -
Economic Conditions. Told me not to worry I could
would get plenty of arms if they needed them.
Hopes they will.

Aitchison was to leave for England next day.
I instructed him to bring pressure on English
to force a peace with Arabs. Used my strong
words when speaking of Berens. He felt confident
that there would not be any more war in France.
Was much concerned about Weygand's health.
Internationalism was out.

H. S. T. resented the tactics being used by you
to pressure him - informed him that I was
going to N. Y. to meet Louis Hepaly and R. H. Hays
to see if it were possible to get them to quit
these foolish tactics.

He told me I was losing weight - told him I
thought our President was a little pregnant -
he told me it was none of my business.

...back to Lebanon for another conference...
He had told me he was to leave for London
also that Dr. W. had a severe heart attack.
I really think Israel made a mistake in taking
Elath away from Washington. He was liked
very much by our state dept. ^{as spelled as our}
^{told him good bye as something else was}
President. Humidity 87 - temperature 90...

Stayed with Hazel and Maurine...
Left for N.Y. for meeting - not with Lifshy -
I told him how important it was to stop all
pressure on Washington. Explained to him that the
whole future of Israel was at stake and please
with him to use his Powers instead of his
mouth. I don't know whether or not I accomplished
anything in my visit - but I tried. When I
returned to N.Y. I found that Mr. Lifshy had
told me. He told me in N.Y. that he did not mention
as Truman's name in his bulletin - ^{found out different} he had asked
the Rotars to name the Pres. - the worst thing they
could do. He was going all out for Israel. He certainly

could not tell them what he was doing.

Returned home by plane
Sunday May 7th.
My love to
...

WESTPORT
MENSWEAR
1002 JACOBSON'S
MAIN AT 29TH STREET
KANSAS CITY 2, MISSOURI
PHONE VA. 3582

B File
B File

Memorandum on the De Jure Recognition of Israel

On Saturday evening, June 5, I learned that the State Department had indicated that de jure recognition of Israel would not be granted unless territorial concessions were made by the Jewish state. This coincided closely with the reports published in The Nation of the British intention, and resolved all doubts, if any existed, that the State Department and the British Foreign Office were in collusion. It also illuminated the purpose behind the remark made to me on June 3 by Chester Williams, a member of the staff of the American delegation, in the course of a conversation at Lake Success. I had asked him what the attitude of the United States was going to be during the truce period and what they hoped to accomplish. His answer was: "Get an agreement." "On what?" I asked. "Oh, on a Vatican city to begin with, let us say," was his answer. "What?" I asked. "Oh, from there we'll go on," he said.

Upon hearing this I decided to go to Washington to secure more facts concerning the situation with respect to the Palestine question, and to establish contact with a number of personalities known to be close to the President.

Prior to this, however, I again communicated with Mr. Sherman, told him the story and asked him to please get in touch with Ewing and Flynn. Mr. Sherman communicated with Ewing on Monday and discussed the matter twice with Flynn on Tuesday. He was utterly aghast and insisted that this situation need not have been allowed to develop and that the President should have issued the instructions with respect to the embargo, the Haganah, and the loan when he saw Dr. Weizmann. He promised to try to do something about it. The information was transmitted to Ewing by letter because the latter prefers not to discuss matters of this nature on the telephone and remains to be heard from.

B. File

him I was leaving that night but was prepared to be of service at any time and would, if he deemed it necessary, come to Washington with very short notice.

* * *

My net impression of these discussions is:

(1) That the three people I talked to were genuinely disturbed and will try to take some action.

(2) That obviously there is no one person or persons in the President's confidence who has continuous information concerning the Palestine developments and can report back to the President, and that this is where the fault largely lies. In the absence of such a person, obviously the President is fed by the State Department whose information can hardly be trusted.

(3) That there seems to be no person officially representing the Zionist movement in this country who has the ear of key people in the Administration.

(4) That a disinterested party, such as ourselves, can put across very important ideas because of our disinterest and our general repute.

(5) That the situation is by no means lost if a coordinated effort on a selective basis were undertaken to keep primed, warmed, and moving half a dozen key personalities in the Democratic Party who in turn could buttress the President and bring the whole issue to a decent conclusion. That is to say that a continuous, instead of a sporadic, effort on a full-time basis is more imperative than it ever was before.

Perhaps the outstanding conclusion which I carried away with me is that the approach has to be friendly; the distinction must be made

(2) It no longer considered itself bound to recognize the Jewish state within the boundaries established by the U.N. resolution of November 29 indicating that its recognition of the provisional government of Israel was a de facto recognition based on a de facto situation and having no reference to the November 29 resolution.

Armed with this information I went to see Senator Howard McGrath, who is the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee; Senator Harley Kilgore, one of the most liberal members of the Senate, who has the added distinction of being on very good personal terms with the President and having conducted for some months an effort to secure the replacement of Secretary Forrestal as one of the chief authors of the policy of betrayal; and Leslie Biffle, secretary to the minority leader of the Senate, who is regarded as the person having the closest personal relations with the President and being privy to all his thinking.

I saw Senator McGrath first. He came off the floor of the Senate to have a talk with me. I began by telling him that I thought it was imperative that he should know that the President was being double-crossed by his own State Department, and that the double-cross would have the effect both of destroying all his decent acts with respect to Israel, and of destroying the newly-revived prestige of the President himself. I then proceeded to tell him the story of the newest step of the State Department, placing responsibility at the door of Loy Henderson. I told him that there was a remarkable coincidence in the fact that Loy Henderson should be asking for territorial restrictions at the same time that the British had dropped their mask and, through newspaper stories which appeared a week ago in the London Times and the Manchester Guardian, were suggesting that recognition of Israel would be forthcoming if territorial concessions were made.

BREN

I also gave him a telescopic picture of the machinations in the Security Council. I told him that the fact that the President had allowed the execution of his policies to remain in the hands of the State Department resulted in no effort to secure sufficient votes for United States proposals, and that this was particularly true with respect to the proposal on declaring the situation a threat to peace and security. I indicated to him that what was involved here was British determination to maintain sole control of the Middle East, to push the United States out of the picture, and to accomplish this purpose they were prepared to allow, if this were possible, every Jew in Palestine to be killed and the United States to be made a mockery. In this policy, I told him, Loy Henderson and his clique were willing accomplices. I asked him why Loy Henderson was being kept. His answer was that it was intended that he should be kicked out a long time ago. "Why hasn't it been done?" I asked. He shrugged his shoulders. I emphasized to him that the policy of double-cross would continue as long as the President had nobody in the State Department who would carry out his policies explicitly. He asked me what had happened to Hildring. I told him the story that while Hildring's illness was genuine in the beginning and prevented him from taking up the post at the time he accepted it, at the end it was Marshall who told Hildring he didn't want him to come. McGrath said he couldn't believe it. I told him that the source of the story was such that he would not challenge it if he knew, and perhaps some day I could reveal the name. (The source is Leslie Biffle, the President's friend.)

I also indicated to Senator McGrath that the repercussions, politically speaking, were obvious. Senator McGrath said that of course the situation would have to be handled, but could only be handled by the President and would therefore have to await his return. He asked me to

prepare a memorandum for him recapitulating the facts already told to him and bringing the situation up-to-date to be available to him upon the President's return. The President, he said, should be back in Washington some time around June 17, when he would take the whole matter up with him again. I agreed to do this.

I then saw Senator Kilgore and told him the same story, adding only that we were opening the doors to the very thing that we said we wanted to avoid -- the possibility of Russian penetration of the Middle East. I asked Senator Kilgore whether he would think that the Jewish state, if it were to continue to be double-crossed by the United States and the Western powers, should refuse Soviet aid if that aid should be offered at a crucial moment. He said that of course the Jewish state should accept aid if the circumstances were allowed to continue. He too berated the lack of continuity in policy and said that part of the reason that certain people were not fired was due to the fact that the President had difficulty in getting Senate confirmation for decent replacements. What he was talking about was Secretary Forrestal to whom the President seems now to be opposed but can't fire because he can't get any nomination through, according to Senator Kilgore. I pointed out that where Loy Henderson was concerned that was not the case. I indicated to him that what the President could and should do is to immediately give de jure recognition, announce the loan, and indicate that when the truce is ended we would arm the Haganah just as if it were Paraguay or any other so-called friendly state. Senator Kilgore promised to do what he could, stating that his principal advantage is that he is on first-name terms with the President and can have his ear. I agreed with him that this was a very important advantage and should be utilized.

I then went to see Leslie Biffle. I discussed the matter a little bit differently with Mr. Biffle in the light of his great personal friendship

with the President, pointing out that it was the President who was responsible for every decent act, and that it was the State Department which had consistently undermined his policy and seemed bent on a determined effort to discredit Mr. Truman. I gave him the particulars to show the coincidence of direct ^{retrogression} aggression on Palestine policy with Mr. Truman's absences from Washington.

I told him that unfortunately the public at large, not privy to the details of such a double-cross, would not distinguish between the President and his State Department, and that it was the President who would get it in the neck. Mr. Biffle agreed completely that the repercussions would be felt by the President and also that he was being double-crossed. In the course of our discussions he received a message from Senator McGrath to come to the floor of the Senate. I arose and wanted to leave. He insisted, however, that having this discussion with me was more important than anything else he could do at the moment. "You are the first person," he said, "who has come to me with the complete facts. I want to listen to you." I told him also that the policy of discrediting the President had penetrated to the American delegation which receives its instructions from the State Department, and without mentioning the name, I told him of my discussion with a member of the American delegation staff, ^{who} ~~he~~ laughed and said, in response to my question as to what the next steps of the U.S. were, "That depends on the President's next non-political speech."

Mr. Biffle told me that he considered the matter so important that he would relay the information to the President at once -- meaning that night when he expected to telephone him. That terminated the conversation. When I arose to go Biffle thanked me again for having come, asked me to be in touch with him and to be sure to call on him when in Washington. I told

On Tuesday, June 8, I went to Washington. There I saw the file on the most recent State Department attitude toward Israel and learned that:

- (1) The State Department no longer considered itself bound to recognize de jure the Jewish state "because of the present situation."

between the President and the State Department, and can be made only by those people who have not been parties to attacks on the President, lumping him with every American double-cross. This is of the first strategic importance.

B. File

On Thursday, May 27, I called Carl Sherman to express my anxiety about what seemed to me an impending new reversal by the United States on the Palestine question. Indications of such a reversal were the President's press conference, the failure of the United States to reintroduce its own resolution with respect to invoking Article 39, leaving Russia to do so, and the introduction of a British resolution which coupled the Jews with the Arabs as aggressors and called for an arms embargo directed against the Jews as well as the Arabs. It also would have halted Jewish immigration into Palestine.

I asked him to look into the matter and to get hold of Jack Ewing and Ed Flynn. I pointed out also that I was afraid that with the impending departure on June 3rd of the President for a ~~xxx~~ tour, a lot of skullduggery would take place unless the matter were sewed up promptly. He promised to get in touch with Ewing and with Flynn.

On Friday he told me that he had discovered that Ewing left Washington on Thursday and would not be returning until next Tuesday. But he undertook to try to discover his whereabouts. Flynn also could not be reached until Tuesday.

On Sunday, after the vote of the Security Council on the amended British resolution, I called Mr. Sherman at his country house, told him the facts, that the general impression was that a new Anglo-American collusion had been arranged, and what the outlook was. He told me that he had been unable to discover the whereabouts of Ewing and asked me to call him again early Tuesday morning and brief him again as he would surely get hold of Ewing on Tuesday.

B. Fil

recognize the state of Israel and then let it die. He also intimated that the embargo would be lifted and that the important thing for the United States was to get a resolution leveling the embargo against the Arab states.

Mr. Sherman passed on to Mr. Ewing the suggestions which we had made and the latter promised to put them to the President before his departure on his speaking tour. Mr. Sherman also reached Ed Flynn and told him the situation. Flynn was very much disgusted and indicated to Sherman that he would do something in his own way and at the proper moment.

On Friday morning there was a meeting in New York between Mr. Ewing, Paul Fitzpatrick, chairman of the New York State Democratic Committee, and Flynn, in which the Palestine situation was gone over in full detail. Mr. Ewing again indicated that something would be done. He intimated that the President intended to name an ambassador to Israel and also that the President had indicated to Bernadotte that the United States favored Jewish immigration into Palestine during the truce period. In the opinion of Ewing it was this which on June 3 brought about Bernadotte's initial interpretation of the May 29 resolution of the Security Council as indicating that it did not affect Jewish immigration into Palestine.

B. File

On Tuesday morning I telephoned Mr. Sherman and had a long talk with him, calling attention in detail to the evidence of collusion, the intention of the British to soften up the Jews to negotiate a peace which would shrink their territory, and the utter injustice of American support of the British act, particularly in the light of the recognition of the Jewish state by the United States. I urged him to suggest to Mr. Ewing that if the President wanted to maintain a newly-gained prestige, he would have to take effective action on the Palestine situation, and I suggested the following:

(1) Dismissal of Loy Henderson.

(2) Appointment of a special adviser to the State Department to replace Hilldring, suggesting two names, Sumner Welles, former Under Secretary of State, and Dr. Frank P. Graham, President of the University of North Carolina, who is already a special adviser to the State Department.

(3) The immediate announcement of a loan to the Jewish state and a declaration that the United States would help to arm the Haganah once the truce period is over.

(4) A public declaration that the United States would not support Mr. Bevin's policies on Palestine.

On Tuesday evening Mr. Sherman told me that he had finally reached Mr. Ewing and had a long talk with him. Ewing promised to do what he could and asked Carl Sherman to call him back in two days, which means Thursday morning. Sherman told him that he thought some of the things that had happened had been due to Ewing's absence from Washington. Ewing was aware of some of the State Department's action but insisted that so was Truman and that it was absolutely wrong to anticipate that the worst was going to happen. He insisted that it was not the intention of the United States to

CHAIM WEIZMANN ARCHIVE
 100-107141-10000
 100-107141-10000

April 20, 1948

Dr. Chaim Weizmann,
 The Waldorf-Astoria,
 Park and Lexington Avenues,
 New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Dr. Weizmann:

Thanks so much for your good letter. I hope you will see our Commander-in-Chief this week! I should hate to have the case left in the hands of Judge Rosenman - even with our "points" to fortify him.

I understand that Bartley Crum is also making certain specific proposals to the President. This may be useful. For some reason or other he is supposed to have considerable personal influence at the White House.

I am much interested in what you say about our request. A cable from Keyer to Lillie indicated that something might be decided soon.

These next few days and weeks will be particularly ticklish ones both in Flushing and Washington. I hope we can be of some help. Lillie is out at the U. N. today and had appointments with several delegates she knows well.

We'll all do our best and continue to hope - but without too many illusions.

Affectionately yours,

Frida

I enclose a copy of a wire I sent to Truman last week - #

B Eil

the Mandate was unworkable and that the country should be partitioned between the two peoples.¹¹ However, the Partition Commission which followed the Royal Commission was unable to work out a practicable partition within its terms of reference, and the British Government, having previously accepted the principle of partition, now rejected it.¹² The Jews (Zionists) and Arabs both rejected partition as they had rejected all other solutions except their own.

With war coming on, the British Government issued its now famous White Paper of 1939 which declared that the British obligation to foster the national home had been fulfilled and announced the intention of preparing the country for self-government with its existing population.¹³ Out of consideration of the plight of the Jews of Europe, provision was made for a final immigration of 75,000 more refugees in the next five years. Further restrictions were also placed upon the purchase of land by Jews. The Jews unanimously condemned the Paper, while the Arabs slowly accepted it as fulfilling their main demands.¹⁴

During the war the conflict in Palestine continued, but the problem was engulfed by much larger world issues. However, the Nazis' mass killing of the Jews during the war shocked the world and focused attention on the remnants of the people who collected in the camps in Germany and demanded to go to Palestine.

In early 1946 the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, a group of twelve distinguished Britains and Americans, looked at the problem in Europe and Palestine and stated in their report that the hostility between Jews and Arabs precluded an independent state and that the country should be placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations. They rejected the idea of a Jewish state or an Arab state. They recommended, among nine other things, the immediate admission of 100,000 refugees, some form of further immigration, and repeal of the restrictions on the sale of land to Jews. The recommendation for the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews was singled out by the Zionists to be implemented at once without reference to the other nine recommendations the Committee of Inquiry had made, and there followed an active campaign to get this done at once.¹⁵

of extreme nationalism is, of course, equally a backward rather than a forward movement.

When I think of the extraordinarily great talents of the Jewish people in the fields of medicine, science, art, music and statesmanship, I can visualize a great world university in Palestine which would make possible the concentrated efforts of the Jews on research, particularly in the problems of the Middle East. These are multiple. In the field of public health alone so much is to be done. I feel that a great university would do more to raise the prestige of the Jews throughout the world than a Jewish state with ambitions to become a power and an active participant in world politics.

There is, it is true, a small Israeli university in Jerusalem, but it is a national university.² I would wish to see a great international one into which the Jews of the world would pour their resources and make it a great monument to Jewish genius and to the Jewish spirit. Students from everywhere, especially from the Middle East, would be welcomed there and become part of a great undertaking. What could do more to bring Jews and Arabs together in happy unity?

I shall refer later to the efforts that were made by our Government and the British Government to find homes for all the refugees of Central Europe in various parts of the world, including the United States. There are many countries still available for the settlement of industrious, capable people who want to become citizens in a new homeland.³

The problem of the European Jews left homeless as a result of Nazi persecution and the war was the principal stimulus behind the intensified Zionist movement which followed World War II. This decimated people ^{WAS} were collected in the American and British zones of Germany, particularly in the former, and were given temporary housing and care by the Allied armies. The camps set up for these refugees, though reasonably well equipped, were soon crowded to the point where they were appallingly unsatisfactory for human beings. With regard to the large numbers of refugees

B File

coming in by the underground railroad from the sections east of the Allied zones, the authorities could do little. These conditions intensified the already strong desire of the Jews to emigrate to Palestine. Thus there was given great impetus to the Zionist movement which had been growing in strength and influence throughout the Western world.

Palestine was a bitterly disputed land. The Jews based their claim to the right to go to Palestine on the Balfour Declaration of 1917 which said:

"His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine . . ."

The French and Italian Governments endorsed the declaration in 1918 and a joint resolution of Congress in 1922 gave formal United States sanction to the idea of a Jewish national home.⁵ The Zionists put all the stress on the first part of the statement and very little on the latter part. When I speak of Zionists I do not mean this to be synonymous with Jews. The terms are not interchangeable. If I criticize Zionists I am not criticising Jews, for whom as a group I have the highest admiration and respect.⁶

The question of a "national" home could be subject to many interpretations. It is hard to believe that the British Government, ^{but} using the words "national home" in 1917, had any idea that there should be created a Jewish state in Palestine without regard to the rights of the large Arab majority living there.

The Arabs in Palestine, at the time of the Balfour Declaration, were a part of the Turkish Empire and believed that they had obtained from the British a wartime promise of independence in the McMahon Letters of 1915, and, in any event, being about 90 per cent of the population at the time, ^{They} felt they had a natural claim to the land.⁷ The Jews, however, had been buying up steadily the large estates of absentee Arab land owners and settling immigrants on these estates.⁸

B file

If the Arabs in Palestine had continued to be a backward, disorganized people, and if the Jews had never had more than cultural aspirations for their national home, the situation in Palestine might have developed peacefully. But that was not the case. The Arabs came out of the War with an intense nationalism and a burning desire for independence. Some of the Zionist leaders always had in the back of their mind a Jewish state in part or all of Palestine. The aspirations of the two peoples in this little land, the size of Vermont, were contradictory. That the two peoples themselves realized this most sharply is shown by the bad will which has grown between them in the three decades ^{after} succeeding the Balfour Declaration.

After World War I Palestine became a ^{Territory} Mandate under the League of Nations, with Great Britain as the administering Power.⁹ During the next ^{Territory} 25 years Great Britain engaged in an unhappy effort to find a solution to the conflict between Jews (Zionists) and Arabs, always of course bearing in mind that she herself needed to retain bases in the strategic Middle East. During these ^{Territory} 25 years, while their population increased through continued immigration from about ¹⁰ 10 per cent to ^{Thirty} 30 per cent of the total population, the Jews established a Western community with intensified farming and modern industries.¹⁰ The miracles they worked in this formerly arid country, the horrible persecution of their brethren in Europe, as well as the strong support they received from American Jewry, made their case a strong one. The Arabs, on the other hand, being the long-time inhabitants who were now being displaced (the last independent Jewish state ended in 63 B.C.), naturally had many sympathizers, and Great Britain, with her eye on the many Arab countries in the Middle East, was attentive to the Arab position.

The conflict between the two peoples led to a continuing impasse and from time to time to riots and violence. The British sent a number of investigating commissions whose reports led to a series of White Papers. Perhaps the most famous of the investigators was the Royal Commission of 1936, which concluded that the

CHAPTER IX

One of the darkest chapters in world history is the persecution and slaughter of the Jews in Germany under the regime of Adolph Hitler. The world owes this suffering people much in partial payment for the frightful treatment they received throughout Central Europe before and during World War II. Whether the establishment of a national Jewish state is the answer to the Jewish problem in Central Europe, I seriously doubt.¹

I can understand how the Jewish people of the world, especially the Jews of America, in particular those who have recently immigrated here or whose ancestors are from the areas that came under the fury of the Nazis, feel toward the people of their faith that have been so cruelly persecuted in Central Europe. All informed Americans feel the same way. When I think of alternatives for world Judaism to a Jewish State, I feel there are several which would have been so much better from the standpoint of the Jews all over the world. A state means world segregation and such segregation will emphasize segregation for the Jews who do not go to Israel. Segregation, I fear, will bring about more rather than less anti-Semitism. Even if the Jews are a race rather than a religious community, which many Jews will not admit, extreme nationalism such as that represented by the State of Israel is reactionary in the kind of world we are trying to build. Irish, Polish or any kind

In order to work out and carry through some plan of action with the British Government, President Truman, on June 11, 1946, appointed a Cabinet Committee under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State, and with the Secretaries of War and Treasury as members. The President stated in a release from the White House that:

"The Committee will be charged with assisting me in formulating and implementing such policy with regard to Palestine and related problems as may be adopted by this Government. . . The Committee will be authorized to negotiate with the British government and with other foreign governments and to maintain contact with private organizations relative to the various matters arising out of the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry."¹⁶

and the Secretary of Treasury appointed Mr. Herbert Gaston as alternate

On the same day the Secretary of State appointed me as his alternate with the personal rank of Ambassador; the Secretary of War appointed Mr. Goldthwaite Dorr as his alternate.¹⁷ The Board of Alternates, or Committee as it was called, selected a small staff and began to study intensively all the documents and material available on the subject. Having finished its preliminary investigations, the Committee, with its staff, flew to London in early July. In the meantime, the British had set up a similar committee under the chairmanship of Sir Norman Brock.¹⁸

Goldthwaite Dorr is one of the finest and most able men I have ever worked with. My association with him and Herbert Gaston was an extremely pleasant one. Herbert Gaston brought to our Committee an experience of many years in newspaper and government work. He later became president of the Export-Import Bank and did an outstanding job.¹⁹ I was fortunate indeed to have these two men with me as the members of the Committee. We supplemented each other in the particular work we took up and were in complete agreement on our report when it was finished.

Before leaving for London, the Committee outlined a general program which it had decided to make the basis of negotiation with the British Committee. This program was based on nine points which the Committee took up with the President for his approval or disapproval. The British had been urging that the United

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States should be prepared to give military assistance in the event of trouble with the Arabs over the immigration of the 100,000 Jews to Palestine (and with considerable logic, because if 100,000 immigrants were to be forced on the Arabs under pressure of the Zionists in America and the American Government, we might well be expected to share the responsibility for the troubles which might ensue). However, the Committee felt there were ²involvements to military participation on our part and therefore that American military forces should not be employed. The President agreed. The President, however, approved the other eight recommendations, and these were the basis for our negotiations with the Brook Committee and all were incorporated in the final joint report.²⁰

We believed that if, as a result of our conferences in London, it was decided that a trusteeship should replace the Mandate and we were asked to be co-trustees, it would be preferable not to accept this responsibility. The President was willing to have the matter of co-trusteeship left open for later consideration.

We also agreed that the United States should support the Anglo-American Committee Report as a whole, including the third recommendation that Palestine should be neither a Jewish nor an Arab state. The President concurred.

We felt that we could not effectively urge renewal of immigration into Palestine with all that this would imply unless we were prepared to open our own doors to an increased number of victims of Nazi persecution. The President agreed to request Congress to provide an additional immigration quota for 50,000 refugees.²¹ The fact that we could state that the President would make such a request strengthened our position in our discussions with the British.

We also felt that the United States should be in a position, if necessary, to give some assistance to Middle Eastern countries, including Palestine, in the form of loans and grants. The President concurred and stated that immediately upon the implementation of the plan to admit the 100,000 Jews into Palestine, he

would ask the Export-Import Bank and/or the International Bank to make loans up to \$200,000,000 as a means of stimulating the economic life of the Middle East. The President was willing, also, as a part of the program for the 100,000 immigrants, to ask Congress for a grant-in-aid for Palestine of \$25,000,000 to \$50,000,000 to be spent for improving conditions of the Arabs there.

We also raised with President Truman the matter of the Jews who continued to come from Eastern Europe to the camps in our zones at the rate of 200,000 per year. We could not ask for the closing of the borders in face of the conditions in Eastern Europe. To do so would be inhumane. Our Committee felt that while we should continue to offer our physical protection to the future refugees, we could not give them ~~the~~ preferential treatment over all other persons displaced by the War. The President concurred in this.

We also felt that it was necessary that it should be made clear that the measures we were endeavoring to take with regard to Palestine should not adversely affect our national position in the whole Middle East. The President agreed that in any future announcements of our policy, there should be some emphasis on our interest in the Palestine situation as part of our larger interest in the peoples of the Middle East, in their regained political equality and their economic development. We felt strongly that we should at any rate indicate an understanding of the point of view of the peoples of the Middle East with regard to the Palestine question. Actually, the directive under which our Committee was working placed on us a responsibility for policy recommendations not only with regard to Palestine, but also with regard to related problems.²²

The Anglo-American Committee's report, while very good in many respects, was quite general in form. This was perhaps due to the many compromises which had been necessary ~~to make~~ in order to attain unanimity among twelve men. For example, though recognizing the difficulties involved in the British Mandate over Palestine, which the Committee felt should be continued for the time being,

the President. These statements seemed to have been based on their assumption that the experts and not the Committee were to decide what our report should be. They indicated this to me and to Messrs. Dorr and Gaston in several of our staff meetings. I have headed a number of government missions but in no other have I ever experienced so much disloyalty, ~~from so few~~.

The Zionists, who had long considered the United States Government their champion in this struggle, were sorely disappointed that they were not consulted as the negotiations progressed, and evidently from what they were able to learn in the course of the negotiations they decided they did not like them. In any event, without ever having seen the plan, they launched a campaign in the United States against it. And in the United States, since there is no political force to counterbalance Zionism, its campaigns are apt to be decisive. Illogically enough, the ~~main~~ attack of the Zionists, who had unofficially proposed complete partition a few weeks before, was that the Plan "ghetto-ized" them — set them off in a small portion of Palestine. In their effort to discredit the Plan they had never seen, they depicted territorial separation of Arabs and Jews as something in itself wrong.

Actually, what the Zionists really disliked about the Plan was the size of the area apportioned to them. Land was the all-important factor to them — not the nature of the proposed government. Receiving all the land in which there was an appreciable number of Jewish settlers did not satisfy their demand for expansion. They insisted on the right to grow even if growth had to be at the direct expense of the Arabs on the land.

The storm of criticism raised by the rumors about the Plan was peculiarly trying for my colleagues and me because we were not at liberty to defend it by disclosing it, and because any defense of the Plan was directly a criticism of the President for not accepting it. Privately, the President has several times said to me that he thought the plan for provincial autonomy was the best

it recommended a trusteeship system for the future. Except for the negative statement "that Palestine should be neither a Jewish nor an Arab state," little concrete guidance was given for the future government of the country. And the problem which had always proven^d to be the stumbling block for governments of the past -- the level of immigration or how the level should be decided -- was left open.

We were aware that the British were unwilling to let the unsatisfactory governmental situation drag on and we therefore knew that we would have to be prepared to discuss proposals for a new form of government. On the question of specific types of government, we knew that the Anglo-American Committee had rejected partition, which was advocated by some of its members, and that a bi-national state had been favored by a strong element in the Committee, though a specific recommendation for such a state had not been put into the report.²³

Having only general guidance on the question of government, and in any event not being bound by the previous Committee's recommendations, we gave serious consideration to partition. Having been recommended by the Royal Commission of 1936, whose report was admittedly the most exhaustive and profound of all the studies of Palestine in the last ^{Thirty} 30 years,²⁴ this solution continued to present itself as the most ^{possible} way ^{out} for settling the problem, particularly in view of the continuation of strife between Arabs and Jews. Furthermore, the Jewish Agency unofficially presented us with a paper on partition, this plan having recently become their solution. Any compromise plan backed by at least one party to the dispute had a better chance of success than proposals opposed by both.

Whatever our views on partition, however, we went to London with a plan for a bi-national government under the Trusteeship of the United Nations. Our plan only partially answered the questions which the Anglo-American Committee Report had left unanswered, but we were hoping that there would be enough Arab-Jewish cooperation to make the bi-national scheme workable.

Much to our surprise, on our arrival in London, the British presented us with a proposal for a Federal Government in which there would be semi-autonomous Jewish and Arab Provinces.²⁵

The plan was immediately recognized as the "Harris Plan" by those of our staff who had also served on the previous Committee. It had been prepared some time before our recent efforts by a British civil servant and presented to the Anglo-American Committee without the backing of the British government. Official British support of the plan now was somewhat of a surprise to us since provincial autonomy was a step toward partition, a solution which we thought was not in consonance with the supposed British desire to retain Palestine as a military base. We were, nevertheless, considerably relieved that the British were presenting it, since we had never been fully convinced in our own minds that there was enough Jewish goodwill for the bi-national plan we had in our briefcases. Furthermore, provincial autonomy seemed a solution which stayed within the Anglo-American Committee recommendations and yet moved toward a solution -- partition -- which would enlist the backing of at least one party to the dispute. Backing by two parties was considered almost unattainable. The provincial autonomy plan we thought might ultimately result in an integrated Jewish-Arab state, which would be a most satisfactory alternative to partition.

The provincial autonomy plan provided for the division of the country into an Arab Province and a Jewish Province, each of which would have powers somewhat greater than those of an American State. Foreign Affairs, Defense, Transportation and some other powers were reserved to the Central Government, which was to be controlled by the Trustee power. As to the two most crucial issues, the regulation of land purchase and immigration, both were left to the provincial governments, with the condition that on the latter question neither province could permit more immigration than it was able to absorb.

The Districts of Jerusalem and the Negev were to be under control of the

Central Government. Jerusalem's population was about evenly divided between Jews and Arabs, and the international interest in the city was great. The Negeb District was largely an uninhabited desert; its future was to be settled at a later date.

In a statement of policy by our two delegations, the British and the American, it was said:

"The plan offers to the Jews an opportunity to exercise a wide measure of control over immigration into one part of Palestine and to forward in the Jewish Province the development of the Jewish National Home. At the same time it offers to the majority of the Arabs of Palestine their own political institutions in an Arab province and freedom from the fear of further Jewish immigration into the province without their consent. It makes it possible to give practical effect to the principles of government enunciated in recommendation 3 of the Anglo-American Committee; and it offers a prospect of development towards self-government of which there is less hope in a unitary Palestine. It provides a means of segregating Jew and Arab to an extent which should substantially reduce the risk of a continuation of widespread violence and disorder in Palestine.

"In the long term the Plan leaves the way open for constitutional development either towards partition or towards federal unity. The association of representatives of the two Provinces in the administration of central subjects may lead ultimately to a fully developed federal constitution. On the contrary, if the centrifugal forces prove too strong, the way is open towards partition. The Provincial Plan does not prejudice this issue either way. The administering authority will be prepared to hand over the government to the people of the country as soon as the two communities express a common desire to that end and present an agreed scheme which will ensure its stable administration."²⁶

The area proposed for the Jews was smaller than that proposed for the Arabs, but it was immeasurably richer. To the Jews would go 85 per cent of all the citrus lands, almost all the industries, the deep water port and the railway, most of the coastline, practically all the water resources and virtually all the lands inhabited by Jews. In the Arab province of 830,000 people, there were only 15,000 Jews whereas in the Jewish province of 750,000 there was an Arab minority of 300,000.

In addition to giving the Jews a large measure of control over immigration

the Plan provided for the early transportation of the 100,000 from Europe to Palestine. Responsibility for the £70,000,000 cost of immigration of the 100,000 in two years, including the capital investment to provide employment for them, was accepted by the Jewish Agency. The British Delegation was to recommend to its Government that it accept responsibility for the £2,000,000 annual government deficit of the Arab provinces. The American Delegation was to propose to the President that he seek legislation for a \$50,000,000 loan for development projects in the Arab province and for a \$250,000,000 loan for development of the Middle East, including Palestine. As mentioned above, the President had already agreed to do this as a part of a solution to the problem of Palestine.

For obvious reasons, the London negotiations between the British and American representatives on this highly charged issue were being conducted in private. The two Delegations were to formulate a plan for presentation to their two Governments and to the Arabs and the Jews. The time for public discussion was to come after that presentation. Nevertheless, news of the nature of the plan being considered began to appear in the press midway through the negotiations. The stories correctly stated that provincial autonomy was being discussed, but their statements about the division of powers of the government and the division of land were in most cases inaccurate speculations.²⁷

When we arrived in London for our discussions with the representatives of the British government, there at once followed us a number of representatives of the Jewish Agency. I have had a good deal of experience with lobbies but this group started where those of my experience had ended. They maintained extremely close contact with our staff and got information from several experts on our staff which they were not entitled to receive. They were frequently in our headquarters and usually at the dining room where we took our meals. Two members of our staff became very close to the lobby and made critical statements of our report to the press when our report was finished but before it was submitted to

would ask the Export-Import Bank and/or the International Bank to make loans up to \$200,000,000 as a means of stimulating the economic life of the Middle East. The President was willing, also, as a part of the program for the 100,000 immigrants, to ask Congress for a grant-in-aid for Palestine of \$25,000,000 to \$50,000,000 to be spent for improving conditions of the Arabs there.

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The Anglo-American Committee's report, while very good in many respects, was quite general in form. This was perhaps due to the many compromises which had been necessary to ~~make~~ in order to attain unanimity among twelve men. For example, though recognizing the difficulties involved in the British Mandate over Palestine, which the Committee felt should be continued for the time being,

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of all the solutions proposed for Palestine.

Secretary of State James Byrnes, who was in Paris for the Peace Conference at the time we submitted our report to the President by cable, ⁱendorsed provincial autonomy, but in the face of the concerted attack on the Plan in the United States, the President decided that he would not support it. Mr. Herbert Morrison, on behalf of the British Government, nevertheless, presented the Plan to the House of Commons and arranged to negotiate it with both the Jewish Agency and the Arab High Authority. But the failure to get American support, which greatly weakened the British position, as well as the traditional reluctance of the Jews and Arabs to negotiate, caused the attempted negotiations to come to naught.

The problem then went to the United Nations, which sent an International Commission to Palestine to once again search for a solution. The Commission recommended partition, and its recommendation having been accepted by the General Assembly, Palestine was partitioned and the State of Israel came into being on May 15, 1948.²⁸

The problem is not settled today nor can one visualize its settlement in the foreseeable future. The military conflict which broke out ^tresulted in the ^{About 200,000 Arabs} pushing out of Palestine and making ^{them} refugees ^{of about 300,000 Arabs.} The United Nations, through its Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, has been attempting to solve this tragic problem, but with only moderate success because it is almost insuperable. On the other hand, the Clapp Report, written under the auspices of the United Nations and released in January, 1950, found that Israel could not be a viable state without extraordinary capital investments.²⁹

In the meantime, American Jewry is pouring vast sums of money into Israel and the American taxpayer is contributing to the development of the State of Israel through large Export-Import Bank loans and generous grants-in-aid. Moreover, contributions to Jewish Relief are deductible from income taxes, and so

the United States Treasury makes a large direct contribution to Israel. In the same degree that money is pouring in, Jewish immigrants from other countries in the Middle East are moving into Israel. Many have come from Yemen, where there is no refugee problem, and others from Arab states from which they have been driven out in retaliation for the ^{expulsion} driving of the Arabs ^{from} out of Palestine. It seems no longer to be a question only of the Jews of Europe who were victims of Nazi persecution, but Jews from other areas who, until the Palestine question became a serious one, lived in peace and prosperity throughout many countries of the Middle East.³⁰

The years succeeding our mission, with their military conflicts, ^{and} economic and political problems not only in Palestine but in the whole Near East, have confirmed in my mind the conviction that our Plan offered the best chance of a solution.

One must remember that our Plan called for increased immigration of Central European refugees to the United States, and despite the failure of our Plan, Congress later provided emergency quotas for displaced persons. Another special quota of 209,000 has just been provided by Congress.³¹ Also there was set up at the end of the war in the State Department a special section under an assistant secretary to endeavor to facilitate immigration of the homeless of Europe to South America. Our Plan also called for the British Government to request the dominions to aid in this regard.

But efforts of this kind do not fulfill the Zionist dream of a Jewish state in Palestine!

our Government

I have always felt that we rather badly let the British down by ~~our Government~~ not supporting the joint Report. Our Committee had gone to London with the basic points of an agreement approved by the President and the British had every reason to assume that when and if both Delegations had agreed on a report that it would receive the support of both Governments. The British had hoped to

We got word from President Truman that he would not stand behind our feelings. Averell Harriman, then Ambassador to London, was also in Paris at the time

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advise the House of Commons that the Report had the full backing of the American Government. Instead, Herbert Morrison had to go before Commons and get its approval of the Report, which he did, and then ~~to~~^{try} attempt to get acceptance of it by representatives of the Arabs and the Jewish Agency. It is easy to see how much stronger the position of the British Government would have been in its negotiations if the negotiations were based on a combined program of the British and American Governments. Prime Minister Clement ^AAtlee was in Paris at the time ~~and undertook to tell Atlee of the decision of the President.~~ I was glad that he was willing to undertake it rather than I.

Some members of the British group that had negotiated with us were in Paris also at the time. I must say they took the decision in a fine spirit.

Our Committee was instructed to consider in its report not only Palestine but "related problems." These problems were, of course, the relationship of a settlement of the Palestine ^{question} to American foreign policy in the whole of the Middle East. We kept this in mind during all of our studies and conferences with the British. Had all our recommendations been accepted I feel sure that not only would the aspirations of the Zionists for a home for Jewish refugees ^{have} been realized, but we would not have had the bloodshed that came later. Nor would we have had the ill-will of the Arab states, which are of such strategic importance in our "cold war" with the Soviets.

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It is said that it will be brought into play immediately after May 15, or after August 1 (date of final British departure), unless the fighting does not require full disclosure of the equipment available for use. Do we know the facts on this point fully, and in detail and accurately?

It is said that the Jews have youths of military age in Italy, North Africa, Germany, Yemen, France, Cyprus, all picked for prior immigration. It is said that there has been preliminary military education of many of these youths. Do we know how many of them there are, how soon they will get to Palestine; and, important for this inquiry, whether any of them can get in, and if so how many, despite a naval blockade that may be set up by American ships of war?

Do we know what are the facilities available in Palestine for arms manufacture, what new facilities are being built, what military supplies are waiting in South America and European countries?

Have we accurately gauged the Palestinian Jews' know-how and speed? This morning's New York Times dispatch reports that though the experienced British had estimated that it would take the Jews a week to clear the roadblocks on the TEL Aviv-Jerusalem road, Haganah did the job in a few hours.

Can we be sure of the British? Are they going to try for peaceful conditions in Jewish Palestine, to protect the investments by large British capital, already made and now in process of being greatly increased, in the chemical works, the electric power works, the fruit growing and shipping companies, etc? This morning's dispatch from London is to the effect that the Foreign Office recognizes that a Jewish State will be announced, and

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towards achievement of a peaceful settlement--it would necessarily be a compromise--and use all of the resources, material and spiritual, of its 58 members. If either side or both sides are bent on putting the issue to the test of war, it would be the duty of the Security Council to take steps to quarantine such a war, if it remains internal, or to smother it by overwhelming force if it develops into an "aggression or a threat to the peace" of the world. Those are the two alternatives that should be clearly set forth. If, as we are confident, it can be brought about that reason rules and the parties to the controversy decide to accept the temporary tutelage of the United Nations, an immediate Trusteeship should be set up to establish a government to rule the land and permit a peaceful evolution of its political and economic patterns under conditions of law and order.

Frank P. Corrigan

B File

Clark:

Please do not let anyone else
read this dynamite.

(Lowenthal)

WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES BEFORE THE PRESIDENT AT THIS MOMENT?

1. Secretary Marshall's attitude.

Last Saturday, May 8, at a conference in his office with Mr. Shertok, the Secretary was given a cable received by Mr. Shertok from Palestine, reporting an offer from an Arab Legion colonel representing King Abdullah; the offer was for an agreement between Abdullah and the Jewish State, to enable Abdullah, without Jewish interference, to take over the Arab portion of Palestine, while leaving the Jewish area to the Jews. Mr. Shertok's Washington representative privately reports that Secretary Marshall twice said: there is nothing I would like more than such an agreement between Abdullah and the Jews.

2. The contrary assumption, that the Jews will be swallowed by the Arabs two years from now, or at some future time.

That assumption whether it be regarded as a military judgment about the future or a simple prophecy, may be correct. But it may be incorrect. Who can say for sure? The best military judgment has at times been upset by actual events, as in the case of the prophecy about how long the Russians would be able to hold out against Hitler's armies. There may be facts not known about the Jews and Arabs, to wit:

(1) Arabs -- what will come of their internal rivalries, whether the Jews can play them off against each other, whether the Jews can scare off Arab troops and for how long, etc.

(2) Jews -- they are said to have heavy artillery and other equipment of such size that they have not dared to use it while the British troops are still there, lest the British try to seize this equipment.

B. File

Summary Of Palestine Problem.

The Palestine question has been so thoroughly gone over during the last regular session and the present special session that it is difficult to imagine anything new that might be advanced by either side. The Jewish claims fall into two categories as to their basic concepts: (1) Juridical, and (2) Revolutionary.

The legal claims stem first out of the Balfour Declaration. This was a political paper that promised the Jews a "home" where they might feel safe from persecutions from which they had for centuries been the victims. Closely examined, this does not constitute much grounds for the legal establishment of a sovereign Jewish state in Palestine. The Jews have read into it much more than it contains.

The second legal claim is based on the UN recommendation for partition and economic unity passed by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly on November 29, 1947. It is a stronger base on which to set up legally a sovereign state, but still not enough. That would require either the consent of the Arabs, who are in the majority in the present mandated territory, or the use of force by the UN to overcome their opposition. This concept was debated in the Security Council which refused to act--taking the position that there was no call upon the Council to use force, since no "aggression nor threat to the peace" was found. In both cases the Jews have read into the documents in the case more than they contained. The legal rights for the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state in Palestine are not clearly established. It seems quite obvious that they would lose in a free election to determine the issue. "Where does this leave them? They have organized a revolutionary army which is attempting to take over the territory by force. Here they are on solid ground following the good old Latin American pattern. But in order to take over they must win a war. This war for independence is being carried out against both the Mandatory Power, which is the recognized legal authority, and the Arab majority in the area. They are, in their present conduct, trying to stand on two stools and between the two are likely to fall to the ground. They should either take a legal position and try to work out the matter politically and peacefully or take the field openly as revolutionists who are out to seize power by force of arms.

The UN should have a thorough appreciation of these two basic facts and not let itself become involved by taking sides in an armed movement. If the Jews wish to obtain their ends by legal means, the UN would go along

that it cannot be stopped. It is privately reported that when Creech Jones called on Dr. Weizmann the other day to say goodbye, he talked about meeting soon in other circumstances, when the British and the Jewish State could sit down to arrange things together. There have been other such uses of language, in recent days, between high British officials and high Jewish representatives.

3. Are we trying to advise the Palestinian Jews as their friends, or are we seeking to embark on a course of opposition? Is our policy toward them simply one of friendship, or of neutrality or of force?

Our government has told the representatives of the Palestinian Jews that some time in the future the Arabs will overrun them, and that the Jews are being misled by their military successes to date; this advice was given privately.

Suppose the Jews in Palestine do not agree with this view. Suppose they base their action on their opinion, and contrary to the advice we give them. Are we then going to engage on a policy of threat, of pressure, and of effectuation of threats? Such threats were already made by Lovett to Nahum Goldmann, though the threats were only of the issuance of a White Paper attacking Jewish leaders.

It is important to analyze where the policy of threats may take us, assuming that the Jews do not accept our advice, proclaim a Jewish state, and do business with British, with Abdullah, and others, as equals.

4. Where will the policy of hostility or force lead us?

Our people at Lake Success, according to the news dispatches and to authenticated private reports as well, are frantically trying to line up the UN Aseembly against (1) the possibility of a Jewish State, (2) partition,

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(3) the resolution of the Assembly setting up partition, and (4) anything else, so as to cast some kind of illegality over the proclamation of a Jewish State.

How much further do we intend to go? Do we intend (a) to issue public denunciations of the Jewish Agency, or the Jewish State, or the Jewish leaders, and if so, will it be in the form of a formal White Paper, or informal press statements, or what?

(b) to threaten the imposition of economic sanctions on the Jewish State, if proclaimed? If so, what kind of sanctions? Denial of trade between the U. S. and Palestine? Incidentally, news dispatches say that the British are planning to save their present trade with Jewish Palestine, and increase it, at the same time that they increase their investments there. What are we to do about British business now in the chemical works at the Dead Sea, in the railways, in the electric works, in the banks, all of which will be vitally affected by economic sanctions imposed by our country?

(c) to send warships to blockade Jewish Palestine?

What will we do if ships seek to bring goods into Palestine? Or foodstuffs? A few weeks ago the Jewish Agency placed a contract for foodstuffs for three-months supply, in the amount of [£]1,500,000, with British interests, through Steele Brothers, the long-established factors for British Government interests in Palestine, Burma and elsewhere. What do we do with ships bringing in any of that food?

What do we do about immigrants being brought into Palestine while we blockade? If we stop the passenger ships from unloading, where do we put the passengers? On Cyprus? Will the British agree?

Who will guard the immigrants behind the barbed wire? American marines? Have we enough of them available? Who will feed the immigrants? With what?

What do we do about heavy machinery brought to Palestine, useful to Arabs as well as Jews, both for giving them jobs, and for giving them such useful things as additional horsepower, etc.

What do we do about ammunition and armament coming in ships? If we say this cannot come in, but other things can, do we search the ships?

What do we do about airplane freight coming into Jewish Palestine? Will we set up an air blockade? Have we the facilities there?

(d) to send troops to unseat the Jewish State? How long will we keep troops there? If any are killed, will it be by Jews or by Arab agents provocateurs? How will we know?

(e) to go to still further limits? How far, and of what nature?

Will we deem it advisable or inadvisable to ask Congressional approval of any of these steps, before we embark on them?

When President Truman said, at a press conference a few weeks ago that the President has power to send troops to Palestine (UN police duty to enforce a trusteeship was then under discussion), various newspapers said he had the power, but wisdom would dictate his first consulting Congress and getting its approval by vote.

How far are ^{we} going to become involved with UN, with other countries, with Congress, with the churches and nation-
country?

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1. The controversy over the creation of the State of Israel in 1947, the policies leading to this historic event and its implications in terms of explosive developments in the Middle East, have been the subject of thousands of books, articles and pamphlets as well as innumerable diplomatic exchanges among the great and small powers directly or indirectly interested in this problem. The following summary of events, it is hoped, will throw some light on the major factors leading to the creation of the State of Israel.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, assimilation of Jews in Western European countries and their acceptance within the social, cultural and political life of each nation resulted in an influx of Jews from Eastern Europe who sought a better life in Austria, Germany, France, England and the United States. The emigration of large numbers of Jews to Western Europe and their economic and commercial success resulted in a wave of racial tension and anti-Semitism which came to a climax, in the twentieth century, in the Nazi movement in Germany. Certain Jewish leaders, particularly Moses Mendelssohn (1729-36) and Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), alarmed at the process of assimilation in Western Europe, looked upon it as a threat to Jewish traditions and culture and took advantage of existing racial difficulties to preach the gospel of Jewish nationalism and to seek a solution to Jewish problems through the creation of a Jewish State. In 1896, Herzl wrote in his Der Judenstaat: "The Jews have but one way of saving themselves—a return to their own people and a return to their own land." Modern Zionism, with its political and nationalistic ambitions, aimed at the creation of a Jewish State, gained support from the oppressed European Jews and its first Congress, held in Basel in 1897, formalized the program which eventually led to the creation of the State of Israel. As yet not all the Jewish leaders agreed on Palestine as being their goal. The so-called Territorialist Zionists, led by Dr. Israel Zangwill, were willing to settle for a Jewish home regardless of its geographical location, while the Zionists proper, under Dr. Chaim Weizmann, argued in favor of a Jewish State in

Husein and Sir Henry McMahon see Hurewits, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 13-17. For additional information see G. Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York: H. Hamilton, 1938); P.L. Hanna, British Policy in Palestine (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942); Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. XXX, Cmd. 5974, 1939 and 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCXCV (1938-1939), 2032, 2769.

8. In 1917 the total population of Palestine was 600,000, of whom 13,000 (3%) were Jews. By 1922, owing to the opening of the gates to Zionist immigration, the number of Jews in the country had reached 33,790. The Arab agitation against the British policy provoked Mr. Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, to write his well-known "Churchill Memorandum" in which he reassured the Arabs that the Balfour Declaration was not intended to turn Palestine into a Jewish State and that Jewish immigration would be permitted to the extent justified by the economic capacity of Palestine. This, however, did not satisfy the Arabs and, moreover, Zionist immigration continued, so that in 1939, when the British government decided to impose restrictions by cutting it down to 75,000 more for the ensuing five years, the Jewish population of Palestine had reached 445,457, or almost one-third of the total population, which was at the time 1,501,693. For detailed statistical information on Palestine see the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1945, information paper No 20 (London: The R.I.I.A., 1946). See also Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 317-326. For the text of "Churchill Memorandum" see Hurewits, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 103-106.

9. As was stated before (Chapter V, note 6), the secret agreements of World War I provided^{ing} for the division of enemy territories among the victorious powers were in violation of public statements made by various leaders of the Allied Powers on "self-determination" and the "rights of small nations" during the war years. To find a legal formula through which the imperialistic ambitions of the victorious powers could be satisfied, Article 22 of the League Covenant was devised; this made

which recognized the Turkish Republic under Ataturk) made the Balfour Declaration an integral part of the British Imperial policy in the Middle East. The implementation of the Sykes-Picot Treaty through the legal device called the mandate system made Palestine a British Mandate, opened its gates to Zionist immigration and resulted in terrorist activities of both Arabs and Zionist Jews, which form the bloody history of Palestine throughout the mandate period.

During the Cairo Conference of 1921, called to plan the future course of the British Imperial policy in the Arab world, Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, carved out the autonomous state of Transjordan, reportedly over a bottle of brandy and a cigar, to satisfy the disgruntled Hashemite family of Sherif Hussein. Hussein's son Abdullah, was declared the ruler of the new state and his grandson, King Hussein, is currently ruling the area, which since 1947 has been called the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Thus, the Cairo Conference established a de facto basis for the division of Palestine into Jordan and Israel which was consummated in 1947. For more information see Mahum Sokolow, History of Zionism, 1600-1913, 2 Vols. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1919); H.M. Kallen, Zionism and World Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Co., 1921); O.I. Janowski, The Jews and Minority Rights, 1648-1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), and F.F. Andrews, The Holy Land under Mandate, 2 Vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931). For the texts of documents on British policy in Palestine and the creation of Transjordan see J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and the Middle East, 2 Vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956), Vol. II, pp. 103-111, 156-159.

2. The Hebrew University at Jerusalem was opened by Lord Balfour on April 1, 1925. For information on the University see Facts About Israel (Jerusalem: The Government Press Office, 1961), pp. 130-134.

3. Besides Uganda there were a number of other proposals for the settlement of Jews and the creation of an autonomous Jewish National Home. These ranged from the Island

of Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean to Mesopotamia, Sina and even Argentina. Dr. Herzl, even after being committed to Palestine through the decision of the Zionist Congress mentioned above, was still ready to consider the possibility of colonization in other areas. The split over Uganda resulted in the creation of the Jewish Territorial Organization (ITO) under the leadership of Dr. Zangwill; the purpose of ITO was to dissociate itself from the Zionist Organization and "...to acquire a territory on the basis of autonomy for those Jews who cannot or do not wish to remain in their present countries of residence." For detail see Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State, Harvard Middle Eastern Studies No. 3 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 152 ff.

4. Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a Russian born Professor of Chemistry at the University of Manchester, and Nahum Sokolow, a Russian born journalist and a member of the Zionist Executive Committee who had come to England in 1914, were the two leading Zionist spokesmen who were pressing to obtain the support of the British government for the Zionist cause. In March 1917 Sokolow went to Paris and Rome seeking endorsement of the Zionist program from France and Italy and he returned to London in June 1917 with a favorable letter from Jules Cambon, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. On July 18, 1917, Lord Rothschild submitted to the British Foreign Office the Zionist draft of a declaration of policy to be considered by the cabinet. After days of heated discussion, the draft was adopted in its revised form known as the Balfour Declaration and was part of a letter written by Sir Arthur to Lord Rothschild on November 2, 1917. The text of the letter was published in The Times of London on November 9, 1917. See Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 25-26.

5. In May 1917, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Arthur Balfour, paid a visit to the United States and tried to get the support of the American Government for the Zionist ambitions in Palestine. Sir Arthur discussed the question with Justice Brandeis, who was both a Zionist and a close adviser to the President. His attempt, supported by activities of leading American Zionists, brought favorable

response from such prominent officials as William J. Bryan, the former Secretary of State; Robert Lansing, currently Secretary of State; Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War; Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy; Col. Edward House; Norman Hapgood; and many influential members of the Congress. Even President Wilson showed enthusiastic support when, in the course of a discussion with Brandeis, Frankfurter and Wise, he referred to himself as a Zionist. Not being at war with the Ottoman Empire at the time, the President did not wish to make public his views, but on October 16, 1917, President Wilson instructed Colonel House to approve, on the part of the United States government, the Zionist draft declaration which was being considered by the British government. After the Declaration was issued, the Zionists concentrated their campaign on winning the support of other Allied governments; in this they were quite successful. France gave its formal approval on February 11, 1918 and Italy followed suit on February 23, 1918. On October 29, 1918, President Wilson gave his open support to the Declaration in a letter addressed to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise. The Congress gave its support to the Balfour Declaration through a joint resolution signed by President Harding on September 21, 1922. See Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs 3rd ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 77-93 and notes. For the text of the joint resolution endorsing the Declaration see Statutes of the United States: 1921-1922, Part I, p. 1012.

6. The term Zionism, as explained in note 1, refers to a definite political and nationalistic movement and, as the author states, cannot be equated with Judaism any more than the term Arab could be equated with the religion Islam. A number of Jews --both before and after the Declaration of Balfour,--have publicly opposed the Zionist movement. The grounds for opposition have not always been the same but public statements by anti-Zionist Jews ^{dict}contracted the contention of the Zionists that their political movement is identical with Judaism and the Jewish people in the world. See, for example, J.M.N. Jeffries, Palestine: The Reality (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939), pp. 141-147; Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 77 ff. and Rabbi Elmer Berger,

Who Knows Better Must Say So (New York: American Council for Judaism, 1955). When President Wilson finally gave his support to the Balfour Declaration (note 5, above), Dr. Chaim Weizmann called the action "one of the most important individual factors in breaking the deadlock created by the British Jewish anti-Zionists." Chaim Weizmann, Trial & Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann (New York: Harper, 1949), p. 208.

7. At the outbreak of World War I one of the aims of Arab nationalism was emancipation from Ottoman rule and Sherif Husein of Hejaz, the head of the Hashemite family and the Governor of Mecca, was one of the most enthusiastic leaders of the Pan-Arab movement. In February, 1914, a series of negotiations started between Abdullah, the second son of Husein, and Lord Kitchener, then British Agent and Consul General in Egypt, for British support of Arab national ambitions against the Ottoman government. Upon the Ottoman involvement in the war, the negotiations became the basis for the McMahon Agreement reached in a correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, acting on instruction of the British government, and Sherif Husein, which resulted in a military alliance between Arabs and the British. The Alliance provided for the formation of an Arab Army to fight against the Central Powers in return for which the British government promised to support the independence of the Arabs in the area bounded on the north by Turkey, on the east by the Iranian border down to the Persian Gulf and on the south by the Arab principalities of the Persian Gulf. As to the western boundaries, Husein demanded the Mediterranean and the Red Sea; but the British government, while accepting the Red Sea boundary, excluded the coastal belt of Syria from the pledge, for the French Government had sought this territory since 1860. The McMahon Agreement never went into effect and apparently the British government never intended to honor its obligations under it, for—apart from the Balfour Declaration of 1917—while the Arab side of the Agreement was being implemented, the British government was busy negotiating the secret Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916 (note 1, above), under which the area covered by the Agreement was divided between England and France. For the text of the letters exchanged between Sherif

Palestine—then a part of the Ottoman Empire. The Zionist Congress, which at first met annually and after 1901 every second year, received an offer from the British government in 1903 to permit the Jews to settle in the African territory of Uganda as an autonomous community within the British Empire. Both Hertzl and Zangwill favored acceptance but they were opposed by Dr. Weizmann, who successfully maneuvered against the Territorialists; the Congress declined the offer and Palestine became the official target of the Zionist Organization. During the years that followed the 1903 decision, the Zionist Movement undertook a world-wide campaign in order to bring more Jews into active participation in the movement and to gain political support from Western governments in general, and the British government in particular. Their campaign was without outward success until 1917. The beginning of World War I and the alliance between the Ottoman Empire and Germany marked a decisive turn of events in favor of the Zionist movement. The Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916 (see Chapter V, note 6), secretly negotiated between Britain, France and Tsarist Russia (made public and denounced by the Soviet government in 1917) divided the Ottoman Empire between the three powers, giving Syria and Lebanon to France, Constantinople and the Dardanelles, under certain conditions to Russia, and Iraq and Palestine to Great Britain. This was followed, on November 2, 1917, by the so-called Balfour Declaration in which Sir Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, wrote to Lord Rothschild on the sympathy of the British government with the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Palestine, with 97 per cent of its population Arab, was a part of the projected Arab State under the McMahon Correspondence (note 7, below) which was now being violated by the Balfour Declaration. In response to protests from Arab leader Sherif Husein, the British government issued a clarification in which National Home was distinguished from National State and the Foreign Office denied that the British government supported the creation of a Jewish National State. Nevertheless the endorsement of the Declaration by Italy, France and the United States, its acceptance at the San Remo Conference of April 26, 1920, and its inclusion in the projected Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which was aimed at the defeated Ottoman government (this was later replaced by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne,

the advanced countries of the West the caretakers of the inhabitants of the former enemy territories. This was attributed to the facts that these people were not, as yet, "able to stand by themselves" and "the well being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization." Under agreements concluded later between the Allied and Associated Powers the former enemy territories were classified into A, B, and C mandates in conformity with the categories mentioned in Article 22 of the *Great Britain* Covenant. See Parliamentary Papers, Vol. XI, Treaty Series No. 11, Cmd. 964, 1920, pp.11-12. For a scholarly discussion of the mandate system and its function during the years following the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty up to 1929, see Quincy Wright, Mandates under the League of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). For the full text of the Mandate Agreement on Palestine see the Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 151.

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10. See note 8, above.

11. The stormy history of Palestine throughout the mandate period and the hostile reaction of other Arab countries to the British policy in Palestine forced the British government to set up a number of commissions to find a solution to the problem of Palestine. Each commission turned in a voluminous report and then a White Paper would be issued by the British government. Thus, for example, after the Wailing Wall incident of August 1929, when the first large-scale attack on the Zionists was undertaken by the Arabs, the British government set up the Shaw Commission on Palestine. After investigation, the Commission attributed the incident "to Arab hatred of the Jews and the disappointment of Arab hopes for independence." This was followed by the Hope-Simpson Commission of 1930 upon whose report was based the Passfield White Paper of October 20, 1930, proposing a temporary stop to Jewish immigration and a ban on land purchase by Zionists in Palestine. There were a number of other commissions and White Papers, the most important of which was the Royal (Peel) Commission mentioned by the author, set up as a result of the crisis precipitated by the formation of the Arab High Committee in April 1936 and a general strike called by the Committee which

lasted from August to October of that year. The Peel Commission Report, published by the British government on July 8, 1937, proposed that, since Arabs and Jews could not possibly get along together, the mandate system ¹should be considered unworkable and abandoned in favor of a partition plan dividing Palestine into three states: (1) a Jewish State, comprising approximately one-third of the total territory; (2) an Arab State united with Transjordan²; and (3) a British mandated territory comprising a strip from Jaffa along the railway to Jerusalem, including both Jerusalem and Bethlehem. For the texts of documents and related papers see Abraham Tulin, Book of Documents, compiled and annotated on instructions of the Jewish Agency for Palestine (The Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1947), pp. 53-215.

12. The Peel Report was accepted by the World Zionist Congress on August 2, 1937, on the condition that it be revised in favor of the Zionist demands for more territory. A minority of the members of the Congress voted against it and it was generally condemned by the Zionists outside the Congress as a violation of the Balfour Declaration. The Permanent Mandate³ Commission adopted the Report on August 23 and the British government also stated its agreement to the partition plan. On September 3, 1937, the Pan-Arab Congress at Bludan, Syria, voted overwhelmingly against the Report and demanded the termination of the mandate, the establishment of an independent Arab State of Palestine allied with Great Britain, and end to Jewish immigration and the abandonment of the prospective Jewish National Home, instead of which the Jews would have the status of a guaranteed minority within the Arab State. The split of the Zionists over the Peel Report and its rejection by the Arabs resulted in the postponement of the partition plan and the creation of a new Commission on January 4, 1938, under Sir John Woodhead to study the Peel Report further. See The New York Times, October 6, 13, and November 10, 1938. ⁴For the texts of the documents see Tulin, op. cit., pp. 35-38, 49-52, 97-99 and 100-111 and The Monthly Summary of The League of Nations (Geneva, Switzerland: The Information Section, League of Nations, 1937), Vol. XVII, No. 8 (August, 1937), pp. 167-174. See also the following note.

18. See note 15, above.

19. See notes 11-12, above.

20. On August 31, 1945, President Truman sent a letter to Prime Minister Attlee in which he informed the Prime Minister of the recent mission of Mr. Earl G. Harrison to inquire into "the present condition and the future fate" of displaced Jews. In his report to the President, Mr. Harrison, former United States Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization and at the time American representative on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, recommended arrangements for immediate immigration of Jews in Germany and Austria to Palestine. The report was the basis of President Truman's insistence upon the admission of 100,000 new Jewish immigrants into the country. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (note 14, above) in supporting the Harrison recommendation for immediate admission of 100,000 new immigrants, also recommended (Recommendation No. 3) that Palestine "shall be neither Jew nor Arab" and that Arabs should not dominate Jews nor Jews Arabs. The recommendation urged the creation of a state in which the rights of both Jews and Arabs could be protected. Dr. Grady's reference to the proposal as the "Harris Plan" apparently refers either to the Harrison Report and the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry partially based on it, or to the report prepared by the British Civil Servant mentioned by the author. The Plan is officially known as the Grady-Morrison Proposals or the Morrison Plan. For the text of the Harrison Report see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIII, No. 334 (November 18, 1945), p. 790. For the text of the Grady-Morrison Plan see Tulin, op. cit., pp. 280-295. For a discussion of the plan see Hurewitz, op. cit., 272-273.

21. For an enlightening discussion of similar pressures used by the Zionist lobbyist to change the votes of those members of the United Nations who opposed partition see E. Roosevelt, op. cit., pp. 13-15.

22. See note 17, above.

- officials for support of the Baltimore Program, and in February, 1944, a resolution, was introduced into both Houses of Congress which, if passed, would have made the Baltimore Program the official policy of the United States government. It was the intervention of General Marshall, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that postponed the vote on the resolution at the last moment. General Marshall, on the basis of reports from the Middle East, informed Congressional leaders that such a resolution at that time would impair the war efforts of the Allied Powers. Despite this setback official Washington was generally in favor of the Zionist program and on August 31, 1945, President Truman sent a message to Prime Minister Attlee asking for immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine. In reply, the British Prime Minister proposed the formation of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (on Palestine) to study the matter. The American government accepted the proposal and the Committee completed its inquiry on April 20, 1946, and presented its Report to the two governments. See Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIV, No. 388 (May 13, 1946), pp. 733-737. For the text of the Report see The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, Department of State Publication 2536, Near Eastern Series 2 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946). See also Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 326-332. For the British and the American members of the Committee see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIII, No. 388 (December 16, 1945), pp. 958-959. See also note 20, below.
15. For the text of the executive order establishing the cabinet level committee discussed by the author see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIV, No. 364 (June 23, 1946), p. 1069-1090.
16. See Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XV, No. 372 (August 18, 1946), p. 334, and No. 380 (October 13, 1946), pp. 669-670.

17. The Grady Committee flew to London on July 10, 1946, and after negotiation with its British counterpart submitted its report to President Truman on July 24, 1946. The report, known as the Grady-Morrison Plan, provided for provincial autonomy leading ultimately to a bi-national federal state. This proved unacceptable to Mr. Truman. Mr. Truman rejected the proposal due to opposition of "members of the major political parties in the United States" and proposed substantial immigration of Jews into Palestine without waiting for a solution to the problem. ^{He} ~~We~~ pledged American assistance to make immigration possible. The President also supported the Zionist proposal for "the creation of a viable Jewish State in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine."

According to James Reston of The New York Times, Mr. Truman's Palestine policy was attributable to political considerations. Two Democratic candidates, Mr. Mead and Mr. Lehman, were campaigning for the two highest political posts in the State of New York. Mr. Mead was seeking the governorship and Mr. Lehman was after a seat in the United States Senate. The two candidates informed the White House that a statement favoring Zionism must be made if they were to win the election. On October 4, 1946, Mr. Truman issued the requested statement. Thus a vital question of foreign policy was decided on the basis of partisan political considerations. Mr. Bevin, the Labour Secretary for Foreign Affairs, subsequently deplored the fact that the Palestine issue had become the subject of local elections in the United States. According to C.L. Sulzberger of The New York Times, the British government was well on the way towards a solution of the Palestine problem on a cantonal basis "when President Truman upset the apple cart by making his speech demanding the immediate entry of 100,000 Jews." For Mr. Truman's rejection of the Grady-Morrison Plan see Basic Documents, pp. 816-817. For Mr. Bevin's statement see The New York Times, February 26, 1947. For an evaluation of Mr. Truman's policy see Kermit Roosevelt, "The Partition of Palestine: A Lesson in Pressure Politics", The Middle East Journal, Vol. II, No. 1 (January 1948), pp. 1-16. The views of Mr. Reston and Mr. Sulzberger are from The New York Times, October 7, 1946, and December 8, 1947, as cited by Roosevelt, op. cit. pp. 12-13.

13. The Woodhead Commission, after spending five months (April-August, 1938) in Palestine, reported to the British government that partition was impracticable. On November 9, 1938, the British government announcing the findings of the Woodhead Commission, abandoned the partition plan and called a Zionist-Arab Conference to discuss the Palestine problem in London. The Conference met in London in February, 1939 and lasted until March 17. Despite the efforts of non-Palestinian Arabs to effect a compromise, the Conference did not accomplish anything and closed on March 17 without reaching a settlement. This having failed, the British government issued its famous White Paper of May 17, 1939, which provided (1) an independent Palestine in which both Arabs and Jews would share in the government would be created within ten years; (2) during the transition both Arabs and Jews would be appointed as heads of government departments with British advisors; (3) after five years a constitution would be drafted providing for a Jewish Home; (4) immigration of Jews would be terminated within five years, during which period 75,000 new immigrants would be permitted to come into Palestine; and (5) the sale of new land to immigrants would be prohibited immediately. The British Parliament approved the plan on May 23, 1939, but it was rejected unanimously by the Zionists, as well as by the great majority of Arabs. The outbreak of World War II created a temporary armed truce which flared up in new fighting and acts of violence in 1945. For the text of the documents and a discussion of events see J.C. Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 212-226 and The Struggle for Palestine, (New York: Norton Book Co., 1950), pp. 67-111. See also Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 316-326.

14. During ~~the~~ World War II the world Zionist movement began gradually to shift its reliance for support from London to Washington. On May 11, 1942, the ~~American~~ Zionist Organization met in New York and adopted the so-called Baltimore Program presented to it by David Ben Gurion. The program called for the creation of a Jewish Army, the repudiation of the 1939 White Paper, and unlimited immigration into Palestine. Next the Zionists began to put pressure on Congressional leaders and high government

22. On April 2, 1947, the government of the United Kingdom requested the calling of a special session of the General Assembly to consider the entire problem of Palestine. The General Assembly met on April 28 and May 15, 1947, and set up a United Nations Special Committee on Palestine composed of eleven members (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia) under the presidency of the Swedish delegate. The Committee was given "the widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine," and to report its recommendations, not later than September 1, 1947, to the regular session of the General Assembly. The Committee completed its work by September, 1947 and presented two plans for the settlement of the Palestine problem to the General Assembly. Both plans recommended the establishment of an independent and economically unified Palestine at an early date but there were sharp differences on other matters. The majority plan, recommended by seven members of the Committee (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay) recommended the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state with the city of Jerusalem internationalized and administered by the United Nations. The minority plan, proposed by India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, advocated a federated state of Palestine composed of two autonomous states, Jewish and Arab, and recommended that immigration into the Jewish section be permitted for three years with a committee formed of three Jewish, three Arab and three United Nations representatives determining the number of immigrants in accordance with the absorptive capacity of the Jewish State. The Arabs favored the minority plan while the Zionists expressed willingness to accept the majority plan. On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly adopted the majority plan with some modifications. The Palestinian Arabs, supported by all the Arab states, refused to recognize the partition plan. The Zionists, accepting the United Nations decision, created the independent State of Israel on May 14, 1947, the day when the British mandate over Palestine expired. The United Nations documents on Palestine are too numerous to be cited here. For a summary of the proceedings at the special session of the General Assembly convened at the request of

the United Kingdom see The Yearbook of the United Nations: 1946-1947 (Lake Success, N.Y.: U.N. Department of Public Information, 1947), pp. 276-303. For proceedings at the regular sessions of the Assembly (September-November 1947) and a summary of the majority and minority reports of U.N.S.C.O.P. and the final decision to partition Palestine see The Yearbook of the United Nations: 1947-1948, pp. 16, 27-28, 30, 227-281, 307, 402-451, 552, 622 and 917.

23. See the United Nations, Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Final Report of the UN Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, UN Doc. AAC 25/6, Dec. 28, 1949.

24. On February 16, 1956, the Special Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Judiciary Committee was empowered to study the problem of refugees and make the necessary recommendations to the Senate. Subsequent to the report prepared by the subcommittee, the United States Congress, on March 2, 1957, authorized the Department of Justice to make available visas to displaced persons who qualified under the provisions of the Refugee Relief Act of Congress. See Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with the Emigration of Refugees and Escapees, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 1st Sess., 1957, Report No. 129, pp. 1 ff. See also Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Sess., 1957, CIX, part 3, p. 2954.

May 1, 1946.


MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE MATT CONNELLY:

Dear Matt:

The President may be interested in a conversation I had with Justice Frankfurter about midnight last night on the Palestine report.

Justice Frankfurter, as you probably know, is perhaps the most prominent supporter of Palestine in public life today among the Jews, and has been for many years. The great Zionist leader in this country and in the world, for many years, was Justice Louis D. Brandeis. Frankfurter and Brandeis had been intimate friends for many, many years. Frankfurter said to me, after reading the report, "I have only one regret". My heart sank a little bit and then Frankfurter continued, "My regret is that Justice Brandeis did not live to see this report. He would have called it a miracle". Then Frankfurter launched into a tirade against Silver and the other Zionist leaders who, he says, prefer a Jewish State on paper rather than doing something real for human beings.

I asked Justice Frankfurter if he had any objection to my quoting him on this and he said he did not and he would be glad to have me do so. You may be certain that I will use this to the limit with our friends in New York the next couple of days.



DAVID K. NILES
Administrative Assistant
to the President